

UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

VOL. LXXII, 3

AUG 14 1951

WHOLE No. 287

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AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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JULY, 1951

BALTIMORE 18, MARYLAND
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

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The *American Journal of Philology* is open to original communications in all departments of philology, and especially in the field of Greek and Roman studies. It is published quarterly. Four numbers constitute a volume, one volume each year. Subscription price, \$5.00 a year, payable in advance (foreign postage 25 cents extra); single numbers, \$1.50 each.

Articles intended for publication in the Journal, books for review, and other editorial communications should be addressed to the editor, Henry T. Rowell; proof should be returned to the secretary, Evelyn H. Clift, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore 18, Maryland.

Contributors are entitled to receive twenty-five copies of their respective contributions free of charge. Additional copies will be supplied at cost.

Subscriptions, remittances, and business communications should be sent to

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS, Baltimore 18, Md.

The contents of the *American Journal of Philology* are indexed regularly in the *International Index to Periodicals*.

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1911, at the postoffice at Baltimore, Maryland, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917. Authorized on July 3, 1918.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY J. H. FURST COMPANY, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. LXXII, 3

WHOLE No. 287

THE PROBLEM OF CRATYLUS.

Cratylus of Athens, son of Smicrion,¹ has come down into history as a Heraclitean²—a believer in the flux of all things, a noteworthy influence on the youthful Plato, and an extremist who thought it impossible to step into the same river even once and who finally abandoned speech and resorted to pointing. That he was a Heraclitean is shown, one is told, by Plato's dialogue *Cratylus*; that he was an extreme Heraclitean is shown by two mentions of him in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.³ There is no other evidence for Cratylus than this: later references, in Diogenes Laertius, III, 6, in the commentators on Aristotle, and in Proclus' commentary on the *Cratylus*, are all patently dependent upon either Plato or Aristotle.

The main purpose of this paper is to show that contrary to the general assumption Plato does *not* depict Cratylus as a convinced Heraclitean. To this demonstration is appended a consideration of some of the difficulties inherent in the combination of the Platonic with the Aristotelian account of Cratylus.

Cratylus appears in Plato only in the dialogue which bears his name—a dialogue of which the date and purpose have been the

¹ This can be inferred from Plato, *Cratylus*, 429E and 348B.

² This term is used purely for convenience; I do not propose to discuss here either the accuracy of Plato's picture of Heraclitus as a believer in flux, or the hypothetical existence of an actual sect of "Heracliteans."

³ Aristotle mentions him once apart from this, at *Rhet.*, I 16, 1417 b 1. There he merely quotes a remark of the Socratic Aeschines that Cratylus used to wave his hands and hiss while talking. This information seems to refer to a physical idiosyncrasy and to have no relation to Cratylus' ideas: see p. 244 below.

subject of constant discussion. As for the first, I believe that the old view that the *Cratylus* is an exploratory dialogue belonging to the first decade of Plato's literary activity has been satisfactorily discredited by M. Warburg,⁴ who on stylistic and other grounds attributes the *Cratylus* to the period of the *Theaetetus*. However, it is the purpose of the dialogue which is of more immediate relevance here. Beginning with a discussion of the natural or artificial origin of names, it proceeds to a long etymological excursus by Socrates which is mainly jocular in intention. At the end of the dialogue Socrates declares that knowledge does not depend upon names, nor can its objects be the transient contents of the phenomenal world, but that knowledge is of "the beautiful itself, the good itself, and all such things" (439C). This last is the positive conclusion of the work, yet it is the discussion of the origin of names which is the main theme; and into this discussion the Heraclitean view of the world as flux is introduced. Cratylus, who supports the natural validity of names against Hermogenes' belief in their artificial origin, accepts from Socrates a Heraclitean argument for this natural validity, and is commonly written down by modern critics as a Heraclitean who also had ideas on speech and words.⁵

Yet if the dialogue is examined closely, and without preconceptions derived from Aristotle's treatment of Cratylus as a Heraclitean and nothing else, it will be seen that Cratylus is first and foremost a protagonist of the natural validity, ὁρθότης, of names; thus at 427E he describes this problem as ὁ δὲ δοκεῖ ἐν

⁴ "Zwei Fragen zum Kratylos," *N. Philol. Unters.*, V (1929). Warburg's thesis was violently criticized by von Arnim, "Die sprachliche Forschung," *Wien. Sitzb.*, CCX (1929), and is by no means universally accepted, e.g. not by Goldschmidt, *Essai sur le Cratyle* (Paris, 1940), p. 33, n. 7.

⁵ So e.g. O. Apelt, *Kratylos* (1922), p. 2: "um so sicherer ist, was wir aus unserem Dialog erfahren, das weiterhin seine Schule (sc. Heraclitus'), zu der Kratylos gehörte, eine Sprachtheorie vertrat, die sich ganz auf des Heraklits Bewegungslehre gründete." V. Goldschmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 32 ff., deals at some length with the question of the historical Cratylus without solving the real difficulties or breaking any new ground, but has useful remarks on the linguistic views of Democritus and Antisthenes (pp. 16-20). Other recent writers on the dialogue have confined themselves chiefly to the elucidation of Plato's theory of language, and have been content to accept the conventional view of Cratylus: see Goldschmidt's bibliography.

τοῖς μέγιστον εἶναι. It is *Socrates* who introduces the Heraclitean idea of flux, and this before Cratylus has properly entered the conversation; the latter accepts the idea only because he has been misled by Socrates into thinking that it supports his own theory about names. When Socrates goes back on his tracks and removes this apparent support Cratylus is left confusedly and futilely clinging to the Heraclitean view, which Socrates had apparently justified by so many persuasive etymologies. Thus the dialogue does not reveal Cratylus as a convinced Heraclitean, but as a convinced believer in the natural validity of names who is led to accede, mistakenly and perhaps temporarily, to the theory of universal flux. This contention is supported by the detailed analysis of the *Cratylus* which follows—an analysis which is necessarily selective and therefore to some extent subjective. Not all the convolutions of the argument are followed up, and many transient concessions by Cratylus are passed by; it is hoped that the total picture is a fair one, but the reader can only satisfy himself about this by referring to the dialogue itself. He should be warned that two passages (440C-D, and Cratylus' remark at 440D-E, ἀλλά μοι σκοποῦμένῳ κτλ.) are given a new interpretation on which the present thesis largely stands or falls, and should therefore be examined especially critically.

At the opening of the dialogue Hermogenes and Cratylus have decided to refer an argument to Socrates. Hermogenes says (383A): "Cratylus here, Socrates, says that there is a naturally existing correctness of name for each of the things that are (ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα εἶναι ἐκάστω τῶν ὄντων φύσει πεφυκυῖαν); and that this is not a name, whatsoever people call a thing by mutual agreement, uttering for it a piece of their own voice, but that there exists some correctness of names, both for Greeks and for barbarians, the same for all. So I ask him if Cratylus is in truth his name, and he agrees . . . (384). And when I ask and am eager to know whatever he means, he makes nothing clear and dissembles toward me, claiming to have some private idea of his own as though he knew all about it—which, if he wished to speak it out, would make me too agree and share his views. . . ." ⁶ Socrates undertakes to examine the problem, and Hermo-

⁶ This "private idea" of Cratylus is not revealed in the dialogue, and it must be assumed that it is pure humbug. It is not the theory of

genes, who is the respondent for the first and greater part of the dialogue, states his own position (384C-D): "For my part indeed, Socrates, I have frequently talked both with Cratylus here and with many others, yet am unable to be persuaded that there is any other correctness of names than compact and agreement." Hermogenes is led by Socrates to profess a subjectivist view (385D): ΣΩ. ὃ ἂν ἄρα ἕκαστος φῇ τῷ ὀνόμα εἶναι, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἕκαστῳ ὄνομα; 'EPM. Ναί. Yet he denies that he really agrees with Protagoras. Socrates now leads him to admit to some sort of natural validity of names: naming is an action which has some sort of reality (387D), names were devised by some lawgiver or namemaker who had the ability "to put the name which exists by nature for each thing into his sounds and syllables," just as the shuttle-maker looks to the task which the shuttle has to perform, and to the essential nature of Shuttle, to determine what shape to give it. Socrates hints that this concession to Cratylus' view is dialectical (indeed it appears to involve a gross *petitio principii*), yet he admits, apparently seriously, that (391A) "so much already is apparent beyond our previous assumptions, both that the name does have *some* correctness by nature and that not every man has the ability to apply it correctly to any object." The next task is to determine the character of this "correctness." After considering the difference between divine and human names in Homer, Socrates examines and finds appropriate some of the proper names of mythology, professing that he is "inspired" by Euthyphro; the names of deities are treated next, then words like *δαίμονες* (derived by Socrates from *δαήμονες*). At 401C *οὐσία* is described as having the dialect variants *ἐσσία* and *ὠσία*: the second of these is connected with *ὠθεῖν*, and Heraclitus is mentioned for the first time (401 D): ὅσοι δ' αὖ "ὠσίαν" [*sc. λέγουσιν*] σχεδόν τι αὖ οὔτοι καθ' Ἡράκλειτον ἂν ἡγοῖντο τὰ ὄντα ἰέναι τε πάντα καὶ μένειν οὐδέν (Hermogenes is still respondent; Cratylus has no part in this conversation). This derivation allows Socrates to see a "swarm of wisdom" (*σμῆνος σοφίας*, an extravagant phrase which warns us, but not Cratylus, not to take what follows too seriously): "I seem to spy Heraclitus saying certain ancient words of wisdom,

flux, for Cratylus simply accepts this from Socrates and does not profess to have held such a view himself.

simply things from the time of Cronus and Rhea, which Homer too said. *Herm.* What do you mean by this? *Soc.* Heraclitus says somewhere that all things move and nothing remains still, and likening the things that are to the flux of a stream he says that you would not step twice into the same river (402A: λέγει πον Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης). . . . Do you think that he who gave the names 'Cronus' and 'Rhea' to the ancestors of the other gods had anything different in mind from Heraclitus? . . . Observe then that these names agree with each other and all tend toward the words of Heraclitus." Socrates does not pursue this intuition further until 411C, where he remarks that the old name-givers were like "the majority of the wise men of today, who are always becoming dizzy through frequently revolving in their search for the nature of existing things, and then it appears to them that the objects are revolving and in motion," not themselves. For, Socrates enquires of Hermogenes, "perhaps you did not notice that in the case of what we were just talking about the names were applied to the objects altogether as though these were in motion and flowing and becoming?" This contention is illustrated from moral terms, and it is discovered that "good" words contain the idea of motion, "bad" words that of rest and hindrance. At 422C Socrates becomes serious again and attempts to fulfill his promise of 391A, to determine the character of whatever correctness adheres to names: they are found to *imitate* the things for which they stand, through the natural associations of letters and sounds—thus iota and rho suggest movement, delta and tau, rest. Here Cratylus is brought into the discussion to replace the confused Hermogenes, who withdraws with a reiterated complaint about Cratylus' obscurity in his defence of the correctness of names. The latter admits (428B) to having "both investigated such things in person and learned from others," and to Socrates' injunction: "If you have anything better to say, enrol me also as one of your pupils in the correctness of names," he replies: "Perhaps I *will* make you a pupil." Neither remark should be taken too seriously, yet Cratylus had clearly devoted a more than amateur attention to this study, and it is not at all impossible that, even at the period represented in the dia-

logue, he was embarking upon the career of a professional philologist.

Cratylus declares that he has nothing to add to Socrates' treatment of names, which had after all reached the (to Cratylus) satisfactory conclusion that they have a kind of natural *ὀρθότης*.⁷ Socrates however returns to the attack, and to his question (429B): "Are then all names correctly assigned?" Cratylus replies: "As many as *are* names" (*ὅσα γε ὀνόματα ἔστιν*). This involves the view that false utterance is impossible because it means saying that which is not, and that which is not cannot exist—a view emphasized in a slightly different form by Parmenides⁸ and the Eleatics, but one which was not exclusively their prerogative and was commonly held by sophists and others until Plato's final unmasking of the predication problem in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. Cratylus develops this argument by asking in true Parmenidean style: "How could anyone, saying that which he says, not say that which is" (*τὸ ὄν*, which also has the connotation "that which is true")? Against this argument Socrates brings up his theory that names are imitations of things; false names are simply bad imitations—to which Cratylus is eventually (431A) forced to agree. He also agrees with the earlier argument that names resemble things because their elements, i. e. letters, have their own separate associations. Under pressure his assertions become more extreme, and at 435D he says: "Whosoever knows the names knows the objects too." To meet Socrates' objection that the original name-giver may just have misjudged the nature of the objects he adduces a fresh, non-Eleatic argument, which represents his first positive championship of the theory of flux originally mentioned by Socrates: (436B-C) ". . . but it is necessary that he who gave the names did so in full knowledge; otherwise, as I keep on saying, they would not be names at all. And let this be your greatest proof that the name-giver was not balked of the truth: in this case his names would not all have been so consistent—or did you not

⁷ Contrast what A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, p. 84, has to say about this attitude: "Cratylus now replaces him (*sc.* Hermogenes) as interlocutor. He is delighted with all that Socrates has said—no doubt because Socrates has professed to find Heracliteanism embodied in the very structure of language—and thinks it could hardly be bettered."

⁸ Cf. Parmenides, fr. 5 (Diels-Kranz); fr. 8, 8; fr. 8, 34.

notice that you yourself said that all names were formed in the same way and to the same end" (*κατὰ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτόν*)? The reference is, of course, to the "flowing" etymology of good words, the "static" etymology of bad words; but it is the *fact* of a consistency in names, rather than their consistent content, which interests Cratylus here. Socrates replies very much to the point, that consistency in conclusions is no proof of the correctness of their premises; if the initial assessment of objects by the name-giver was wrong, then the consistency of the names assigned to them is not particularly significant; all it tells us is that the name-giver had an orderly mind. Before Cratylus has time to comment on this argument—and he would surely have maintained that the whole system of names cannot be wrong, otherwise there would be no names at all and no significant speech—Socrates continues that in any case he doubts whether names really are consistent (436E): "Let us review our previous discussion. Names, we say, indicate reality to us, with the implication that everything is moving and flowing. Do you think that this is what they show? *Crat.* Very much so, and they certainly indicate it correctly" (*πάνν σφόδρα, καὶ ὁρθῶς γε σημαίνει*). Cratylus' vehemence here is surely due to his determination to cling to an argument of which he is rather proud, and which he still thinks can save his belief in the natural correctness of names in spite of Socrates' warning of the fallaciousness of the argument from consistency. Perhaps sensing obstinacy, Socrates proceeds to destroy the consistency which he himself had so laboriously demonstrated; examples are given of etymologies which suggest not universal flux but universal rest, and Socrates concludes: "I think one would find many other names too, if one took the trouble, which would lead one to the opposite opinion, that the name-giver indicated objects not as in motion but as stationary." He is of course merely toying with the unfortunate Cratylus, who objects that nevertheless *most* names (of those which had been examined) indicate motion, to which Socrates answers that absolute *ὁρθότης* does not rest with a majority: if the argument from consistency has to be used, then at any rate all names must tell the same story. Eventually (438C) Cratylus remembers to assert that one or other of the opposed classes are not names at all, in other words that all true names do consistently give the same picture of reality; but he

does not here seem certain which class should be chosen. At this point Socrates becomes serious again and suggests that knowledge is to be acquired not from names, as Cratylus thought, but from things themselves, of which names are more or less bad imitations. Cratylus concedes this with a hesitant *Φαίνεται* (439B), and Socrates proceeds to the following important question: "Consider, my excellent Cratylus, what I often dream of. Are we to say that the beautiful itself and the good itself and each of such things are anything, or not?—I think so, Socrates.—Then let us consider *that*, and not whether a certain face is beautiful, or any such thing, and whether all these things seem to be in flux; but shall we say that the beautiful itself is not always of the kind which it is?" Cratylus is not willing to say this, in fact at this point he agrees with everything that Socrates says; probably the reason is that Plato is subordinating the dramatic purpose of the dialogue to the clear and vital statement by Socrates of the theory of Forms⁹—perhaps the first statement in the dialogues, in point of time, in which the epistemological argument is explicitly defined. This occurs a few lines later at 440A: "But in addition neither would it (*sc.* that which changes) be known by anyone; for at the instant when the potential knower approached, it would become something else and different in character, so that its nature and state could no longer be known . . . but it is not even reasonable to say that knowledge exists, Cratylus, if all things are changing and nothing stays still." On the other hand, Socrates continues, if there is such a thing as knowledge and the stable realities which can be its objects, then one is obliged to deny the Heraclitean thesis that *all* things are changing. The two alternatives being thus outlined Socrates emphasizes the necessity for a choice between them. The correct interpretation of the passage which follows is not so simple as it appears. Socrates mentions (i) the belief that all things flow, and (ii) the belief that names are correct (from which Cratylus' agreement with Socrates' postulation of Forms *appears* to proceed); but it is not immediately clear how he relates these two ideas. The Greek is as follows (440C-D):
ταῦτ' οὖν πότερόν ποτε οὕτως ἔχει ἢ ἐκείνως ὥς οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτόν τε λέγουσι καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, μὴ οὐ ῥᾶδιον ἢ ἐπισκέψασθαι, οὐδὲ πᾶν νοῦν

⁹ So Goldschmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 176, n. 2.

ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου, ἐπιτρέψαντα ὀνόμασιν αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν
θεραπεύειν, πεπιστευκότα ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς θεμένοις αὐτά, δισχυρίζεσθαι
ὥς τι εἰδότα (καὶ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καταγιγνώσκειν) ὥς οὐδὲν
ὑγιὲς οὐδενὸς ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ κεράμια ρεῖ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ
κατάρρῳ νοσοῦντες ἄνθρωποι οὕτως οἶεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακείσθαι,
ὑπὸ ρεύματός τε καὶ κατάρρου πάντα [τὰ] χρήματα ἔχεσθαι. ἴσως μὲν
οὖν δῆ, ὦ Κρατύλε, οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως δὲ καὶ οὐ. (The Oxford text
of Burnet has commas after οὐδενός and εἰδότα, and no paren-
thesis; otherwise it is as above). I propose the following as the
correct translation:

Whether these things are thus, or in the way that Hera-
clitus' entourage and many others say, is perhaps not easy to
determine; nor perhaps is it the characteristic of a sensible
man that,¹⁰ once having entrusted to names himself and the
care of his soul, having confidence in¹¹ them and their
assignors, he should assert as though in full knowledge (and
thus condemn both himself and reality) that there is no
sound part of anything but that all things flow like leaky
pots, and just like men suffering from running noses that
he should think that things too are so disposed—that all
things are gripped by flux and catarrh. Now perhaps,
Cratylus, these things are so; but perhaps again they are not.

The construction is δισχυρίζεσθαι ὥς τι εἰδότα . . . ὥς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς
οὐδενός <ἐστι>. δισχυρίζεσθαι, καταγιγνώσκειν, οἶεσθαι, are the three
infinitives of the accusative and infinitive subject-clause; κατα-
γιγνώσκειν, although grammatically parallel with the others, is
explanatory and subordinate in sense; I have therefore set its
clause in parentheses.

According to this translation the thing which "condemns both
himself and reality" is not simply that a man should believe that
"there is no sound part of anything, but that all things flow":
it is the fact that he holds this belief simultaneously with the
other irreconcilable belief in the natural validity of names. It is

¹⁰ Accusative and infinitive as subject-clause: cf. e.g. Plato, *Apology*,
29A: τὸ γὰρ θάνατον δεδιέναι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα.

¹¹ πιστεύειν in Plato always means "have confidence in" (with the
dative). The sense "entrust something to something" does not occur in
Plato; otherwise it might be possible to translate: ". . . having turned
himself over to names, and having entrusted his soul to them and their
assignors to care for . . .," which would do away with the somewhat
unusual asyndeton between ἐπιτρέψαντα and πεπιστευκότα.

the combination of two such beliefs which, according to Socrates, would be the mark of a fool. If things are always changing then the φύσει . . . ὁρθότης which names are said to have is destroyed; if names do have such an ὁρθότης then the objects which they represent cannot always be changing.

This is not the conventional interpretation of the passage. According to other translators (and e.g. the paraphrase by Shorey, *What Plato Said*, p. 267), Socrates is simply telling Cratylus to stop attaching any importance to the apparent presence of the flux-idea in etymologies; it is the belief in mere names which by itself is the characteristic of a fool, for it leads to a view of the world—that all is flux—which is quite impossible. Three well-known translations are given below, all of which lead to this interpretation, and I know of no other translation which avoids this fault.

Jowett

. . . and no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far trust names or the givers of names as to be confident of any knowledge which condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he will not believe that all things leak like a pot . . .

Apelt (*Krat.* 131)

. . . und es steht einem vernünftigen Menschen schlecht an die Sorge für das Heil seiner selbst und seiner Seele von den Worten abhängig zu machen. Das führt nur dazu, im Vertrauen auf sie und auf die Namengeber sich dreist als ein Weisen anzugeben und so über sich zugleich wie über die Dinge abzuurteilen, als gebe es nichts Gesundes an irgend einem Ding, sondern alles fliesse wie in reissender Strömung¹² . . .

H. N. Fowler (Loeb ed.)

. . . but surely no man of sense can put himself and his soul under the control of names, and trust in names and their makers to the point of affirming that he knows anything; nor will he condemn himself and all things and say that there is no health in them, but that all things are flowing like leaky pots . . .

These translators all get into difficulties with δυσχερίζεσθαι ὥς τι εἶδота . . . καταγιγνώσκειν, and their attempts seem to fall short of total accuracy; indeed it is an interesting speculation what Jowett and Fowler at any rate thought the construction actually was.

Now whether or not the Greek can be made to mean anything like any of these translations, such an interpretation is intrinsically improbable. Having carefully outlined the choice between the views that all things flow, and that beauty itself, etc. exist, and having asserted that this choice is not easy, Socrates is

¹² Reading, most improbably, χειμάρρα for κεράμια.

extremely unlikely to have destroyed his show of objectivity by prejudging the issue and saying that the flux-view necessarily involves condemning oneself and reality, in short that it is quite wrong. It is clear of course that this is Socrates' own opinion, and that he deliberately ridicules the idea of universal flux with his catarrh-simile; but he would hardly *formally* reject one alternative within the limits of the very sentence in which the alternatives are formally stated, and immediately before a formal recapitulation of the possibility of choice between the alternatives ("perhaps these things are so; but perhaps again they are not." This type of phrase in Plato is usually intended to carry the emphasis on the second member; nevertheless, formally it expresses the possibility that either of two alternatives may be true).

To recapitulate my argument on 440C-D: Socrates here outlines two alternatives: either (a) things such as knowledge, the knower, the known, the beautiful, the good, exist and are unchanging; or (b) the Heraclitean view that all things are constantly changing is true. He then adds a rider addressed particularly to Cratylus, that a sensible man could not believe both (a) and (b) at the same time—which is just what Cratylus is inclining to do: for a belief in the natural correctness of names involves (as Plato really sees, and as he argues elsewhere) a belief in certain abiding common qualities to which some class-name can be attached. These qualities come under (a) and are irreconcilable with (b). Socrates makes it clear that Cratylus has been led to accept (b) in defence of his theory of names, whereas in fact this theory should logically lead him to accept (a). The whole passage is an *argumentum ad hominem* and does not suggest that Socrates himself agrees finally with the belief in names.

Cratylus however fails to see the point of Socrates' warning, and to his injunction to "consider well and manfully, and not accept lightly—for you are still young and in your prime; and if, on consideration, you make a discovery, give me also a share in it," he replies as follows (440D-E): "Yes, I will do so. Yet be well assured, Socrates, that not even now am I unreflecting, but to me as I deliberate and exert myself it appears to be much more in the way that Heraclitus said" ('Αλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. εὖ μέντοι ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ νυνὶ ἀσκέπτως ἔχω, ἀλλὰ

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μοι σκοπουμένῳ καὶ πράγματα ἔχοντι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκείνως φαίνεται ἔχειν ὥς Ἡράκλειτος λέγει). So, after one more trivial exchange, the dialogue ends. Now Cratylus' profession of adhesion to Heraclitus is almost invariably¹³ taken as referring to the time before the dialogue takes place: Cratylus was a Heraclitean and here he says so. Yet this appears totally to disregard the *present* participles in the passage just quoted, σκοπουμένῳ and ἔχοντι, which, taken with the present tense of the main verb φαίνεται, must mean that these activities are contemporary. If Cratylus really meant that he had *in the past* (i. e. before the time of the dialogue) devoted, and was continuing to devote, careful attention to the Heraclitean view, we should have not present but perfect participles. The phrase ἀσκέπτως ἔχω is neutral and can either mean σκοποῦμαι or ἔσκεμμαι, but the former must be the case in view of the present forms which follow. Cratylus is therefore referring to the active consideration which he has been devoting to the problem during the dialogue itself, and especially during the formulation by Socrates of the alternatives. The present tenses, admittedly, logically do not preclude previous consideration continuing into the present, but in the absence of positive evidence and in view of the general probabilities of the case his adoption of the Heraclitean view seems to be a recent and perhaps a transient affair; at least an opinion reached in so shallow and unthinking a manner could be abandoned just as quickly.

The foregoing examination of the dialogue has reached the conclusion that Cratylus is not portrayed there as a convinced and established Heraclitean, but as a young man whose primary interest is the origin and validity of names, who grasps eagerly at the hypothesis proposed by Socrates, that the correctness of names may be shown by the fact that they all seem to point to a single cosmic theory (that all things flow), and who clings to this hypothesis, which he had welcomed so warmly, even when it has been discredited by Socrates and the irreconcilability of the Heraclitean view with Cratylus' belief in the natural correctness of names has been clearly shown. At first sight it is surprising that the dialogue should end with one of the main participants clinging to a quite untenable position, even though Socrates has

¹³ M. Leky, *Plato als Sprachphilosoph*, p. 82, translates correctly: " . . . aber indem ich darüber ernsthaft nachdenke, scheint es mir. . . ."

hinted at further discussion of the question with Cratylus. Dramatically, however, the ending is not without point. Cratylus has appeared in the earlier part of the work as an obstinate dogmatist who refused to expand or support his contentions at the request of Hermogenes. In the conversation with Socrates he is perhaps no more obstinate than other respondents in other dialogues, until the very end; but in gullibility he comes well up to the standard of most of Socrates' victims. It is by no means contrary to human nature that a young man of this type should reach a state of confusion in which he refuses to think clearly and merely reiterates with increasing vigour his belief in what at first appeared to be a positive proof of his primary contention.

At this point it is worth considering the attempts of orthodox interpreters of the *Cratylus* to solve the dilemma which confronts them: how could an extreme Heraclitean, like Cratylus as he appears in Aristotle, have also believed in the natural validity of names? These attempts have taken five separate directions; in every case they show considerable weaknesses, which I briefly describe.

(1) Plato's picture is not intended to be historical, and Cratylus did not really believe in the validity of names, although this was a problem which interested many of his contemporaries. —This is the underlying motive of E. Weerts' treatment of Plato's "historical dialectic," in his "Plato und der Heraklitismus," *Philologus*, Supplb. XXIII, 1 (1931). Weerts is also attracted to some extent by (3) below, which, like (2), presupposes a similar view of Plato's historical methods and intentions. Now admittedly Plato did not set out to be a historian in any sense, any more than Aristotle did; the dangers of taking the dialogues too literally as historical documents are well known. On the other hand they are not entirely fictitious, and the characters named in them lived not so very long before, so that Plato could not take too great liberties with them. One can hardly doubt that the historical figures whom Plato chose to be Socrates' respondents (many of whom may well have played this part in real life) had some connexion at least with the views which they are made to support, in the first place at all events, in the dialogues—and often an obvious connexion, otherwise the dialogues would lose much of their dramatic interest for those who read them. Thus Euthydemus was in fact an eristic and a dealer

in fallacies in predication, Laches was a simple soldier, Protagoras to some extent a subjectivist. As the dialogues advance such figures are made by Socrates to agree to opinions which they might never have held in real life; but it is often not hard to detect these extravagances. Even at their first appearance in the dialogue they may be, and undoubtedly often are, caricatured; yet the essence of caricature is that it puts all the emphasis on a man's most prominent feature, not that it totally misrepresents him. Even with due allowance for Plato's lack of historical intentions, and for such added hazards as Socrates' "irony," there is still perceptible in the Platonic dialogues a hard core of truth. It may not be too imprudent to assert that Cratylus' keen interest in names (and perhaps particularly in etymology, though it is Socrates who does the etymologizing) belongs to this core of historical fact.

(2) Cratylus was a Heraclitean, but Plato grafted on to him the personality of Antisthenes, whom we know to have been interested in the correctness of names, but not in Heracliteanism; in other dialogues too Plato attacked Antisthenes, whom, however, he never actually named from motives of delicacy. This composite personality accounts for any inconsistency in the ideas ascribed to Cratylus.—The discovery of Antisthenes in the dialogues, ruthlessly pursued by e. g. Hermann, T. Gomperz, Dümmmler, and Natorp, has been effectively opposed by e. g. Zeller, Kirchner, and, most decisively, by Wilamowitz in *Platon*, I, pp. 294 f., whose work was elaborated by Dahlmann. In fact the Antisthenes-theory is almost dead; but Kiöck (*De Cratyli Platonici indole ac fine*, pp. 44 f.) has maintained more plausibly that Plato in his picture of Cratylus was representing "sophistae grammatici ideam," of which the historical Antisthenes may have been an important element. Yet it is just as hard to reconcile Antisthenes or any such etymologist with the doctrine of flux as it is Cratylus.

(3) Cratylus was a Heraclitean and a relativist but he held no theory of names; Plato was led to ascribe such a belief to him by his close acquaintance with Heraclides Ponticus, a prominent member of the Academy and a man who was probably interested in both Heraclitus and the theory of names. Cratylus to some extent represents the views of Heraclides, who could not be named in person in a dialogue set many years in the past.—This

is the theory of Warburg, "Zwei Fragen zum Kratylus," *N. Philol. Unters.*, V (1929), pp. 8 ff. and 23-31. It is an ingenious theory which, however, again demands a very liberal view of Plato's use of the dialogues; in addition it does not remove the difficulty of a single man (this time Heraclides) holding inconsistent ideas. Actually our knowledge of Heraclides' interests is extremely indefinite, and while we know that he wrote four books of *ἐξηγήσεις* on Heraclitus (Diogenes Laertius, V, 88), we do not know that he accepted the Heraclitean theories as correct.

(4) Cratylus was a Heraclitean who "claimed to obtain through names that knowledge of things which he despaired of obtaining through the senses": so Henry Jackson, *Cambridge Praelections*, 1906, p. 11. This explanation fails to account for the particular situation of the dialogue, where Cratylus appears to welcome the Heraclitean theory of flux because he thinks it supports his primary belief in the natural correctness of names; which is the reverse of resorting to names because the belief in flux has induced scepticism about any other means of obtaining knowledge. Of course Jackson and other scholars who have tried to reconcile a belief in flux with one in the natural correctness of names did not perceive that the Cratylus of the Platonic dialogue is not so simple in his relationship to Heracliteanism as the Cratylus of Aristotle; but simply as a reconciliation of two logically inconsistent theories this type of solution has considerable merits. A more or less irrational belief in a natural connexion between names and things recurs again and again in Greek thought. Such a belief is perhaps magical in origin: knowledge of the exact name of a person, which is an essential part of him, confers power over him. The ritualistic implications of names are analogous: a deity has to be addressed by his full titles, otherwise the invocation is not only ineffective, but actually offensive. Thus Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*, 681, 689, 1081, relates the names of gods to their functions; cf. Heraclitus, fr. 32 (Diels). Heraclitus indeed appears to have thought that words had a significance other than artificial, and when he said (fr. 48) that "the name of the bow is life (*βίος* life, *βίος* bow), but its function is death," he probably thought that he was adducing another valid example of the coincidence of opposites. So too word-plays like *μόροι—μοίρας* (fr. 25) and *ἐν νόῳ—ἐν νῶ* (fr. 114) may be more than mere tricks of style. Indeed Warburg,

op. cit., p. 11, is probably right in thinking that no special, conscious theory of language should be attributed to Heraclitus; nevertheless words have real significance for him, as Snell, *Hermes*, LXIII (1926), pp. 386 ff., and Calogero, *Giornale Critica di Filosofia Italiana* (1936), pp. 204-9, have shown: cf. also Goldschmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 9 f. An irrational belief of this kind, perhaps developed into but still underlying a conscious theory of language, might explain how names as a source of knowledge could be accepted even when the things which names "naturally" represent have been rejected. Such a belief would be illogical by our standards and by Aristotle's, and by Plato's too; its illogicality is just what is pointed out in *Cratylus*, 440C-D, as has been demonstrated; but this does not mean that it could not have been held by a sophist at the end of the fifth century.¹⁴

(5) Cratylus was a Heraclitean and a Protagorean subjectivist, combining these two positions much as Plato does at *Theaetetus*, 152D-E; he was led by his belief in flux to think that all names were correct for the namer.—So, with reservations, Calogero, *Enciclopedia Italiana*, XI, p. 805, *s.v.* "Cratilo." Karl Reinhardt, one may infer, subscribed at one time to a variation of this view: the Heracliteans, he maintained in *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, pp. 241 ff., were, like Protagoras, reactionaries against extreme Eleaticism who chose the escape offered by relativism, itself suggested by the Parmenidean *πρὸς δόξαν* and Melissus. These relativists later adopted the physical idea of flux from Heraclitus because they thought it supported their theory of knowledge, and so became "Heracliteans." The *Cratylus* of the dialogue is an example of such a Heraclitean.—This explanation of the *Cratylus* of the dialogue ignores the fact that it is Hermogenes, not

¹⁴ The argument might be advanced that *because* Cratylus was a Heraclitean he was led to combine the idea of flux with a belief in the natural correctness of names—both of which ideas are present in Heraclitus. But the latter idea was probably not developed by Heraclitus, and I believe that the *πάντα ῥεῖ* hypothesis, in the form in which it is presented by Plato, was not held by Heraclitus, whose views on change would not of themselves lead to the kind of scepticism envisaged for Cratylus by Aristotle. In any case Cratylus clearly went far beyond Heraclitus, and an inconsistency in his position is not fully justified by pointing to the hypothetical roots of such an inconsistency in Heraclitus.

Cratylus, who is tempted to adopt the subjectivist position; for further discussion see below.

The article on Cratylus by Julius Stenzel, in Pauly-Wissowa, *R.-E.*, XXII, cols. 1660 ff., shows with great clarity the difficulty of satisfactorily reconciling the divergent theories accepted by orthodox interpreters of the dialogue. By accepting Aristotle's evidence that Cratylus was an extreme Heraclitean he is led to believe that Cratylus' doctrine was a "continuation of Heracliteanism to the point of radical scepticism," and to admit the real inconsistency with this of the objective correctness of names proclaimed by Cratylus in the dialogue; he attempts to meet this difficulty by supporting Kiöck [cf. (2) above, *ad fin.*]. A strange part of Stenzel's treatment [cf. also Calogero in (5) above] is that he professes to find in the dialogue a belief by Cratylus in a subjective, as well as an objective, correctness of names. The latter is certainly present and is explicitly asserted throughout; indeed when questioned about the origin of names Cratylus had advanced the theory that they have an objective, divine origin (438C): "I think that the truest saying about them is, Socrates, that some greater than human power attached the first names to things, so that it is necessary that they are correct." The idea that Cratylus showed a belief in a merely subjective value of names seems to depend chiefly on two passages: (i) Hermogenes said at the beginning of the dialogue (383A) that Cratylus assumed "a certain correctness of names *both for Greeks and for barbarians, the same for all.*" Now it might be argued that if the Greek and, say, the Persian name for a common object, for example a bed, were totally different and could not even be connected by one of Socrates' linguistic devices, then the correctness that inheres in each of these different names must be relative to the two different races: for an object cannot have more than one "naturally correct" name. Thus Cratylus was really accepting a relativist view. But this interpretation is the opposite of the truth: the words "the same for all" (*τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασιν*) surely imply a universal correctness which is unaffected by racial conventions and differences. Cratylus would doubtless have argued against this objection that a Persian bed, by the very fact of being Persian, was different from a Greek bed and therefore deserved a different name. If a Persian came to Greece and used the Persian name for a Greek bed, doubtless this

would be incorrect and the Persian name would on this occasion be non-significant and therefore not really a name at all. (ii) At 429B, as we saw, Cratylus professed to an Eleatic belief in the impossibility of false names and false assertions. Thus Calogero, *loc. cit.*, writes apropos of this profession: "S'intende che tale 'esattezza' (*ἀρθότης*) intrinseca del linguaggio . . . se corrispondeva in sostanza alla 'verità' soggettiva e assoluta di Protagora" But when Cratylus asked: "How could anyone, saying that which he says, not say¹⁵ that which is?", he does not mean that any sound uttered by a man for any object is correct. An object only has one correct name and anyone who tries to call it anything else is not naming it at all but only uttering "a piece of voice," *φωνῆς μῶριον* (383A). Thus these two passages, when rightly interpreted, support Cratylus' belief not in the subjective, but in the objective validity of names.

The upshot of the foregoing examination of various attempts to account for Cratylus' professed belief in the natural correctness of names, in the Platonic dialogue, is that only by supposing with Jackson that a prior Heracliteanism led to a resort to names as the only means of knowledge can we reconcile the two different elements in Cratylus;¹⁶ and this does not fit the conclusion elicited from the dialogue, that Cratylus adopted the Heraclitean view (whether temporarily or permanently) *as a result* of his ideas about names.

At this stage it is advisable to turn to Aristotle's evidence for Cratylus, according to which he was an extreme Heraclitean. The first of the two relevant passages is the famous one describing the origins of Plato's philosophy, in *Metaphysics* A, of which a paraphrase, composed somewhat later, occurs in M:

<i>Met.</i> , A 6, 987a29	<i>Met.</i> , M 4, 1078b9	Translation of <i>Met.</i> A
(Plato to some extent followed the Italian philosophy, but was subject to other influences too)	(For translation see p. 251 below.) (The theory of Forms resulted, for those who held it)	

¹⁵ λέγειν in Greek has the connotation "significant utterance."

¹⁶ The possibility that Plato shows Cratylus at the exact moment of change from a belief in names to a belief in flux can be dismissed. Why should Plato suddenly become so historical about an event which seems to have taken place before he was born? And if Aristotle is right, it was not as a believer in names that Cratylus interested Plato.

Met., A 6, 987a29

ἐκ νέου τε γὰρ συνήθης
γενόμενος πρῶτον Κρα-
τύλῳ καὶ ταῖς Ἡρακλει-
τείοις δόξαις ὡς ἀπάντων
τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ ρέοντων
καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν
οὐκ οὔσης, ταῦτα μὲν καὶ
ὑστερον οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν.
(Socrates with his ethical
definitions, reached induc-
tively, was another in-
fluence).

Met., M 4, 1078b9

διὰ τὸ πεισθῆναι περὶ
τῆς ἀληθείας τοῖς Ἡρα-
κλειτέοις λόγοις ὡς πάν-
των τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ
ρέοντων, ὥστε εἶπερ
ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἔσται καὶ
φρόνησις, ἑτέρας δεῖν
τινὰς φύσεις εἶναι παρὰ
τὰς αἰσθητάς, μενούσας·
οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τῶν ρέον-
των ἐπιστήμην.

Translation of Met. A

For having become famil-
iar from youth up with
Cratylus and the Hera-
clitean opinions that all
existing things are always
flowing and that knowl-
edge about them is im-
possible, these things he
supposed to be so later on
in life too.

Here Aristotle attributes to Cratylus not only the Heraclitean view that all things are in flux, but also the epistemological deduction from this that knowledge of such things is impossible *because* they are in flux and constantly changing. That this deduction is attributed to Cratylus, and is not just made by Aristotle himself, is shown more clearly in the version of M, where the indirect discourse of οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τῶν ρέοντων ἐπιστήμην shows quite clearly that this conclusion belongs to Cratylus. Thus this statement by Aristotle supports the theory that it was a scepticism arising out of the Heraclitean position that all things are in flux which might have driven Cratylus to his trust in names; although Aristotle himself seems to ignore this last part of Cratylus' beliefs.

The second Aristotelian passage is *Metaphysics*, Γ 5, 1010a7:

. . . ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην
κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ
μεταβάλλοντος οὐθὲν ἀληθεύμενον,
περὶ γε τὸ πάντῃ πάντως μεταβάλ-
λον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀληθεύειν. ἐκ
γὰρ ταύτης τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἐξήνθη-
σεν ἡ ἀκροτάτη δόξα τῶν εἰρημένων,
ἡ τῶν φασκόντων Ἡρακλείτῳ
καὶ οἷαν Κράτυλος εἶχεν, ὅς τὸ
τελευταῖον οὐθὲν ᾔετο δεῖν λέγειν
ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον,
καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι ὅτι
δὺς τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν
ἐμβῆναι· αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾔετο οὐδ'
ἅπαξ.

Further (*sc.* they believed that
knowledge is impossible) through
seeing that all this natural world
is in movement, and that nothing
is truly asserted about that which
is changing—at least, that about
that which is changing all over in
every way it is impossible to make
a true assertion. From this belief
blossomed the most extreme opin-
ion of those under discussion, that
of those who profess to follow
Heraclitus—an opinion such as
Cratylus held, who finally thought
it improper to say anything but
only moved his finger, and blamed
Heraclitus for saying that it is im-
possible to step twice into the same
river; for *he* thought, not even
once.

Here Aristotle asserts more positively that Cratylus was led by the epistemological consequences of the theory of flux to an extreme scepticism. The indication of things with the finger rather than by words might appear to have some connexion with the quotation from the Socratic Aeschines at *Rhetoric*, Γ 16, 1417b1, cited in n. 3 on p. 1. However, although the phrase τοῖν χερσὶν διασείων occurs there, we are told that Cratylus did this while talking, and not therefore as a substitute for speech. Aristotle quotes this as an instance of rhetorical peculiarity, and it must be assumed that the context in Aeschines¹⁷ did not preclude this interpretation. Yet if we can trace no source for the pointing-anecdote, we seem to be able to do this for the other anecdote, about the river. Aristotle summarizes Heraclitus' belief, as criticized by Cratylus, as follows: δις τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι. These words closely resemble the language of Plato at *Cratylus*, 402A: [Ἡράκλειτος] λέγει ὡς δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης. The two slight differences in construction do not negative the implication of the very similar word-order and choice of words: that Aristotle is here dependent upon Plato for his summary of Heraclitus. It is possible, of course, that Aristotle and Plato were both quoting or closely paraphrasing some familiar words of Heraclitus, and that their similarity is due to the use of a common source. Most authorities, however, now follow Reinhardt (*Parmenides*, pp. 165 and 207, n. 1; *Hermes*, LXXVII [1942], pp. 18 f. and especially, for what follows, n. 2 on p. 18) in thinking that the original of Plato's version was Heraclitus, fr. 12 (Diels), of which the certainly genuine part is as follows: ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ.^{17a} That this is so is confirmed by the following consideration. Most of the post-Aristotelian notices of the river-statement adhere either to Plato's version or to Aristotle's very similar one. But Plutarch is particularly interesting, for he gives three different versions:

¹⁷ H. Dittmar, "Aeschines von Sphettos," *Philol. Unters.*, XXI, pp. 293 f., rejects the idea of Hermann that the context of this remark is the dialogue *Telauges*. Admittedly it is known that Hermogenes (one of the respondents in the Platonic *Cratylus*) takes part in that dialogue; but he seems to play a totally different rôle from the one he plays in the *Cratylus*, and there is no reason why he should be associated here with Cratylus; see *op. cit.*, pp. 226 ff.

^{17a} See also fr. 91. Fr. 49^a is of course spurious.

(1) *De E*, p. 392a(2) *De sera num.*,
p. 559c(3) *Qu. Nat.*,
p. 912a

ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν	. . . ποταμὸν . . . εἰς	ποταμοῖς γὰρ δις τοῖς
ἐμβῆναι δις τῷ αὐτῷ	ὄν οὐ φησι δις ἐμβῆναι	αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης·
.	ἕτερα γὰρ ἐπιρρεῖ
		ὕδατα.

It will be noticed that (1) reproduces the Aristotelian version, of which the distinguishing marks are οὐκ ἔστιν with the infinitive and the dative after ἐμβῆναι; while (2) probably follows Plato with his optative construction and εἰς after ἐμβαίης (although in the oratio obliqua ἂν has been dropped); (3) however contains vestiges of both the Platonic and the Aristotelian version, which were presumably equally well-known to Plutarch; but, in addition, unmistakable elements of the original fragment of Heraclitus are present—the words ἕτερα . . . ἐπιρρεῖ ὕδατα, and the plural form ποταμοῖς which neither Plato nor Aristotle has. Plutarch preserves a good number of the extant fragments of Heraclitus, and there can be little doubt that he had access to a good handbook if not to Heraclitus' work itself; he was also, of course, familiar with both Plato and Aristotle. In these circumstances his combination of the two versions of the river-statement with the original cannot be accidental, and indicates that he knew them to bear this relationship—i. e. the relationship of copies or paraphrases to an original source. Now the two versions of Plato and Aristotle are so close to each other, and yet so verbally different from the original, that they cannot be separate and disconnected paraphrases of a common source; in other words they are interdependent, and Aristotle simply took over Plato's paraphrase, with slight modifications. Plutarch's synthesis also discredits another possibility: that Cratylus himself was the author of the version of the river-statement preserved by Plato and Aristotle, and that the οὐδ' ἄπαξ anecdote attributed to him in the passage from *Met.*, Γ 5 quoted above is a literal account of Cratylus' words. Of course it is possible that Plutarch had no separate information about Cratylus, and was mistaken in his connexion of the Platonic-Aristotelian version directly with Heraclitus; but in any case it is extremely unlikely that if Plato knew Cratylus to be the author of the summary of the river-statement he should not have mentioned him, and especially his

extreme criticism, in contexts like the *Theaetetus* as well as the *Cratylus*.

It seems probable therefore that Aristotle, in his account of Cratylus' criticism of Heraclitus, used a summary of Heraclitus' river-statement which he had learned from Plato, and perhaps in particular from the dialogue *Cratylus*—for it is doubtful whether, in referring verbally to Heraclitus, Plato would consistently have used exactly the formula which he wrote in the dialogue and which is so closely followed by Aristotle. At this point an interesting possibility presents itself. Could Aristotle have developed this anecdote about Cratylus simply from what he read in the dialogue, and from his own deductions about the extreme form to which a theory of flux could be taken? Further, could *all* his information about Cratylus (i.e. the pointing-anecdote and the statement that Cratylus influenced the young Plato, in addition to the above) be due simply to his own inferences from the dialogues, the *Cratylus* in particular? Doubtless this appears to be a very remote possibility when one considers that Aristotle spent no less than twenty years as a member of the Academy and therefore had presumably no need to depend solely on a reading of the dialogues for information about Plato's older contemporaries. However, Cherniss in his book *The Riddle of the Early Academy* has argued that the oral instruction given by Plato during the last decades of his life was mainly mathematical, and that in many cases Aristotle appears not to have asked Plato about uncertainties in the dialogues; and on p. 72 the conclusion is reached that "Plato did not expound any physics or natural philosophy beyond that which he wrote in the *Timaeus*, and he did not give his students or associates any further exegesis of the doctrines which he set down in his dialogues." Cherniss supports this contention by showing that Aristotle failed to elucidate, by direct enquiry from Plato, points which puzzled him (and which in fact he misunderstood) in the *Timaeus*. In addition one may wonder how soon Aristotle became interested in the earlier history of philosophy in Greece. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (Eng. transl., 1st ed.), p. 173, assigns the composition of *Metaphysics A*, which is the first extant systematic presentation of the history of earlier philosophy (for *Physics A* is far from comprehensive), to the time when Aristotle retired to Assos, after Plato's death (but see also Cherniss, *Aristotle's*

Criticism of Plato and the Academy, I, pp. 488 ff.). The *De Philosophia* may have belonged to the early Assos period too; Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 128, puts it not earlier than *Metaphysics A*; but again Cherniss maintains with some plausibility that it, like the *De Ideis*, was written before Aristotle left the Academy. The *De Philosophia* certainly contained a thorough review of earlier philosophies, including eastern philosophies. Certainty here is difficult to achieve, but one may perhaps hazard the conclusion that Aristotle may not have concerned himself with a detailed study of earlier philosophy (of course a consideration of the major movements must have been part of the regular teaching in the Academy) until shortly before Plato's death; and that he may have had to rely to some extent on the dialogues for information about the lesser-known contemporaries and predecessors of Socrates—among whom Cratylus must be numbered. If the *De Philosophia* and *Metaphysics A* were written at Assos then Aristotle may have had very few books to refer to; but copies of his master's dialogues he would certainly have with him.

In view of these last considerations the possibility outlined above seems to deserve detailed examination, although it must be emphasized that in the present state of the evidence it can never be more than a possibility, and perhaps a remote one. The advantage of such a hypothesis is, of course, that it resolves the difficulty of reconciling the picture of Cratylus in Plato as primarily a believer in names, with the picture of him in Aristotle as simply an extreme Heraclitean. It does so by assuming that Aristotle was misled by the *Cratylus*, as many modern readers have been, into thinking that Cratylus is there shown as a *convinced* Heraclitean. In the following pages, therefore, I shall briefly consider Aristotle's three main statements about Cratylus with a view to determining whether they could have been determined wholly or in part by the dialogues, and particularly the *Cratylus*, alone.

It has already been shown that the language used by Aristotle in recounting the οὐδ' ἄραξ anecdote is in part derived from the *Cratylus*. There is no doubt, however, that the kind of extension of Heraclitus' fr. 12 which occurs in this anecdote certainly could have been made in the latter part of the fifth century and by anyone who reflected seriously on the proposition "You cannot step twice into the same river." In fact, though, this propo-

sition is first stated in extant literature by Plato, and goes far beyond the words of fr. 12. If it was not Plato but Cratylus or some other pre-Platonic Heraclitean who put this interpretation on the fragment, and added perhaps the modification implied in οὐδ' ἀραξ, then it is surprising that Plato did not seize upon this apparent absurdity implicit in the Heraclitean position and use it in the *Theaetetus*, where Socrates and Theodorus are made to pour scorn upon the ideas of the ῥέοντες (179D-180D). It is still more surprising when one remembers that Plato applies an analogous criticism in the fields of knowledge and perception. There is a close parallelism between the ontological observation that universal change destroys the possibility of any fixed relationship between man and the outside world (in terms of the river-image, between the wader and the river), and the epistemological discovery that universal change destroys the possibility of a fixed relationship, i. e. knowledge, between the potentially knowing and the potentially known. This last theory, as we saw, was explicitly stated for the first time by Plato in the *Cratylus*, where the fact that knowledge itself and the knower (corresponding to the wader in the river) must be changing as well as the object to be known is stated with the air of a new discovery (440A): "But it is not even reasonable to say that knowledge exists, Cratylus, if all things change and nothing stays still. For if this very thing, the knowledge, does not change from being knowledge, then the knowledge would always remain and be knowledge; but if the very form of knowledge changes, at the same time it would change into another form of knowledge and not really be knowledge; and if this change is constant there would never be any knowledge, and from this argument there would never be either knowing agent or known object." This duality of knower and known as equally important elements in an act of knowledge is transferred, in the *Theaetetus*, to the theory of sense-perception: perception involves two "motions," one from the perceived object and one from the perceiving organ.¹⁸ Now if this subject-object dichotomy was applied by Plato in the fields of both knowledge and perception it is perhaps significant that it was not applied by him in the field of physical

¹⁸ Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, I, p. 242, recognised the connexion when he wrote (without real grounds): ". . . the doctrine is that of Kratylus, while the elaboration of it is Plato's."

change (of the *objects* of knowledge and perception), in particular relation to Heracliteanism. The fact that it was not specifically so applied, when it would have been so excellent an argument against Heracliteanism and for the existence of stable realities, may suggest that it was *not* developed before Plato (as Aristotle suggests that Cratylus developed it), and that Plato did not realize its full significance. On the other hand, it may be that Plato took it so much for granted that he did not bother to state it explicitly. Be this as it may, to Aristotle's analytical mind the application of the rule of change to man as well as to the outside world would be a necessary consequence of the Heraclitean position and a necessary development of the Platonic version of the river-statement; taking Cratylus as he did to be an extreme Heraclitean he might well have attributed to him what he assumed to be an obvious implication of the river-statement as quoted by Plato, even without direct evidence that Cratylus actually held such a view.

Aristotle's other statement about Cratylus in *Metaphysics* I is that because of his extreme Heraclitean views he finally avoided speech and resorted to pointing as a method of signification. We may infer that some sort of strong belief about words, as well as about the flux of all things, is involved in this radical position. A Heraclitean *tout simple* would have no motive for avoiding words as long as they served the needs of practical life, even if they did not bear any fixed theoretical relationship to objects in constant change. However, a Heraclitean who in addition believed that the use of a proper name somehow implied a real fixity in the thing to which the name was applied might, if he were eccentric as well as conscientious, find it necessary to avoid proper names altogether. This kind of resultant belief is well exemplified in two passages in Plato. First, *Theaetetus*, 183A-B: (Socrates) ". . . Now it seems that what has in fact come to light is that, if all things are in change, any answer that can be given to any question is equally right: you may say it is so and it is not so—or 'becomes,' if you prefer to avoid any term that would bring these people to a standstill." (Theodorus) "You are right." (Soc.) "Except, Theodorus, that I used the words 'so' and 'not so,' whereas we have no right to use this word 'so'—what is 'so' would cease to be in change—nor yet 'not so': there is no change in that either. Some new dialect

will have to be instituted for the exponents of this theory . . .” (translated by F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 100). The second passage is *Timaeus*, 49B-E: (fire, water, etc., are constantly changing into each other in a cyclical process) “Then, since none of them thus wears a constant aspect, of which of them can one say with confident assertion that it is *this* same thing and no other, without blushing for himself? Of none of them all; far the safest rule in speaking of them is the following. Whenever we see a thing changing, fire, for example, we must, in every case, call fire not *this* but *this-like* (μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον), nor yet may we use the word *this* of any of the things we fancy we are indicating when we point them out by the use of the words *this* and *that*, as though any of them had a permanent being . . .” (translated by A. E. Taylor). Now it again seems strange, if Cratylus used to do the very thing which Plato is talking about in these passages, that he is not cited by Plato as an excellent illustration of the point in question; he could have been introduced particularly effectively in the *Theaetetus* passage, where the tone is not too serious. If Cratylus did *not* do any such thing, then it is not inconceivable that these Platonic passages in themselves should have suggested to Aristotle the kind of behaviour that might be expected of an extreme Heraclitean who believed in the natural correctness of names—which is the picture which he might have derived of Cratylus from the dialogue. But supposing Cratylus did in fact resort at some stage to pointing, but not because he was a Heraclitean? In this case he could not be appropriately introduced by Plato into either of the passages quoted above. And indeed there is another perfectly good reason (good to an eccentric, that is) for the avoidance of names: it is that the man who avoids them is a believer in the real and natural connexion between names and things, but that he is sceptical of his ability, or the ability of men in general, to determine on every occasion what the correct name for an object is. This is approximately the attitude of Cratylus in the Platonic dialogue, after he has been led to admit by Socrates’ discovery of both flux and rest in words that some names are not correctly named. I remarked in the analysis of this part of the dialogue that his logical reply to Socrates would have been that one or other of the conflicting classes of names were not names at all; and there is no particular

vice except waste of breath in simply uttering "a piece of voice." However, Cratylus in real life might not have taken this easy way out, and might have saved himself from error by the adoption of pointing as a means of signification which served its purpose without committing its user. I do not say that this is the truth of the matter, but merely that Cratylus *could* have avoided speech, if he really did so, for other reasons than those given by Aristotle; and that in any case Aristotle would have attributed such behaviour to Cratylus' connexion with Heracliteanism.

There remains *Metaphysics*, A6, 987a29, quoted on p. 243 above; Aristotle's meaning is perhaps put more plainly in the paraphrase of this passage, composed later, at M4, 1078b9: "The theory of Forms resulted, for those who profess it, through believing, on the subject of Truth, the Heraclitean arguments that all perceptibles are in continual flux, so that if there is to be knowledge and understanding of anything there must be other, enduring, natures besides the perceived ones." Cratylus is not specifically named here but we know from the version of A that Aristotle considered him to have taught Plato about Heracliteanism. Now it has generally been thought that the overwhelming probability is that Plato *told* Aristotle, while the latter was his pupil, about the early influences on himself and the manner in which he arrived at a theory of Forms; in other words that Aristotle's account in the passages above must rest on the ultimate authority of Plato himself. This probability cannot be minimized. On the other hand it is by no means impossible that Plato, who during the period of Aristotle's membership of the Academy had gone beyond the theory of Forms as such, remained silent about the details of his youthful development. In this case Aristotle might have fallen back on the dialogues themselves, after their author's death, as the source of a plausible inference about Plato's historical position. Weerts, "Plato und der Heraklitismus," *Philologus*, Supplb. XXIII, 1 (1931), pp. 1 f., observed that Aristotle's judgement about the Heraclitean-Cratylean influence on Plato might be inferred from the last two pages of the *Cratylus* alone: there Cratylus is made to admit the existence of *some* real entities by the argument that knowledge (which is assumed without question to be real) must have stable objects. One may compare in particular this state-

ment at *Cratylus*, 440A: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γνῶσιν εἶναι φάναι εἶκος, ὃ Κρατύλει, εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μηδὲν μένει with the belief ascribed by Aristotle to Cratylus (and the Heracliteans) at *Metaphysics*, A6, 987a32: . . . ὡς ἀπάντων τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ ῥεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης. Now it is conceivable that students of Heraclitus did make this explicit deduction from the assumption of flux; but Plato's *Cratylus* is the first extant source in which this deduction appears. W. D. Ross may be correct when he writes (*Aristotle, Metaphysics*, I, p. xlvii): "The recognition of the flux of all sensible things and the consequent impossibility of knowledge of them is present throughout the dialogues as the underlying assumption which does not need to be often emphasized because it is unquestioningly taken for granted." Yet even if Plato realized from the first "the consequent impossibility of knowledge" of constantly changing objects, this does not necessarily mean that this consequence was fully understood by any of his predecessors or that Plato derived it from them; and Aristotle's assertion that it was so understood *could* be mere inference from the Heraclitean premises. His whole description of the influences on Plato *could* be mere inference: that is all one can say.¹⁹

¹⁹ Weerts, *loc. cit.*, eventually rejects the possibility that Aristotle's account of Cratylus' influence on Plato is derived from the dialogues. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, I, p. 242, n. 1, maintains that "It is probable indeed that this (*sc.* Plato's familiarity with Cratylus) is only Aristotle's inference from the *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus*, but it is a fair inference." Ross, *loc. cit.*, is more conservative. "What we should not have known from the dialogues is Plato's early acquaintance with Cratylus. This cannot, I think, be merely Aristotle's inference from the *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus*; there is nothing in these dialogues to suggest it. It seems to be a genuine piece of information derived in all probability from Plato; . . . His other piece of information about Cratylus may well come from the same source." Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, I, p. 218, n. 129, effectively sums up the case for prudence: ". . . even though his (*sc.* Plato's) elaboration of the doctrine of flux may have altered the form which it had for those from whom he adopted it, this does not impeach Aristotle's account of the importance of the doctrine in the history of the theory of ideas. It is true too that the dialogues offer no positive corroboration of Aristotle's statement that it was Cratylus from whom Plato adopted the theory of flux; but neither do they offer any ground for disbelief, and we have no other basis on which to challenge the account. . . ."

The examination of Aristotle's statements about Cratylus has shown that it is at least possible that Aristotle was dependent solely upon the Platonic dialogues, and particularly the *Cratylus*, for his information; and that his picture of Cratylus as an extreme Heraclitean could conceivably be the result of his misinterpreting Cratylus' shifts of position and final obstinacy in the dialogue, and a result also of his own preconception of what an extreme Heraclitean should logically have believed. If this were the case, then the dilemma would be solved of whether the historical Cratylus was primarily a Heraclitean, primarily a believer in the natural validity of names, or both at once; and if the last, of how he reconciled the two ideas. The assumption could be made that Cratylus was really a believer in names whom Plato represented in the dialogue as incidentally persuaded by Socrates to adopt, temporarily, the Heraclitean thesis, because he had been misled into thinking that this supported the natural connexion between names and their objects. But it must be emphasized that the possibility of Aristotle's error is still not a strong one, and that the *a priori* probability that he *was* in a position to know the truth about Cratylus stands firmly set against it, whatever we may think in general about Aristotle's reliability as a historian of ideas. Perhaps the strongest argument against Aristotle is that, if Cratylus really was the eccentric (and presumably notorious) extremist that Aristotle shows him to be, it is surprising that Plato painted him in such soft colours and failed to name him as a type of the extreme Heraclitean in the *Theaetetus*; but this may be simply a pupil's deference.

Thus we are left with the Cratylus of Plato on the one hand, the Cratylus of Aristotle on the other. That the two are not identical—that the Cratylus of the *Cratylus* is not, contrary to the general opinion, a convinced Heraclitean—must remain the sole positive conclusion of the present inquiry.²⁰

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²⁰ I must record my gratitude to Professor Harold Cherniss of the Institute for Advanced Study, and to Professors Jaeger, Nock, and Havelock, and Mr. Z. Stewart, of Harvard University, for many valuable criticisms and suggestions.

ON THE CHRONOLOGY OF CAESAR'S FIRST CONSULSHIP.

The major chronological problems of Caesar's consulship in 59 B. C. are the dates of Caesar's first *lex agraria* and of the *lex Vatinia de imperio Caesaris*. On the relative dates of these two laws there was a long controversy between Frank Burr Marsh and Matthias Gelzer.¹ Marsh held that Caesar, having proposed the agrarian law, gave up trying to put it through the assembly and had Vatinius pass the law that gave Caesar an army and the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum; after that law was passed, on February 28, in Marsh's view, Caesar, with soldiers under his command, obtained a favorable vote on the agrarian law in early April. Gelzer is in approximate agreement on the date of the agrarian law, but places the *lex Vatinia* in May or June, shortly after Caesar's second agrarian law, the *lex Campana*. I propose to argue in this paper that Gelzer is right on the order of the laws and on the date of the *lex Vatinia*, but that the first agrarian law is earlier than Gelzer believes. On the basis of my dating I shall attempt to establish the date of other laws and other events in the first six months of 59.

On chronological questions the sources on the consulship, although abundant, are far from conclusive. Cicero nowhere gives us a narrative of events, although in orations of 57-56 he mentions many details. The only letters of the first half of 59—a group of fourteen written from his villas to Atticus in April and early May—are baffling in their brief comments on matters that Atticus, who was in Rome, knew better than Cicero did. But Cicero tells us enough in these letters and in the letters of

¹ Marsh, *The Founding of the Roman Empire* (Austin, Texas, 1922), pp. 94 ff., 271 ff.; "The Chronology of Caesar's Consulship," *C. J.*, XXII (1927), pp. 504-24; *A History of the Roman World from 146 to 36 B. C.* (London, 1935), pp. 180 ff., 387-94; Gelzer, *Caesar*, 1st ed. (Berlin, 1921), p. 69; 3rd ed. (Munich, 1941), pp. 100 f.; *Gnomon*, I (1925), p. 272. For a full statement of Gelzer's views see "Die Lex Vatinia de imperio Caesaris," *Hermes*, LXIII (1928), pp. 113-37. My obligations to this paper will be clear in this investigation. The date of the *lex Vatinia* is also discussed in many of the articles on the terminal date of Caesar's Gallic command. For recent bibliography see G. R. Elton, *J. R. S.*, XXXVI (1946), pp. 18-42.

July to enable us to evaluate later writers. He shows that Velleius omits important events, that Plutarch is confused in various details, that Appian makes shocking errors, and that, although chronology is not the only determining factor in the arrangement of material, Suetonius and Dio are in general reliable.²

From Cicero's letters it is clear that the first agrarian law³ had been passed by the middle of April. This law assigned for distribution to Pompey's veterans and to the urban plebs the public land in Italy—exclusive of the *ager Campanus*—and additional land to be purchased from the revenues of Pompey's conquests. By mid-April also the commissioners who were to administer the distribution had been elected⁴ and three other measures sponsored by Caesar had also been passed—the law restoring Ptolemy Auletes to the throne of Egypt, the law revising the contracts of the publicans,⁵ and the curiate law (passed

² See Vell., II, 44-45; Plut., *Caes.*, 14; *Pomp.*, 47-48; *Cato Min.*, 31-33; *Luc.*, 42; App., *B. C.*, II, 9-14; Suet., *Iul.*, 20-22; Dio, XXXVIII, 1-12. In the early chapters of the *Divus Iulius* Suetonius pays more attention to chronology than he usually does, but in ch. 20 he violates the order of time in mentioning the *lex Campana* before the *lex de publicanis*. Dio has the same order. In general Dio classifies the legislation according to sponsors, treating Caesar's laws first, then the judicial law of the praetor Fufius Calenus, and then the tribunitial law on Caesar's command. The adoption of Clodius is mentioned after the laws.

³ On the agrarian laws see M. Cary, *Journal of Philology*, XXXIV (1920), pp. 174-90; Eduard Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius*² (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1919), pp. 62-72; T. Rice Holmes, *The Roman Republic*, I (Oxford, 1923), pp. 312-17, 476-79. Full citation of the sources dealing with the laws will be found in these discussions.

⁴ Cic., *Ad Att.*, II, 6, 2; 7, 3-4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 16, 2 (written about May 1): *Nam adhuc Pompeius haec ἐσοφίζετο, se leges Caesaris probare, actiones ipsum praestare debere; agrariam legem sibi placuisse, potuerit intercedi necne nihil ad se pertinere; de lege Alexandrino placuisse sibi aliquando confici; Bibulus de caelo tum servasset necne sibi quaerendum non fuisse; de publicanis voluisse illi ordini commodare; quid futurum fuerit si Bibulus tum in forum descendisset se divinare non potuisse.* Cicero is here summarizing a conversation with Pompey which had probably taken place before Cicero left Rome early in April. He may have seen Pompey at Antium about the 18th, though I agree with Sjögren in accepting C. L. Smith's emendation of *Anti* to *Atti* in *Ad Att.*, II, 12, 1. Even if *Anti* is right,

by Caesar as *pontifex maximus*) transferring Clodius to the plebs.⁶

The second agrarian law (*lex Campana*), providing for the distribution of the *ager Campanus* and the neighboring *campus Stellas* to veterans and members of the plebs who had three or more children, was proposed about May first. Cicero, who was at his Formian villa, heard of the bill in a letter from Atticus that arrived on April 29.⁷ Atticus did not at the time know the full conditions of the new proposal, and was evidently writing before it had been posted. The bill seems to have been promulgated about May 1, and, if Caesar was following constitutional procedure, could have been voted on after the legal interval of twenty-four days (a *trinum nundinum*) had elapsed.⁸ I think it was probably passed in one of the *dies comitiales* at the end of May. News of the marriage of Caesar's daughter to Pompey reached Cicero about the fifth of May;⁹ it apparently took place after the posting of the *lex Campana*. At about the same time, if we can trust authorities who mention the two marriages together, Caesar married the daughter of L. Calpurnius Piso.

Now Plutarch, who in his life of Cato shows familiarity with both agrarian laws, mentions only one in his lives of Caesar and Pompey, and places the two marriages between the proposal and the voting.¹⁰ Plutarch has evidently telescoped the two laws, as does Appian, who often used a common source with Plutarch,¹¹ and has transferred the circumstances of the first law to the period of the second, the time of the marriages. As we know

the remarks refer to legislation passed not later than early April since there were no comitial days between the 4th and the 18th.

⁶ *Ad Att.*, II, 7, 2; 9, 1; 12, 1.

⁷ *Ad Att.*, II, 16. Cicero speaks here of an earlier letter which had aroused his anxiety.

⁸ See Kroll, s. v. "Nundinae," *R.-E.* Caesar violated this law (the *lex Caecilia Didia*) in the curiate law transferring Clodius to the plebs (*Cic.*, *Dom.*, 41), but there is no evidence that any of his other laws were passed in violation of it. This was one of the many laws that Vatinius disregarded.

⁹ *Cic.*, *Ad Att.*, II, 17, 1: *Quid enim ista repentina adfinitatis coniunctio, quid ager Campanus, quid effusio pecuniae significant?*

¹⁰ *Plut.*, *Cato Min.*, 31-33; *Pomp.*, 47-48; *Caes.*, 14.

¹¹ *App.*, *B. C.*, II, 10. On the common source of Appian and Plutarch see Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 608.

from Suetonius (*Iul.*, 20), and Dio (XXXVIII, 6), it was after the passage of the first agrarian law that Bibulus shut himself up in his house to remain there the rest of the year. Plutarch, assuming that there was only one agrarian law, and that the marriages took place after that law was proposed, says that Bibulus remained in his house for eight months.¹²

Plutarch's eight months have had undue influence on the dating of the first agrarian law. Although some scholars have conceded that the statement may be inexact and have dated the passage of the first law in March, the more usual view is that the law was not passed until early April.¹³ But an examination of the Roman calendar shows that this date is impossible. Before April 24 there was only one *dies comitalis* in the month that could have been used for voting on laws.¹⁴ That one day would not have sufficed for the passage of the agrarian law, the subsequent election of the commissioners, and the passage of Caesar's two later laws, the *lex de rege Alexandrino* and the *lex de publicanis*. Obviously the agrarian law, which preceded the election of the commissioners and the passage of the two other laws, was voted on before April.

In attempts to date the first agrarian law there has been another erroneous assumption. Several scholars have held that Bibulus, as the older consul, had the *fascēs* in January and the odd-numbered months of the year, and that accordingly Caesar could not have brought up his agrarian law until his turn with the *fascēs* came in February.¹⁵ But Caesar's name comes first

¹² Plut., *Pomp.*, 48, 4: Πραττομένων δὲ τούτων Βύβλος μὲν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν κατακλεισάμενος ὀκτὼ μηνῶν οὐ προῆλθεν ὑπατεύων, ἀλλ' ἐξέπεμπε διαγράμματα βλασφημίας ἀμφοῖν ἔχοντα καὶ κατηγορίας. Velleius, II, 44, who mentions the *lex Campana* but not the first agrarian law, seems, like Plutarch and Appian, to have combined the two agrarian laws into one. The statement about Bibulus which follows (*maiorē parte anni domi se tenuit*) accords with a retirement of eight months.

¹³ Carcopino, *César* (Paris, 1936), p. 683, dates the law in March. Gelzer, *Caesar*³, p. 87, places it in March or the beginning of April. Marsh, *C. J.*, XXII, p. 521, Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 71, and Täubler, *Bellum Helveticum* (Zurich, 1924), p. 57, date the vote at the beginning of April.

¹⁴ The only comitial days in April before the 24th were the 3rd and the 4th, but the latter day was not available for an assembly since it was the first day of the Megalesian games.

¹⁵ See Lange, *Römische Altertümer*, III² (Berlin, 1876), p. 279;

in all the consular lists and datings preserved from this year, and, as Professor Broughton and I have shown,¹⁶ that means that Caesar had priority in holding the *fascēs*. Caesar would therefore have had the opportunity to propose the law in January. Both Dio and Suetonius indicate that the agrarian law was proposed at the beginning of the year.

This is certainly what Cicero expected when he wrote to Atticus (*Ad Att.*, II, 3) at the end of December of 60. Cicero was considering what stand he would take on the agrarian law: *venio nunc ad mensem Ianuarium et ad ὑπόστασιν nostram ac πολιτείαν . . . nam aut fortiter resistendum est legi agrariae . . . aut quiescendum . . . aut etiam adiuvandum*. To make sure that Cicero would decide to be helpful, Caesar's emissary Cornelius Balbus had just come to see Cicero. Balbus' visit was an immediate preparation for the agrarian law designed to provide the land bonus for which Pompey's soldiers were pressing. There is no reason to doubt that this urgent measure came up in January, and probably at the very beginning of the month.¹⁷

A consideration of the circumstances attending the passage of the first agrarian law will, I believe, enable us to date it more exactly. Dio's full account (XXXVIII, 1-7), confirmed in various details by Cicero, seems in general to be reliable. Caesar presented his bill first to the senate, seeking the authority of that body before he took it to the people. The majority of the senate, led by Cato, adopted obstructionist tactics, which, ex-

Täubler, *op. cit.*, pp. 55 ff.; Marsh, *C. J.*, XXII, p. 506, n. 5; P. Stein, *Die Senatsitzungen der ciceronischen Zeit* (Münster, 1930), pp. 25 ff. Carcopino, *loc. cit.*, and Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 71, n. 3, attribute the *fascēs* to Caesar in the odd-numbered months, but date the passage of the law respectively in March and April.

¹⁶ See our paper, "The Order of the Two Consuls' Names in the Yearly Lists," *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*, XIX (1949), pp. 3-14.

¹⁷ By arranging at the beginning of his magistracy for the publication of the *acta senatus* (Suet., *Iul.*, 20), Caesar made sure that the people would know of any obstructions offered to the land bill in the senate. Suetonius goes on to say that Caesar restored the old custom under which the consul who did not have the *fascēs* was preceded by an *accensus* and followed by the lictors. This revival of old custom has been, mistakenly, I believe, interpreted by Lange, *loc. cit.*, to mean that Caesar was doing honor to Bibulus.

tending probably through several sessions,¹⁸ prevented the measure from being brought to a vote. Unable to secure senatorial action, Caesar called a *contio* and, before the people, appealed to his colleague Bibulus to support the bill. When Bibulus proved obdurate, Caesar obtained the public endorsement of Crassus and Pompey and the assurance of Pompey that he would, if need arose, use force to put the bill through. When the time for voting came, Bibulus offered religious obstructions and also, with the aid of three tribunes, tried to have the bill vetoed.¹⁹ There were postponements of the vote until Caesar set a day for the passage of the bill. When the day came the Forum was occupied in advance by armed men, and Bibulus and the tribunes were driven from the Forum. Having thus forcibly prevented a veto,²⁰ Caesar secured the passage of the law. He had added a *sanctio* requiring the senators within a stated period to take oath to observe the law. Bibulus protested to no avail in the senate next day,²¹ and in the end all the senators, including the recalcitrants, Metellus Celer, Cato, and Favonius, took the oath and were thus bound to support a law that they held to be unconstitutional.

Now let us consider the schedule of events in January. Caesar, who had made his plans in advance, must have posted his bill

¹⁸ Dio does not say whether there was more than one meeting. But a good deal of time would have been occupied in calling on all the senators (Dio, XXXVIII, 2, 1), and Cato also made one of his time-consuming addresses. See Capito *apud* Gell., IV, 10, 8.

¹⁹ According to Dio, XXXVIII, 6, Bibulus, to prevent the bill from being voted on, declared a *ιερουνη* for all the remaining comitial days of the year. That is obviously an inaccurate statement made through confusion with Bibulus' course after he shut himself up in his house. Suetonius' account (*Iul.*, 20) is more reliable here: *obnuntiantem collegam armis foro expulit*. Bibulus was trying all means of postponing a vote, and one of them was to announce an adverse omen which would dissolve the assembly. See my *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949), pp. 82 ff.

²⁰ As Dio makes clear, Bibulus also tried a veto. Cicero indicates that the first agrarian law was invalid because a veto had been prevented. See *Ad Att.*, II, 16, 2 (quoted in note 5). See also Suet., *Iul.*, 30, 3, on Caesar's fear that he would be called to account for the acts of his first consulship which violated *auspicia legesque et intercessiones*. The later legislation, passed while Bibulus was watching the heavens, violated *auspicia* and *leges* (presumably the *leges Aelia et Fufia*); the first law violated the right of veto.

²¹ Suet., *Iul.*, 20; Dio, XXXVIII, 6, 4.

promptly, perhaps on the first day of January. At this period certainly Caesar was trying to act constitutionally, and he could not have called for a vote until after twenty-four days. There was a series of comitial days from January 25 to 28 when the vote might take place. Senatorial meetings were, under the *lex Pupia*,²² limited to non-comitial days, of which there were ten before January 16 and only one after that date, the last day of the month, the 29th. There were presumably several senatorial meetings in the first days of January and then one or more *contiones*. The first efforts to put the law through the assembly, which could have been made on January 25-27, were unsuccessful. Dio's account has been interpreted to mean that there was a long postponement before Caesar set the day when the bill was to be voted, but Plutarch's statement that Bibulus remained shut up in his house eight months explains this interpretation. I believe that the day Caesar fixed upon was January 28, the last of the comitial days in January. My reason is that the senate met next day, that the meeting could have been held on the 29th, a *dies fastus*, and that, in my view, Suetonius' account implies that the meeting was held under the presidency of Caesar.

At that meeting, according to Suetonius, Bibulus failed to find anyone who would either put the question or formulate a motion on the subject—*referre aut censere*.²³ Suetonius' words have usually been taken to mean that Bibulus was himself conducting the meeting,²⁴ and that it therefore took place in a month when he had the *fascēs*. But in that case he had the right to put a question (*referre*). It seems clear that the meeting was held under the presidency of Caesar in January and that Bibulus was looking for a tribune who, under his constitutional right, would reconvene the meeting and put the question *de re publica*.²⁵ But the three tribunes who had supported Bibulus

²² On the *lex Pupia* see Cic., *Ad Fam.*, I, 4, 1; cf. *Ad Q. fr.*, II, 2, 3. On the date of the law see Niccolini, *I Fasti dei Tribuni della Plebe* (Milan, 1934), p. 257.

²³ Suet., *Iul.*, 20: *postero die in senatu conquestum nec quoquam reperto qui super tali consternatione referre aut censere aliquid auderet, qualia multa saepe in levioribus turbis decreta erant, in eam coegit desperationem ut, quoad potestate abiret, domo abditus nihil aliud quam per edicta obnuntiaret.*

²⁴ See for instance Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

²⁵ See Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, II³, pp. 313-17.

evidently were intimidated by the events of the previous day, and Caesar doubtless saw to it that the questioning of senators did not last long enough to reach Cato, who would have had the courage to defy Caesar.²⁶

A law governing senatorial procedure made it impossible for Bibulus to postpone the question to February when he would have the presidency of the senate, for under this law no other business could be transacted in the senate until after the foreign embassies had been heard.²⁷ Bibulus could not count on waiting until these hearings were over, for the time limit, five to ten days in other laws on which we have information,²⁸ within which the senators would have to take the oath, would have expired, and the optimates would be bound to support Caesar's law.

I therefore date the passage of the first *lex agraria* on January 28, and the meeting of the senate on the 29th; I would assume that Bibulus refrained from holding the senate in February and remained in his house, watching the heavens on all comitial days, from the beginning of February to the end of the year. His self-imprisonment thus lasted eleven months instead of the eight reported by Plutarch.

According to this view the senate was never convened under the presidency of Bibulus. There was some truth in the jesting description of the year 59 as the consulship of Julius and

²⁶ Cato was still a *tribunicus* and the meeting, like the one reported in *Ad Att.*, I, 17, 9, probably did not last long enough to give Cato a chance to speak.

²⁷ The *lex Gabinia de legationibus* has sometimes been dated in the consulship of Aulus Gabinius in 58, but there are strong arguments against that dating. See Niccolini, *op. cit.*, pp. 256 and 518, who places the law in Gabinius' tribunate in 67. It should more probably be assigned to the tribune of 139. See Carcopino, *Mélanges Gustave Glotz* (Paris, 1932), I, pp. 120 ff. On the effect of these laws see Cic., *Ad Fam.*, I, 4, 1 and *Ad Q. fr.*, II, 2, 3, both of January 56. The embassies were actually postponed in that year (Cic., *Ad Q. fr.*, II, 3, 1), but postponements would have been more difficult in 59 when the ambassadors waiting to be heard were probably under Pompey's protection.

²⁸ Under Saturninus' agrarian law of 100 the senators were given five days to take the oath. Cf. Appian, *B. C.*, I, 29, 3. In the *lex Bantina* the interval allowed is ten days for senators and five days for magistrates. Cf. *C. I. L.*, I, 2², p. 582.

Caesar.²⁹ Whether the embassies were heard we have no sure means of knowing, but I shall suggest that certain laws of Vatinius, which are to be considered later, were a substitute for the customary senatorial action on the embassies. Caesar could, of course, in the absence or "indisposition" of his colleague, have called the senate, and he probably did so in later months when Bibulus had the *fasces*. Certainly Caesar continued to hold meetings of the senate during the year, and, though Cato and his associates stayed away,³⁰ Caesar got a quorum, and had a number of decrees passed. As far as his subsequent laws were concerned, Caesar presented them henceforth directly to the people without any request for senatorial authority in advance. He seems to have continued to assure senatorial compliance by requiring the members of the body to take oaths to support the laws.³¹

In succeeding months Bibulus and the three tribunes were watching the heavens on all comitial days, thereby providing the basis for the claim that all the laws of Caesar and his tribune Vatinius were unconstitutional. Caesar's laws passed by April included the two already mentioned, the *lex de rege Alexandrino* and the *lex de publicanis*, which I am disposed to assign to

²⁹ See Suet., *Iul.*, 20, who quotes the verses that circulated at Rome:

Non Bibulo quiddam nuper sed Caesare factum est;
Nam Bibulo fieri consule nil memini.

Bibulus' policy, which Cicero later praised, is condemned in *Ad Att.*, II, 15, 2, written in April. See also Sallust's comment on Bibulus as consul, *R. P.*, II, 9, 1: *Quid ille audeat, quod consulatus, maximum imperium, maximo dedecori fuit?* There is reason to believe that Bibulus considered a more active course later in the year. In an edict issued in July (Cicero, *Ad Att.*, II, 20, 6) Bibulus postponed the consular *comitia* from July to October 18, that is, according to my view, from a month when Caesar held the *fasces* to a month when Bibulus, as the holder of the *fasces*, would have conducted the election. In the end Bibulus was apparently intimidated and the election was conducted by Caesar, who may have postponed it to his month, November.

³⁰ Cic., *Sest.*, 63; *Brut.*, 219; Plut., *Caes.*, 14, 8.

³¹ Cicero, *Sest.*, 61, seems to show that Cato had taken oath to observe more than one of Caesar's laws: *Quasi vero ille non in alias quoque leges, quas iniuste rogatas putaret, iam ante iuravit.* See also *Schol. Bob.*, p. 133, Stangl. For the *sanctio* of the *lex Campana*, which demanded a special oath from candidates for office, see Cic., *Ad Att.*, II, 18, 2.

March, the second month when Caesar had the *fascēs*. It is generally agreed that the curiate law transferring Clodius to the plebs should be dated in March or perhaps early April. This law was proposed and passed by Caesar as *pontifex maximus* on the day when Cicero spoke his mind too freely in defense of C. Antonius.³²

In the same period Vatinius was very active in legislation. At the beginning of his tribunate he had proposed a law on challenging jurors; it contained a clause excluding from the benefit of the law men who were accused before it was passed, and Vatinius waited to have it voted on until after C. Antonius had been accused.³³ Before that, Cicero tells us (*Vatin.*, 27), Vatinius had passed many other laws. These are apparently the laws referred to by Cicero when he asks Vatinius: *fecerisne foedera tribunos plebis cum civitatibus, cum regibus, cum tetrarchis; erogarisne pecunias ex aerario tuis legibus?*³⁴ Such legislation invaded the prerogatives of the senate, which Vatinius is elsewhere accused by Cicero (*Sest.*, 114) of disregarding. I am disposed to date these laws in February and March, and to suggest that they took the place of senatorial action on the embassies. According to Cicero, Vatinius showed complete disregard of the constitution. He had announced at the beginning of his office (*Vatin.*, 14) that he would not be deterred in his tribunate by the college of augurs. In the laws he had passed by April Vatinius had disregarded the auspices and the *lex Aelia* and *Fufia*, which regulated the validity of the auspices in the assembly; he had also violated the *lex Caecilia Didia*, requiring a *trinum nundinum* between proposal and vote on a law, and the *lex Iunia Licinia* which provided that copies of laws should be deposited in the treasury in the presence of witnesses. By that time too he had, by failure to put on festal attire, refused to recognize the *supplicatio* voted for Pomptinus, the victor over the

³² Cic., *Dom.*, 41; see note 6 above.

³³ *Vatin.*, 27; *Schol. Bob.*, p. 149 St. The bill seems to have been passed before Antonius' accusation resulted in a conviction.

³⁴ *Vatin.*, 29; cf. *Ad Att.*, II, 9, 1: *improbitate istorum qui auspicia, qui Aeliam legem, qui Iuniam et Liciniam, qui Caeciliam et Didiam neglexerunt, qui omnia remedia rei publicae effuderunt, qui regna, qui praedia tetrarchis, qui immanis pecunias paucis dederunt.* See Gelzer, *Hermes*, LXIII, p. 121.

Allobroges.³⁵ That refusal is usually explained by Vatinius' interest in Caesar's designs on Gaul, but there is, in my opinion, a more probable explanation. A *supplicatio* regularly stopped comitial activity, and Vatinius wanted his laws to be voted on without delay. Like the tribunes C. Cato in 56 and Curio in 50, Vatinius was, I think, resisting the removal of comitial days.³⁶

Caesar's law ratifying Pompey's acts is, I believe, later than these laws of Caesar and Vatinius. From Cicero, *Ad Att.*, II, 16 of May 1 or 2, I am disposed to believe that it was proposed and voted on at approximately the same time as the *lex Campana*, in May. Cicero has just mentioned Pompey's attitude on the *lex agraria*, the *lex de rege Alexandrino*, and the *lex de publicanis*. He goes on: *Nunc vero, Samsicerane, quid dices? vectigal te nobis in Antilibano constituisse, agri Campani abstulisse? Quid? hoc quem ad modum obtinebis? "Oppressos vos" inquit "tenebo exercitu Caesaris."* This passage seems to me to suggest that the *lex Campana*, which removed important revenues of the state, was under consideration at the same time as the ratification of Pompey's acts, which established new revenues.

Vatinius' law giving Caesar a five-year command in Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, three legions and the right to name his own legates had certainly been passed by July when Cicero had been offered a post as Caesar's legate.³⁷ There is no word of such an offer in the letters of April and May when Cicero was considering avoiding his difficulties by securing either a *libera legatio* or an appointment as legate to Egypt.

The words that Cicero puts into Pompey's mouth (*Ad Att.*, II, 16, 2)—*oppressos vos tenebo exercitu Caesaris*—are cited by Marsh to prove that by early May Caesar had an army under his command. Marsh concludes that the *lex de imperio* was one of the laws passed by Vatinius in the early part of the year. But,

³⁵ *Ad Att.*, II, 7, 3 proves that this incident had taken place before mid-April. For further details see *Vatin.*, 30-32; *Schol. Bob.*, pp. 149 f. St.

³⁶ *Ad Q. fr.*, II, 4, 6; *Ad Fam.*, VIII, 11, 1. See my *Party Politics*, pp. 79 f.

³⁷ *Ad Att.*, II, 18, 3 and 19, 5, written in the early part of July. On the chronology of these letters see my discussion, *Historia*, I (1950), pp. 45-51.

as Gelzer has shown, *exercitus* is here used to describe a band of adherents.³⁸ We use "army" in the same sense.

Cicero was afraid at this time that Caesar's benefactions, including lavish gifts of money, were increasing his followers beyond bounds. If this was the end, it would be bad enough, he says in the next letter (II, 17), but this cannot be the end. *Numquam huc venissent nisi ad alias res pestiferas aditus sibi compararent*. I agree with Gelzer that Cicero was expecting news of a move on Caesar's part to secure a valuable command. We hear nothing more on the subject, for Atticus and Cicero seem to have been together in the weeks following this letter of early May.

Plutarch, Appian, and Dio all mention the *lex de imperio* after the other legislation. The first two are too inaccurate to merit attention. Dio classifies his material here according to the sponsorship of the laws and is therefore not decisive on chronology, but it is significant that he indicates that Caesar did not have Vatinius propose the law until great popular favor (that is an "army" of supporters) had been obtained by Caesar's lavish favors. There is a similar statement in Plutarch's life of Cato which, for the events of this year, rests on better authority than the lives of Caesar and Pompey. It is significant that Velleius mentions the *lex de imperio* after the *lex Campana* (of May). Still more important is Suetonius, who places it after the marriages and, in the phrase *socero igitur generoque suffragantibus*, attributes to Caesar the assistance of his new father-in-law and son-in-law in securing his command. If Suetonius is correct, the law was proposed after the beginning of May.

The negative evidence of Cicero's letters thus accords with the other sources and particularly with Suetonius in support of the view that the *lex de imperio* was not proposed until after the first of May. For an early date two other arguments have been advanced. First, there was in the *lex de imperio* a mention of the Kalends of March,³⁹ and that has led to the assignment of the law to the end of February, and second, the bill has been

³⁸ *Hermes*, LXIII, p. 116. Especially significant are the parallels from Cicero, *Leg. agr.*, II, 99 and III, 16, where colonists are described as *milites* and *exercitus*. The sources make it clear that Pompey's soldiers were used to put the first agrarian law through.

³⁹ Cic., *Prov. cons.*, 36-37.

dated in the period before the death of Metellus Celer which took place not later than the middle of April.

The meaning of the Kalends of March in the *lex de imperio* has been explained by Gelzer.⁴⁰ There was a provision in the law that the senate was not to assign Cisalpine Gaul to another governor before the first of March of 54; a similar provision was also included in the law of Pompey and Crassus of 55, extending Caesar's command another five years, a provision that prevented discussion of the assignment of the two provinces before March 1 of 50. The Kalends of March was a date of some importance in senatorial procedure.⁴¹ It had no connection with the time when the *lex de imperio* was passed.

So far in my discussion of the *lex de imperio* I have done little more than restate the arguments of Gelzer for a date in May or more probably early June, but on Metellus Celer there is a new point of view that needs to be considered. The general opinion is that at the beginning of 59 B. C. Metellus Celer was governor of Transalpine Gaul, but had not yet gone out to his province, and that his death, not later than the beginning of April, opened up a new field of operations. It has been argued that the *lex de imperio*, which did not put that province in Caesar's command, must have been passed before Celer died. But Professor Broughton, interested in establishing a list of provincial appointments, has argued that Metellus Celer was prevented by tribunitian action in 60 from assuming the governorship of the province, and that in the early months of 59 Pomptinus was still governor.⁴² His arguments and his conclusion that the death of Celer has no bearing on the date of the *lex de imperio* provide strong support for Gelzer's dating of the law.⁴³

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 123 ff. This discussion, in my opinion, provides the best solution that has been offered for the terminal date of Caesar's command.

⁴¹ See also Hirschfeld, *Kleine Schriften* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 319 ff.

⁴² "Metellus Celer's Gallic Province," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIX (1948), pp. 73-76.

⁴³ It is tempting to try to fix the date of Pompey's motion in the senate (Cic., *Ad Att.*, VIII, 3, 3) to assign Transalpine Gaul to Caesar. Suetonius (*Iul.*, 22) and Dio (XXXVIII, 8, 5), who do not share the error of Plutarch and Appian in crediting the *lex de imperio* with the assignment of both Gauls, mention the decree immediately after the *lex*, and Suetonius says it was passed soon afterwards. But the word

In this paper I have provided evidence to support Gelzer's view that the *lex de imperio* followed the two agrarian laws and that Caesar depended for its success on the "army" of clients won by his donations. I have tried to establish a new date for the first agrarian law. If my date is correct, Bibulus withdrew at the beginning of the first month in which he held the fasces, and never functioned as consul. My proposals for the chronology of the laws that were passed and of the major events that occurred from January to June of 59 are as follows:—⁴⁴

- January 1 or 2. Caesar, presiding in the senate, proposed the first *lex agraria*. The law was apparently discussed at subsequent senatorial meetings which could have been held on January 5-6, 9-11, and 13-15. Before the law was voted on, certainly one and perhaps several *contiones* were called to present the bill to the people.
- January 25-27. Comitial days following a *trinum nundinum* when the law could be voted on. Bibulus reported an omen and, with the aid of three tribunes, attempted a veto.
- January 28. A veto was prevented by force, and the law was passed.
- January 29. Bibulus protested in the senate and then went home to shut himself up in his house until the last day of the year.
- February, beginning. The senators took oath to support the land law.
- February to March. Commissioners were elected to administer the land law. Vatinius passed a series of laws on kingdoms and principalities. After these had been voted on, he passed a law on challenging jurors, which had been promulgated at the beginning of his term.

he employs, *mox*, is elastic in his usage. The decree should not be placed at the end of June or in July, a period for which Cicero (*Ad Att.*, II, 18-24) gives detailed information. If the decree was passed in June, it must date before June 16, for the senate could not meet on the comitial days that lasted from the 16th to the 28th. The first half of June may be the correct date, but a date after the beginning of August is also possible.

⁴⁴ There is no evidence for the exact dates of two other laws of this year, Caesar's extortion law and Fufius Calenus' law on jury votes.

- March 1 to April 3. Caesar proposed and passed the *lex de rege Alexandrino* and the *lex de publicanis*. As *pontifex maximus*, Caesar passed the curiate law transferring Clodius to the plebs.
- May 1. Caesar proposed the *lex Campana*; it was probably voted on by the end of the month. About the same time he proposed and passed the law ratifying Pompey's *acta*.
- About May 2-3. The marriage of Pompey and Julia. The marriage of Caesar and Calpurnia took place about the same time.
- May, after the beginning. Vatinius proposed the *lex de imperio Caesaris*. It was probably not voted on until early June.

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THE MEGARIAN DECREE.

It has become the accepted view that the decree by which Megarians were excluded from the Attic market and the harbours of the Athenian empire was passed in 433 or 432 and that it had a significant place among the chain of events leading to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Precisely what significance is not indeed a matter of agreement. Those who explain the outbreak of that war by trade rivalries between Athens and the leading commercial cities of the Peloponnese naturally regard it as a stroke of commercial imperialism on the part of Athens which helped to drive her competitors to the breaking point.¹ Beloch,² who holds that Pericles forced on the war to preserve his own power at Athens and that the decree was one of the measures by which he succeeded in doing this, thinks that the indignation it aroused was the decisive factor that led the Peloponnesian allies to reject Archidamus' advice and resolve on immediate war. Busolt³ apparently treats it as a third incident which along with the Corcyraean and Potidaean occasioned the outbreak. For Adcock it "was not . . . a cause of war, it was an operation of war, the first blow at the courage and will of Athens' adversaries";⁴ the judgement expressed by Glotz⁵ is substantially the same.⁶

From this *communis opinio* of eminent historians of the Peloponnesian war the only dissentient is Thucydides himself. Not only does he not regard the Megarian decree as a cause of

¹ Cf. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (1907), pp. 25-38.

² *Griechische Geschichte*, II², 1, p. 292.

³ *Griechische Geschichte*, III, 2, pp. 810-17.

⁴ *Cambridge Ancient History*, V, p. 186.

⁵ *Histoire Grecque*, II, pp. 618-19.

⁶ Busolt, *op. cit.*, p. 811, n. 1 cites the older literature on the date of the decree; of the writers he names only Steup (see the fifth edition of Classen's *Thucydides*, p. 422) placed the *Handelsperre* before 433, partly on the correct ground that the decree must precede the period of the *aiṛiai* and *διαφοραί* which Thucydides undertakes to record, but partly like Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk d. Thukydides*, p. 123, n. 1, on the basis of a mistaken inference from Thucydides, I, 42, 2; see note 9 below. The views of Bodin, *Autour du Decret Mégarien* (*Mél. littéraires Fac. L. Clermont-Ferrand*, 1910), are unknown to me.

the war—that was of course in his view Athenian imperialism and the apprehension that it aroused at Sparta; he does not even record the decree in the train of events that led up to its outbreak. He mentions the decree in only two connections. (a) It was one of the grievances against Athens voiced by Sparta's allies at the first Peloponnesian congress in 432 (I, 67). (b) In the negotiations of the winter 432-1 the Spartans, besides demanding that the siege of Potidaea should be raised and that the autonomy of Aegina should be restored, declared in the strongest and plainest terms that there would be no war if the Megarian decree were repealed (I, 139, 1; 140, 3-4). But Thucydides gives no inkling that it was a newly passed Megarian decree that turned the scales against Archidamus at the congress; and as for the negotiations he treats them as diplomatic fencing. He writes as if the war would not only have come, but as if it would also have come just when and how it did, even if the Megarian decree had never been passed. In his view it was not even (like the Corcyraean or Potidaean incidents) an occasion (*αἰτία*) of the war. And equally clearly he did not think it an operation of the war; it was his task to record the operations of the war in some detail, and he only alludes to the decree. The refusal of the Athenians to repeal it was an episode in the diplomatic struggle for self-justification and is recorded; the decree itself was no part of his story.

This dissent of Thucydides from the *communis opinio* ought to give us pause. The fact that he held the war to be inevitable did not lead him to treat its preliminaries as trivialities that did not warrant detailed narration. If the Megarian decree was among those preliminaries, why did he fail to inform us when and for what reason it was passed? He represents the revolt of Potidaea as growing out of the hostility between Athens and Corinth engendered by Athenian intervention on behalf of Corcyra and as itself determining the Spartan decision to fight at once; if in the true sequence of events either the Corcyraean or the Potidaean incidents induced the Athenians to pass the Megarian decree, and if this decree was one of the recent circumstances that influenced the Spartan decision, it is incomprehensible that Thucydides should have carelessly omitted or deliberately concealed so important a fact. Certainly he would not have concealed it in order to make the conduct of Athens more

conciliatory than it really was. It was never any part of Thucydides' object to whitewash Athens; he knew that the fact that it was the Spartans who declared war did not make them morally the aggressors; Athenian imperialism *compelled* them to it (I, 23, 6). Thucydides depicts Pericles not as pacific but as unyielding; it would have completed his picture to have stated, if it had been true, that in the delicate diplomatic situation of the autumn of 433 or the summer of 432, Pericles carried the Megarian decree. If Athens had chosen such a moment for a gesture of defiance, calculated "to produce throughout Greece a deep and enduring impression, by showing in a terrible example that she was not to be defied with impunity, that the empire of the sea permitted her to starve out any city (!) that incurred her resentment,"⁷ Thucydides could not have ignored it, and nothing indeed could have provided the Corinthian speakers at the first congress at Sparta with a better illustration of the dangers to be apprehended from the aggressive Athenian character.

The inference to be drawn is that the decree was not passed in 433 or 432, but some time earlier, that it was not classed by Thucydides even among the *αἰτίαι* of the war simply because it was long antecedent to the war and because the long acquiescence of Sparta and her allies in its existence proved that it did not even occasion the war. Of course this inference must be set aside, if strong grounds can be seen for dating the decree to 433 or 432, but such grounds appear to be absolutely lacking.

There is no explicit ancient testimony for the date of the decree.⁸ The earliest dateable reference to its existence is its mention by Thucydides among the complaints made against Athens at the first Peloponnesian conference at Sparta in the summer of 432.⁹ But his language conveys no suggestion that

⁷ Glotz, *loc. cit.*

⁸ Philochorus, quoted by Schol. on Aristoph., *Peace*, 605, dates the Megarian complaints at Sparta, not the decree itself, to 432/1.

⁹ I cannot see any reference to the decree in the words ascribed to the Corinthian envoys at Athens in 433 (I, 42, 2) *τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχούσης πρότερον διὰ Μεγαρέας ὑποψίας*. The word *πρότερον* suggests that, whatever the suspicion was, the occasion for it had passed away; yet if it had been evoked by the decree, it could only have been allayed by its repeal. It is more natural to take the words as alluding to the assistance given by Athens to Megara against Corinth about 460; cf. 103, 4.

it was a recent grievance. Both there and in the negotiations at Athens in the ensuing winter it is mentioned in the same context as the grievance of Aegina. This was a grievance of long standing. It must be assumed that Aegina lost her autonomy at her capitulation in 457 and that whatever vague provisions were inserted to safeguard her rights in the Thirty Years Peace,¹⁰ she did not in fact then recover it, only to lose it again in the interval between 446 and 432. Sparta had thus long given *de facto* recognition to Athens' control of the government of Aegina but that did not prevent her in 432 from demanding the restoration of Aegina's autonomy. Equally she would not have felt precluded from taking up a long standing grievance of Megara. In neither case indeed can we be sure that she had never made any previous representations to Athens; Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 538, quoted below, may show that she had; but in 432 for the first time these representations took the form of an ultimatum.¹¹

But could the tradition that treated the Megarian decree as the cause or immediate occasion of the war ever have arisen if the decree had been passed long before the war? Undoubtedly, yes. The Spartans gave out that in order to avoid war the Athenians had only to repeal the decree (Thuc., I, 139, 2); despite the arguments of Pericles (I, 140, 4), that greater issues were involved than this triviality, some Athenians besides Aristophanes were doubtless convinced, and their numbers would grow with the sufferings of the war. It was therefore easy to say, as Andocides (III, 8) said nearly forty years later, that the Athenians went to war on account of the Megarians, and as memories became dim, it was also easy to confuse the passing of the decree with the refusal to repeal it. This evolution of oral tradition, combined with the evidence apparently provided by Aristophanes, suffices to explain the fact that Diodorus, or rather Ephorus, conveys the impression, though not very explicitly, that the decree was passed shortly before the outbreak of war.¹²

Of course the fact that the words do not refer to the decree does not show that the decree was not then in force; on my view it was.

¹⁰ The Aeginetans said that they were not autonomous *κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς* (I, 67, 2).

¹¹ I, 140, 2: (Λακεδαιμόνιοι) ἐπιτάσσοντες ἤδη καὶ οὐκέτι αἰτιώμενοι πάρεσιν.

¹² Strictly Diod., XII, 39, 4 dates the appeal of Megara to Sparta after

But Aristophanes remains to be considered. In his famous comic account in the *Acharnians* of the origins of the Archidamian war (509 ff.) he describes how "worthless fellows" laid informations against the importation of Megarian wares, how some young Athenians carried off the fair Simaetha from Megara and Megarians retaliated by stealing "two of Aspasia's hussies," and how (530 ff.):

ἐντεῦθεν ὄργῃ Περικλέης οὐλύμπιος
ἤστραπτ' ἐβρόντα, ξυνεκύκα τὴν Ἑλλάδα,
ἐτίθει νόμους ὥσπερ σκόλια γεγραμμένους,
ὡς χρὴ Μεγαρέας μήτε γῇ μήτ' ἐν ἀγορᾷ
μήτ' ἐν θαλάττῃ μήτ' ἐν ἡπείρῳ μένειν.
ἐντεῦθεν οἱ Μεγαρήϊς, ὅτε δὴ πείνων βάδην,
Λακεδαιμονίων ἐδέοντο τὸ ψήφισμ' ὅπως
μεταστραφείη τὸ διὰ τὰς λαικαστρίας·
οὐκ ἠθέλομεν δ' ἡμεῖς δεομένων πολλάκις.
κάντεῦθεν ἤδη πάταγος ἦν τῶν ἀσπίδων.

It is doubtful how far sober history can ever be reconstructed from the jests of comedy. Even if this passage unambiguously implied that the Megarian decree was passed shortly before the outbreak of war, we should not be justified in accepting this as a fact in the face of strong reasons to the contrary. It was at least true that the repeal of the decree had been demanded by the Spartans as a condition of the preservation of peace; this would be remembered by Aristophanes' audience and would afford sufficient basis for them to enjoy his joke, even if he appeared to be putting in 432 a decree passed say in 440. No spectator was going to rise in his seat and say, "This is really not funny; the chronology is quite wrong." But if we must take Aristophanes seriously on such a question, we ought not to be debarred from pressing his words closely. He gives no definite date; the decree *follows* (ἐντεῦθεν, v. 530) the seizure of Aspasia's girls; *thereafter* (ἐντεῦθεν, v. 536) the Megarians apply to Sparta; war begins *after* Spartan representations are rejected. We must indeed note that he says that the Megarians were starving *slowly* when they sought the good offices of Sparta and that the representations of Sparta were rejected *many* times at Athens. These

the Potidaean incident (in 431!), but leaves the decree itself undated in a genitive absolute clause *ὅντος δὲ ψηφίσματος* κτλ. Chronological evidence cannot be expected, and is not found, in Plutarch, *Pericles*, 29-30.

phrases are more compatible with an interval of years between the passing of the decree and the outbreak of war than with one of months. The implications of the language of the *Acharnians* and of the silence of Thucydides are identical; in both cases the evidence points to a date earlier than 433 or 432.

Aristophanes again alluded to the Megarian decree in the *Peace*, 605 ff.:

πρῶτα μὲν γ' αὐτῆς ὑπῆρξε Φειδίας πράξας κακῶς.
 εἶτα Περικλέης φοβηθεὶς μὴ μετάσχοι τῆς τύχης,
 τὰς φύσεις ἡμῶν δεδοικὼς καὶ τὸν αὐτοδᾶξ τρόπον,
 πρὶν παθεῖν τι δεινὸν αὐτός, ἐξέφλεξε τὴν πόλιν,
 ἐμβαλὼν σπινθήρα μικρὸν Μεγαρικὸν ψηφίσματος
 ἐξεφύσησεν τοσοῦτον πόλεμον κτλ.

This passage certainly does afford chronological evidence, though not evidence that the decree was the immediate occasion for the outbreak of war;¹³ if the decree was the spark that kindled the war, it was none the less so, even if it preceded it by some years. What these lines do *appear* to show is that the decree was subsequent to the condemnation of Phidias. Unfortunately there is no agreement about the date of Phidias' trial.¹⁴ If the general view (in which I concur) is right, and it should be dated to 438-7, then the lines quoted above, which suggest that the decree was passed soon after that trial, lend further support to the proposal to date it some years before 432. But no weight could be attached to this evidence. The *Peace* was produced in 421. It is evident from vv. 615-17¹⁵ that no one had previously connected Phidias' trial with the Megarian decree or the origin of the war. Memories of the sequence of apparently unrelated events would be sufficiently dim to ensure that a sense of his chronological inexactitude would not spoil the audience's appreciation of the poet's comic explanation of the cause of the war. Even if the rival dating of Phidias' condemnation to 432-1 had to be accepted, it would still be permissible to hold that for comic effect Aristophanes had confused the true order of events. There would be nothing surprising in this. The humour of his

¹³ As Busolt, *op. cit.*, p. 816, n. thinks.

¹⁴ See *Cambridge Ancient History*, V, pp. 478-80.

¹⁵ Τρ. ταῦτα τοῖνυν μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω 'γὼ 'πεπύσμεν οὐδενός,
 οὐδ' ὅπως αὐτῇ προσήκοι Φειδίας ἡκικήη.

Χο. οὐδ' ἔγωγε, πλὴν γε νυνί.

story rests entirely in its utter improbability, that Pericles who was χρημάτων διαφανῶς ἄδωρότατος (Thuc., II, 65, 8) should have plunged Athens into war to escape a charge of embezzlement, and one historical blunder more or less would not diminish the comic effect of this suggestion.

Granted that the decree was passed well before 433, why and when was it passed? The Athenians justified it, according to Thuc., I, 139, 2, on the grounds that the Megarians had cultivated consecrated soil as well as a strip of No Man's Land on the frontier and had harboured runaway slaves; Aristophanes' tale of the seizure of Aspasia's hussies is doubtless a comic version of the second charge. Disputes of this kind might arise at any time and provide us with no clue to the date. The complaints alleged by Athens against Megara *may* have been no more than a pretence. No doubt the Athenians had hated Megara since her revolt in 446. It may also be that the Athenians suspected that the Megarians had had a hand in the revolt of the Megarian colony of Byzantium in 440, or that they were informed that the Megarians were among those allies of Sparta who had urged intervention in favour of Samos (I, 40, 5); they may have sought the readiest pretext, which could be justified in diplomacy, for punishing Megara for this conduct. All this is guesswork; in plain fact we do not know the date of the decree.

The passage quoted from the *Acharnians* suggests that there were two stages in the action taken against Megara; in the first there was what German scholars have called an *Einfuhrverbot*, i. e. Megarian imports into Attica were liable to sequestration, the execution of the law being left as usual to private informers; in the second—and here we have the decree to which Thucydides refers—not only was this prohibition of Megarian imports into Attica re-affirmed but there was a general *Handelsperre* by which Megara was debarred from sending her goods or even perhaps her ships to all ports in the Athenian empire. The Megarians contended (I, 67, 4) and the Athenians denied (I, 144, 2) that this was contrary to the terms of the treaty, a point which in our ignorance of its text it is idle for us to try to settle.¹⁶

¹⁶ Nesselhauf, "Die diplomatische Verhandlungen vor die Peloponnesischen Kriege" (*Hermes*, LXIX, pp. 286-99), offers a plausible conjecture, which would explain the rival Athenian and Peloponnesian interpretations of the treaty on this point.

The Athenians certainly hoped to inflict loss on the Megarians by their action, and no doubt they succeeded. It has, however, often been thought that their intention was more far-reaching, to coerce Megara to rejoin the Athenian alliance. This was certainly a very natural objective of Athenian strategy; a friendly Megara with an Athenian garrison in Pegae and in Long Walls from Megara to Nisaea secured Attica from invasion by the Peloponnesian army and might permit Athens to resume her attempt to dominate Central Greece. But it is very doubtful if such an objective could have been attained by the decree.

We do not know the extent to which Megara was dependent on trade with the subjects of Athens. Further we may doubt how far the decree could have been enforced. There is no ground for supposing that the Athenians kept a ship in every port to seize blockade runners. The allied cities would have no motive for applying the decree strictly; their interest was to buy the goods that Megara could best supply, and their self-esteem must have been offended by the attempt of Athens to control their trade. Aristophanes' statement that the Megarians were slowly starving may be taken as comic exaggeration. That they suffered inconvenience may be assumed; but if there had been serious danger of their being reduced to submission to Athens by economic pressure dating perhaps from 440 or 439, it would not have needed the Corcyraean and Potidaean incidents to precipitate war between Athens and the Peloponnesian League.¹⁷ It is true that during the Archidamian war Megara was reduced to serious straits, but although the blockade carried out by Athens in war was then presumably far more effective than the operation of the decree had been in peace,¹⁸ Thucydides attributes her plight to the twice-yearly invasions of the Megarid by the Athenian army and the depredations of oligarchical exiles in possession of the port of Pegae (IV, 66), and not to the cutting off of her trade with the Aegean and Black Sea. It looks indeed as if trade was much less important in Megara's economy than

¹⁷ The murder of the herald, Anthemocritus, by the Megarians (Plut., *Per.*, 30) no doubt shows that the decree caused great bitterness at Megara.

¹⁸ Cf. Thuc., II, 93, 4 for the Athenian fort established on Salamis: τοῦ μὴ ἐσπλεῖν Μεγαρεῦσι μηδὲ ἐκπλεῖν μηδέν. Nicias' capture of Minoa in 427 (III, 51) made the blockade more stringent.

we generally suppose, less important at least than freedom to work her own territory. With the cessation of Athenian invasions after 424 (cf. II, 31, 3), and of the depredations by the exiles, who were then admitted to power (IV, 74), Megara had so far recovered that in 421 she was ready to fight on rather than accept a disadvantageous peace (V, 17, 2).

In 432 then the decree had been in force, perhaps nominally rather than effectively, for many years, without exercising any marked influence on the relations of the Great Powers; why then was a demand for its repeal made as an ultimatum by the Spartans in the winter of 432? It should be recalled that this demand was linked with two others, both of which were from the outset plainly unacceptable. The Spartans could not have expected that the Athenians would even consider raising the siege of a revolted subject city or restoring autonomy to Aegina, the "eyesore of the Piraeus." If these demands had stood alone, it would be obvious that they were no more than attempts to justify a declaration of war on which Sparta was already resolved. But on the face of it the demand for the repeal of the Megarian decree was more reasonable, and it has suggested to modern scholars the notion that the peace-party at Sparta had regained the ascendant and was seeking a genuine accommodation. In fact the contrary seems more probable.¹⁹ For whatever motives the decree had been proposed by Pericles, it had been justified in part on the ground that the Megarians were guilty of sacrilege. This was a plea calculated to impose on the credulous masses at Athens at least as much as on the outside world. It was the time perhaps of the prosecution of Anaxagoras and of Diopeithes'

¹⁹ The best analysis of the final negotiations is that given by Nesselhauf, *op. cit.* He shows that the Spartans put forward their last demand that the Athenians should respect the autonomy of the allies, which plainly stood no chance of being accepted at Athens and was only intended to impress the Greek world at large, at the same time that they did not expressly withdraw their previous declaration that the repeal of the Megarian decree would in itself be sufficient to preserve peace. This procedure strengthened the hands of the peace party at Athens, and would yet have left Sparta free to make further demands if that party had secured the repeal of the decree. My only criticism of Nesselhauf's views is that he has not recognized the strength of the objections that must have been felt at Athens even to repealing the decree.

decree. Politicians imbued with the spirit of the *Aufklärung* might evoke for their own ends a religious fanaticism which they could not allay when they pleased. The *Acharnians* suggests that the Megarian decree was couched in terms of unusual solemnity, and according to Plutarch, *Pericles*, 30, there was a law that forbade its repeal. Of course the law itself might have been repealed, but apart from the fact that this would have involved time and difficulty, its mere existence shows that feelings at Athens were strongly roused against Megara, probably because of the alleged sacrilege. If Pericles, as Thucydides relates, offered to abandon the decree if the Spartans would abandon the *xenelasia*, he made a good debating point; he was not simply suggesting that restrictions on freedom of intercourse should be removed on both sides, but hinting that it was no more reasonable to expect the Athenians to sacrifice their religious feelings than to ask the Spartans to surrender one of their most time-honoured institutions, which, like all those attributed to Lycurgus, was supposed to have the divine sanction of the Delphic oracle.²⁰ We know indeed from Plutarch (*Per.*, 30) that the Athenians were not content to make this rejoinder, as specious as the Spartan demand, and to offer to submit the dispute to arbitration, but that they sent a memorandum to Sparta, justifying their conduct and indicting that of the Megarians; they were confident that justice was on their side.²¹ If Thucydides tells us little or

²⁰ I owe this last point to Professor H. J. Rose, who has also suggested to me that the Athenians probably consulted the oracle themselves on the sacrilege committed by the Megarians and acted with its approval.

²¹ The bearer of this memorandum, Anthemocritus, was murdered by the Megarians; in retaliation the Athenians passed Charinus' decree for which see Plut., *Per.*, 30, [Dem.], XII, 4. Anthemocritus was a herald, and apparently on this ground Busolt, *op. cit.*, p. 815, n. placed his mission and murder between the surprise of Plataea and the setting out of the Peloponnesian army; he cites Thuc., I, 146, which states that between the last Spartan embassy to Athens and the commencement of open warfare ἐπεμείγνυντο δὲ ὁμῶς ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτων ἀκηρύκτως μὲν, ἀνυπόπτως δὲ οὐ; cf. II, 1; during the war οὐτε ἐπεμείγνυντο ἔτι ἀκηρυκτεῖ παρ' ἀλλήλους. This argument is not decisive. Heralds were employed not only between states at war or not enjoying diplomatic relations with each other, but for quite other purposes; e.g. heralds inform the subjects of Athens of the decree imposing the use of Athenian currency, etc. (Tod, *G. H. I.*, I², no. 67) and of their obligation

nothing of all this, it is not surprising; he rarely gave full weight to the strength and practical effect of religious or sentimental considerations, doubtless because he himself was immune from their influence. Nor was it necessary for his purpose that he should say more of the Megarian decree. He had already stated that the war was caused by Spartan fear of Athens, he had made it plain that the Spartans had already taken their decision and obtained, as they thought, Delphic sanction for it, he had said explicitly that the Spartans were only concerned in the negotiations to secure the best possible pretext for war, if the Athenians did not comply with their demands (126, 1). The demand for the repeal of the decree was coupled with others patently unacceptable, and was soon superseded by the sweeping claim that Athens should leave all her allies autonomous. Thucydides must have thought—and with reason—that no reader could for a moment have supposed that the Spartans meant peace. This was the essential point; no need for him to go into all the intricate details of the diplomatic fencing. And on this point, if the present analysis of the Megarian decree is correct, Thucydides was right; the Spartans were asking what they knew the Athenians were least likely to concede, until with the return of campaigning weather they could continue their diplomacy by other means.

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to send first fruits to Eleusis (*ibid.*, 74); a herald is sent to Plataea, to advise against the immediate execution of the Theban prisoners (Thuc., II, 6, 2); in Herodotus the word often means no more than messenger, cf. Powell, *Lexicon to Hdt.*, s. v. κήρυξ, though not all his instances of this sense are right. Probably the Athenians sent a herald rather than an ambassador, whenever they wished to convey information or orders or, in the present instance, a protest to another city, and not to enter into negotiations. Thuc., I, 146 does not of course mean that no heralds conveyed messages between Athens and Sparta during the period in question, but that as yet intercourse was not confined to the sending of heralds. Charinus' decree presupposes that military operations had begun or were imminent, and is perhaps later than the attack on Plataea, but Anthemocritus' mission more likely belongs to the winter; after Plataea both sides were preparing for war (II, 7, 1), not sending notes to each other.

Addendum.

In the third volume of *The Athenian Tribute Lists* (Princeton, 1950), published since the preceding paper was written, Meritt, Wade-Gery and McGregor date the Megarian decree to 432; besides the ancient evidence already discussed they cite (p. 321, n. 87) [Lysias], VI, 10 and 54, passages which would not establish its date, even if they were known to refer to the decree at all. They have, however, made a suggestion which, if sound, would refute part of my case for proposing a much earlier date.

I have contended that the Megarian grievance should be associated in time with the Aeginetan and that the Aeginetan grievance was of long standing. The authors of *A. T. L.* hold, on the contrary, that in 432 "it was probably recent" (p. 303, n. 10). They suggest that the clause in the Thirty Years Peace which stipulated that Aegina should be autonomous was phrased like part of a clause in the Peace of Nicias (Thuc., V, 18, 5), providing that certain cities should be autonomous, on condition that they paid the tribute of Aristides' time. By analogy the Thirty Years Peace might have provided that Aegina should be autonomous, so long as she continued to pay the tribute of 30 talents fixed at the time of her capitulation. They note (p. 320) that in the spring of 432 Aegina paid only 9 or 14 talents, and infer that "this partial payment exposed her perhaps to the action which Athens now took. We are not told exactly what this action was, only that later in the year Aegina complained privately at Sparta that her autonomy was being violated. Possibly Athens installed a garrison; strategic control of Aegina was vital in case of war."

This language does not make it as clear as could be wished that the proposed reconstruction of events is merely conjectural. Not only are we not told by any ancient authority "exactly what action" Athens took against Aegina in 432; we are not told that Athens took any action at all. It remains my conviction that Thucydides would not have passed it over in silence, if shortly before the outbreak of the war Athens had taken action against either Aegina or Megara, and if that action had been one of the events directly occasioning the outbreak or even a military precaution, an act of war prior to the beginning of formal hostilities.

What then of Aegina's failure to pay 30 talents in 432?

In the first place we do not even know that Aegina was still liable to pay this sum in the sixth assessment period; her name is not extant on any quota list between that of 440/39 (in the fourth period) and 432 (see *A.T.L.*, I, p. 218). Perhaps Athens had reduced her tribute, on the ground of temporary impoverishment. There is of course no evidence to point to this, but that is not a serious difficulty; we know little of the detailed history of Aegina, or indeed of the economic history of any Greek cities at this time.

Secondly, even if this possibility is discounted, even if we admit that Aegina's low payment in 432 *necessarily* implies that she was in default (perhaps in expectation of a general war), it does not follow that Athens then took action to deprive her of such autonomy as she still possessed. No doubt she pressed her for payment of arrears; but it can hardly be true that she installed a garrison, or else Thucydides' statement of the Aeginetan grievance must surely have been more specific. It is no less clear that Athens did not set up a puppet government. Thucydides says indeed (I, 67, 2) that the Aeginetans voiced their grievance at Sparta in secret, but that does not suggest that the complainants were merely private citizens and not the government of Aegina.

What then did the Aeginetans mean by the assertion that they had been deprived of autonomy? Partly perhaps that like the other allies they had been deprived of full rights of jurisdiction.¹ But it may also be that they regarded the tribute itself as a breach of autonomy.² "Autonomy" is not a precise term; frequently it means simply "independence" (e.g. V, 27, 2;

¹ In the treaty of alliance between Sparta and Argos in 418 juridical equality is closely associated with autonomy, Thuc., V, 79, 1: *ταὶ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλεις . . . κοινανέοντω τῶν σπονδῶν καὶ τὰς ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλεις, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες κατὰ πάτρια δίκας διδόντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας.*

² In several passages Thucydides seems to take payment of tribute as a criterion of subjection; VII, 57, 4: *τῶν μὲν ὑπηκόων καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῶν . . . Χίοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ὄντες φόρον, ναῦς δὲ παρέχοντες αὐτόνομοι*; VI, 85, 2: *Χίους μὲν καὶ Μηθυμναίους νεῶν παροκωχῇ αὐτονόμους*; VI, 84, 3: *καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς . . . ξύμφορος ἡμῖν ἀπαράσκευος ὦν καὶ χρήματα μόνον φέρων, τὰ δὲ ἐνθάδε καὶ Λεοντῖνοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι φίλοι ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτονομούμενοι.* Of course this identification would not have been possible when the Delian league was founded, and the autonomous members paid *φόρος*, not at Athens' behest, but for common purposes and by common consent.

VIII, 91, 3), and a city might feel her independence lost, not only if a constitution or garrison were imposed on her from outside, but also if she were forced to pay tribute to another state at a rate and for purposes which that state determined at her own discretion. The authors of *A. T. L.* assume indeed that the Thirty Years Peace explicitly provided both that Aegina should be autonomous and that she should pay tribute at a fixed rate. If that had been so, Aegina could not have complained that the imposition of tribute infringed the autonomy promised her by the treaty. But the assumption is not necessary to account for the known facts. It may also be that the treaty listed Aegina among the allies of Athens³ and provided that she should be autonomous without defining the nature of this autonomy. In that case the Athenians could have interpreted the treaty to mean that they were within their rights in imposing tribute on Aegina as on other cities listed as allies, though not as in other cases in interfering in her internal government. The Aeginetans, on the other hand, while continuing to pay under *force majeure*, may never have ceased to protest against what they considered an infringement of their independence. If this be so, the clause in the Peace of Nicias, cited in *A. T. L.*, is not a parallel to the provision affecting Aegina in the Thirty Years Peace, but represents perhaps an attempt to remove an ambiguity in the meaning of the term "autonomy" which experience of the working of that provision had revealed.

All this is certainly conjectural, but suffices to show that the epigraphical evidence for the theory in *A. T. L.* can be interpreted in a way more compatible with the silence of Thucydides about the origin of the Aeginetan grievance. That silence surely implies that it did not arise from any new action taken by Athens just before the meeting of the Peloponnesian congress, and the quota-lists do not require us to believe that it did.

One last word. Thucydides makes the Corinthians complain that the Spartans had wilfully closed their eyes to the insidious aggressions of Athens; "we know the path they take and their manner of proceeding against their neighbours *by gradual steps*" (*κατ' ὀλίγον*—I, 69, 3). The point of this would have been lost if it had been true that all the aggressive acts of Athens, of which her enemies were then complaining, had been crowded into the few preceding months.

³ Cf. *A. T. L.*, III, p. 304, n. 15, based on Thuc., I, 35, 1; 40, 2.

ROMAN NAMES AND THE CONSULS OF A. D. 13.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the name of C. Silius, one of the ordinary consuls of A. D. 13,* and to touch upon the matter of suffectus in the same year. L. Munatius Plancus, the other ordinary, does not enter the problem. The name of Silius appears in standard works¹ as "C. Silius A. Caecina Largus" or "C. Silius (P. f. or P. f. P. n.) Caecina Largus," and we have been unable to find any questioning of these forms; but we should like to suggest the possibility that Silius should be known simply as "C. Silius" and that A. Caecina Largus was quite another person, a suffect of the same year.

An examination of all the names in the first edition of the *Prosopographia* and in the volumes of the second edition that have appeared to date shows no example (if one discounts Silius) of a name composed of two complete names in juxtaposition (each with praenomen and nomen, with or without a second nomen, and with or without cognomen) earlier than the Flavian period, over fifty years later.² We are aware that custom and law with respect to the formation of names had been undergoing changes: in the Augustan period it became fashionable to use cognomina as praenomina,³ perhaps through the influence of

* All dates here are of the Christian era unless "B. C." is added.

¹ E. g., *C. I. L.*, I¹ (1863), pp. 475 (XIV, year 766), 629 (*s. v.* Sillii); *C. I. L.*, I², 1 (1893), pp. 166 (year 766-13), 353 (*s. v.* Sillii); P. von Rohden-H. Dessau, *P. I. R.*¹, S 507 (1898); Nagl, *R.-E.*, Silius, no. 12 (1927); E. Groag-A. Stein, *P. I. R.*² after C 100 (1936); A. Degraffi, *I. I.*, XIII, 1 (1947), p. 532, year 13-766; *Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius* collected by Victor Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones (Oxford, 1949), p. 40, year 13.

² The earliest examples are C. Marius Marcellus Octavius Publius Cluvius Rufus, suffect in 80 (*P. I. R.*¹, M 231, *R.-E.*, Marius, no. 46); L. Pompeius Vopiscus C. Arruntius Catellius Celer, suffect *ca.* 72 (*P. I. R.*¹, P 501); C. Octavius Tadius Tossianus L. Iavolenus Priscus, suffect after 83 and distinguished jurist—Pliny the Younger's absent-minded Iavolenus Priscus (*P. I. R.*¹, O 40, *R.-E.*, Octavius, no. 59); M. Larcus Magnus Pompeius Silo, suffect in 82 (*P. I. R.*¹, L 58, *R.-E.*, Larcus, no. 16); C. Antius A. Iulius Quadratus, consul in 94 (suffect) and 105 (ordinary) (*R.-E.*, Antius, no. 10, *P. I. R.*¹, Iulius 338, *Epigraphica*, III, p. 24 and note 11).

³ E. g., Paullus Fabius Maximus and his brother, Africanus Fabius

Augustus' use of "Caesar" as praenomen, and the first examples of nomina used as cognomina, without change of form, are found then.⁴ It has been supposed that such names represent cases of adoption—the second nomen being the adoptee's original one—, but the evidence is not sufficient for certainty. In any event the traditional way of forming the name after adoption seems to have been as follows: the adoptee took over his adoptive father's three names, to which he added as a fourth his original nomen expanded into a form ending in *-anus*; e. g., C. Octavius *Kaivias* (?) Thurinus, adopted by C. Iulius Caesar, became C. Iulius Caesar Octavianus (though apparently he himself avoided "Octavianus" as too plebeian); if the adoptive father had no cognomen, the adoptee retained his own, if he had one (e. g., T. Pomponius Atticus, adopted by his uncle Q. Caecilius, became Q. Caecilius Q. f. Pomponianus Atticus).⁵ If either adoptive father or adoptee, or both, had more than one cognomen (i. e. before the adoption), how many of these the adoptee ended up with, and their order in his final name, are questions not yet clearly answered and not a part of the present study.

Though this traditional system lasted at least into the reign of Tiberius (Sejanus is an example), the case of Brutus—M. Iunius Brutus, adopted by his uncle Q. Servilius Caepio, became Q. Caepio Brutus—indicates that changes had begun before the end of the Republic, and by Tiberius' reign we find frequent examples of a new method of making names after adoption, particularly adoption by will (which Roby⁶ says "appear to be really appointment of heir with direction to bear testator's name"). The adoptee writes his new father's praenomen and nomen, then his own original nomen unchanged, and finally either his new father's cognomen or his own original one. Thus

Maximus, consuls in 11 and 10 B. C.; Iullus Antonius, cos. 10 B. C.; Cossus Cornelius Lentulus, cos. 1 B. C.; Sisenna Statilius Taurus, cos. in 16; Mamercus Aemilius Scaurus, suffect under Tiberius. See Klebs, *P. I. R.*¹, C 1124, and Groag, *P. I. R.*², C 1380.

⁴ E. g., P. Sulpicius Quirinius (cos. 12 B. C.). Cf. Mommsen, *Ges. Schr.*, IV (Berlin, 1906), p. 405; Groag, *P. I. R.*², F 121, note.

⁵ See Ernst Fraenkel, *R.-E.*, XVI, 2 (1935), col. 1662, 6 ff., s. v. *Namenwesen*.

⁶ Henry John Roby, *Roman Private Law in the Times of Cicero and of the Antonines* (Cambridge, 1902), I, p. 59, note 1.

we find M. Acilius Memmius Glabrio, *C. I. L.*, VI, 31543 (probably Tiberian, before A. D. 24: *P. I. R.*², A 75), and C. Sallustius Passienus Crispus, cos. suff. in 27, cos. in 44, adoptive son of the historian's adoptive son,⁷ whose cognomina Glabrio and Crispus (Passienus is a nomen) appear to come from the adoptive fathers; and Sex. Tedi- (or Teidius) Valerius Catullus, suffect in 31 (Groag, *R.-E.*, Teidius, no. 3), and C. Petronius Pontius Nigrinus, cos. in 37 (*P. I. R.*¹, P 218), whose cognomina seem to be their original ones. Cf. also T. Rustius Nummius Gallus, suffect in 34 (Degrassi, *I. I.*, XIII, 1, p. 218, note on 34, 46 f.).

Polynomials became quite frequent and fairly complicated in the latter part of the first century and in the second century, but it seems clear that a person commonly used only part of his name for general purposes. It has been held⁸ that he might employ any combination he pleased of nomina and cognomina from among those to which he was entitled, being bound only to use the praenomen which went with the nomen he choose to use ("la loi de l'adhérence du *praenomen* au *gentilicium*"). In these cases of polynomials through adoption, apparently the name acquired from the adopter came first, but scholars seem to doubt that this was an absolute rule.⁹

It is true that the emperor Galba, who was consul first in 33 and was adopted by his step-mother in her will, used two praenomina, but there is no case in which both his praenomina appear in the same reference, and Galba is the first person (again discounting Silius) for whom there is any evidence for the use of two praenomina (i. e. sometimes one, sometimes the other).¹⁰ Neither Clément Pallu de Lessert nor Degrassi mentions anyone earlier, and we have been unable to find any earlier examples

⁷ *P. I. R.*¹, P 109; Otto Hirschfeld, *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten*² (Berlin, 1905), p. 26, note 1; Stein, *R.-E.*, Sallustius, no. 11, col. 1955, 65 ff.; *P. I. R.*², C 1387; *I. I.*, XIII, 1, no. 24, p. 299, A. D. 27, with Degrassi's note, p. 300.

⁸ A. Clément Pallu de Lessert, *Soc. Nat. des Ant. de France, Cent. 1804-1904, Recueil de Mémoires* (Paris [1904]), pp. 369-375, esp. pp. 371 f., 373.

⁹ For treatment of names in the empire see also Mommsen on the younger Pliny, *op. cit.* (note 4), pp. 394-412 (from *Hermes*, III [1869], pp. 59-77); Fraenkel, *loc. cit.*, cols. 1648-1670 (especially good for origins of names); A. Degrassi, *Epigraphica*, III (1941), pp. 23-27.

¹⁰ On Galba see Degrassi, *op. cit.*, pp. 25 f.

elsewhere. C. Appius Iunius Silanus, consul of 28, seems to be an entirely different kind of case and unique in his period: Mommsen and others have conjectured that the "Appius" came from his mother's family, the Claudii (*R.-E.*, Iunius, no. 155).

Silius, who apparently was the son of P. Silius Nerva, consul of 20 B. C., the brother of P. Silius, consul suffect of 3, and of A. Licinius Nerva Silianus, consul of 7, and the father of C. Silius, consul designate of 47/48 and unfortunately connected with Messallina,¹¹ is a man on whom we have a fair amount of information from historians and inscriptions (see note 1), and in all this evidence except the index to Book LVI of Dio and the inscribed fasti he is *always* referred to simply as "C. Silius" or, once in the text of Dio, "the Silius" (without cognomen of any kind).¹² If his full name really was "C. Silius A. Caecina Largus," we do not know how he came by the name; if by testamentary adoption, we note that his name by birthright comes first, certainly not the common practice.


Let us examine the four inscribed consular lists in which the year 13 has come down to us in whole or in part. They are the *Fasti Consulares Capitolini* (hereafter designated as *Fast. Cap.*), the *Fasti Fratrum Arvalium*, the *Fasti Scribarum Quaestoriorum*, and the *Fasti Antiates Minores*. It is with the last that we shall begin, since it is from this list that the full name (including the praenomen "Aulus") "C. Silius A. Caecina Largus" has been derived.

The "Lesser Fasti from Antium" (*C. I. L.*, I², p. 72, no. XVI; X, 6639; *I. I.*, XIII, 1, pp. 303 f., no. 26), extant for the years 9-18, are on a marble tablet or slab (see Plate; cf. *I. I.*, XIII, 1, Tab. XC) 40.5 cm. high and 27 cm. wide,¹³ broken off at the bottom and at the upper left-hand corner. Found in June 1846,

¹¹ For these relatives, in order of mention, see *P. I. R.*¹, S 512, 506, L 153, S 505; and *R.-E.*, s. *vv.* Silius, nos. 21, 9, Licinius, no. 137, Silius, no. 4.

¹² The Chronographer of 354, the *Fasti Hydatiani*, and the *Chronicon Paschale* all have "Silanus" or "Filanus" by mistake for "Silius" (*C. I. L.*, I², 1, p. 166; *I. I.*, XIII, 1, p. 532).

¹³ These measurements are taken from Degraffi (*I. I.*, XIII, 1, p. 303). Our squeeze measures somewhat less because of the inevitable slight shrinkage. Measurements given below regarding letter size are from the squeeze and accurate with relation to one another, but doubtless a little short of the actual measurements.



Photograph of a squeeze of *C. I. L.*, I², p. 72, no. XVI = X, 6639
 = *I. I.*, XIII, 1, pp. 303 f., no. 26: the Fasti Antiates Minores.

it is now in the lapidary gallery of the Vatican Museum (panel xxxvii, no. 32). As the photograph shows, the general arrangement is that for each year the two ordinary consuls are inscribed on a single line and the suffect or suffects under them on a separate indented line (or lines, if needed, as for the last year). Except for the year 18 (the last 4 lines) the month and day on which the suffects entered office are not given. The lines containing the ordinary consuls begin at very nearly the same distance from the left edge of the stone (about 1.1 cm. on our squeeze), and those for the suffects are all nearly precisely equidistant from the left edge (3 cm. from it on our squeeze). For the years 12, 15, 16, and 17, the letters SVF precede the names of the suffects, and it has been supposed that this was true also of the years 9, 10, and 18, whose beginnings are lost. For the year 9, this is just spatially possible with a little crowding (line 2), and we believe that the first part of the line as preserved shows evidence of such crowding; and the year 18 probably read SVF·K·FEB·, etc. (spatially suitable). But if SVF had preceded the suffects of 10 (line 4), where the name SER·LENTVLVS begins at precisely the indentation used for all the other lines containing suffects and where there is not the slightest crowding, the line would have had to begin even nearer the margin than the lines below it containing the ordinary consuls. The margin for the lines containing the ordinary consuls decreases a little for the last two years, but for the previous years 1.1 cm. is the narrowest margin there is. The smallest space occupied by SVF·, measured up to the left edge of the following letter, is 2.0 cm. on our squeeze. This would bring the beginning of line 4 to 0.9 cm. from the left margin.

We should perhaps add that line 3 (A. D. 10), as completed "[P. Corn]elius Dolabell·," fits perfectly the arrangement which we have noted. Line 1, in order to begin 1.1 cm. from the edge of the stone and to be completed "[Q. Sulpicius·C]" from other fasti, must show very generous spacing between letters, but note the generous spacing in the rest of the line. Allow:

Margin 1.1 to 1.2 cm.

Q. 1.1 (0.1 cm. more than the only Q we have, line 4, measuring to left side of next letter)

SV	1.3	(as in SVF, in line 7, measuring to right side of V)
(V)L	0.9	(as in PROCVL, line 16, measuring from right side of V and allowing no space between L and following P)
PI	1.2	(as in PAPIVS, line 2, from left side of second P to right side, but not right final, of I)
(I)C	1.0	(as in GERMANICVS, line 6, from right side of I to right side of C)
(CI)	0.25	(as in CAECINA, line 9, from right side of second C to left side of I)
IVS	2.10	(as in SILIVS, line 8, from left side of I to right side of S)
(S).C	1.2	(as in PLANCVS·C, line 8, from right side of S to right side of the C)
<hr/> 10.15 to 10.25 cm.		

We measure 10.3 cm. to the right lower edge of the C (which is just visible on our squeeze) of "Camerinus" (line 1).

There are, to be sure, errors in this list. The suffect of A. D. 11, whom we know from the Fast. Cap., is omitted; "Libo," the cognomen of Scribonius, cos. of 16, is wrongly given to Vibius in the next line (the Fasti Ostienses are fragmentary here but give "Rufinus"—nomen not extant—as the cognomen of the first suffect of 16); "Craecina" (*sic*) is written in the same year for "Graecinus." Nomina and cognomina are also omitted now and then, cognomina are in some cases abbreviated, and in 5 of the 10 years the order of the consuls is reversed from that of the Fast. Cap. (3 times, A. D. 9-13) and the Fasti Ostienses (2 times, A. D. 14-18). But we believe that the indentation of the suffects persisted throughout the tablet and that the scribe's error in line 4 was not a change in his plan of spacing but the omission of SVF before SER·LENTVLVS·Q·IVNIVS·BLAESVS (whom we know from other fasti to be suffects). It seems to us therefore that the natural interpretation of line 9 also is that A. Caecina Largus was a suffect and that the stone-cutter here, as in line 4, simply neglected to cut SVF first. Had "A. Caecina" been part of Silius' name, the scribe, we think, would have crowded the ordinary consuls'

line, as he did in other lines where needed, instead of spreading it and would have abbreviated their cognomina to get the two complete names all in one line, in harmony with the rest of the arrangement.

Only one fragment of the *Fasti Scribarum Quaestoriorum* is still extant in stone (it is of a later period than ours), but on the left side of the first fragment preserved in MS form we have the right end of the lines which contained the year 13 (the beginning of the next column with parts of the years 18 and 19 occupies the right side of the fragment), and we can read -CO COS, for ...Plan]CO COS (the consuls are in the ablative throughout this list). Silius apparently preceded Plancus here, and *C. I. L.* (VI, 32270; I², p. 74, no. XVII) and *I. I.* (XIII, 1, p. 306, no. 27) supply [C. Silio Largo, L. Munatio Plan]CO COS. We should like to point out that, even if it could be determined that spatially something more than "C. Silio" is needed, his filiation could have taken the place of the cognomen (see the filiation for Silanus, cos. of 19, in the same list). So this list offers no evidence for the name of Silius.

The *Fasti* of the Arval Brethren (*C. I. L.*, I², pp. 70 f.; *I. I.*, XIII, 1, pp. 296-301, no. 24) have the fragments of only two words from A. D. 13 (a. u. c. 766): ...]COS in one line and ...]CVS or GVS in the line below (*C. I. L.* reads CVS, but both *C. I. L.* and *I. I.* take them to refer to the cognomen of some suffect. Unfortunately we ourselves do not have squeezes of the pertinent fragments, but judging from the drawings and photograph in *I. I.* and relying on Degraffi's opinion of the reading, we would suggest [SVF·A·CAECINA·LAR]GVS as a spatially satisfactory and the most logical restoration of the line. On the order of the names of the ordinary consuls here we have no opinion. But we feel this list to be a small bit of evidence which favors the belief that "A. Caecina Largus" is a suffect's name and not part of Silius'; although not impossible, it would appear too much of a coincidence to find in the same year both "C. Silius A. Caecina Largus" and an otherwise unknown suffect whose cognomen also ended in GVS.

The *Fast. Cap.* end with the year A. D. 13 (*C. I. L.*, I², p. 29, a. u. c. 766; *I. I.*, XIII, 1, pp. 62 f.). They read for that year:

IMP·CAESAR·DIVI·F·AVGVSTVS·PONT·MAX·TR·POT·XXXV
 TI·CAESAR·AVGVSTI·F·DIVI·N·TR·POT·XIII
 C·SILIVS·P·F· P N ·L·MVNATIVS·L·F·L·N
 (erasure) | PLANCVS

LVDI, etc.

C. I. L. gives the letters C and E of the name "Caecina" in the erasure, but Degrassi reports that he could see no certain trace of these letters. Degrassi (*I. I.*, XIII, 1, pp. 63 and 141, year 13) concurs with Henzen (who first suggested it) in thinking that the erasure contained the words "Caecina Largus" (probably without the "A." for "Aulus"), and he states (pp. 142, col. 1, and 296 *fin.*) that the scribe omitted the suffect for the year because of lack of room, since (p. 20, col. 1 *fin.*) the *ludi* notice for 17 B. C. was already in place when the consuls of A. D. 13 were cut. In proposing that the erasure had contained CAECINA LARGVS, Henzen implied (*C. I. L.*, I¹, p. 450 *fin.*; I², p. 39 *fin.*) that the name had been deleted because of Silius' *damnatio* in A. D. 24, but Mommsen pointed out that this explanation was not satisfactory since the better-known name "Silius" was not erased. Mommsen's explanation (he accepted CAECINA LARGVS as the words erased) was that Silius either had no right to bear the name "Caecina Largus" or later lost the right: this could be due to the *damnatio memoriae* of the person from whom he came by the name, or more probably because Silius, for whatever reason he had combined the name "A. Caecina Largus" with his own, found that the combination was untenable under current law, and so it was removed by official order from the Fast. Cap., where it had come from some popular list (*C. I. L.*, I, both edd., *ad loc.*; *Ges. Schr.*, IV, pp. 405 f.). Although no objection to the explanation can be made if one accepts the premise that only *Caecina Largus* was written here (and erased), it is pure conjecture and not deduction from evidence.

Again we have no squeeze, and the photographs available (e. g. Tab. XLII, no. xlviii, of *I. I.*, XIII, 1) are not completely helpful, but several things may be noted. First, the erasure covers a space much larger than that needed for "Caecina Largus" and begins immediately under the "C." of "C. Silius,"

suggesting an arrangement different from that of any of the preceding years. Then, Silius' name and filiation show unusual and unnecessary spreading: why so, if there was still more of the name to be added and space was cramped already by the *ludi* notice below? Finally, the line to the left of PLANCVS, which can be there only to separate what has gone before, is unique in this list and suggests to us that what preceded was not simply Silius' cognomen but something quite different from the arrangement for the previous years. The very fact that the notice of the *ludi* was already in place would make it necessary to abandon the arrangement for recording suffectus used for the preceding (Christian) years, and it seems possible to us that an attempt may have been made to squeeze the name of the suffect (or suffectus?) into the only space remaining, i. e. under Silius' name. Whether the erasure came because this proved inadequate for the purpose or because the suffect suffered *damnatio memoriae*, or whether something quite different (such as a date or heading for the *ludi* entry) was written and had to be erased, there is no way of knowing. If it is true that there are no sure traces of particular letters in the erasure, it seems fruitless to speculate further on what was there and why it was erased. Our purpose is merely to show on what meager grounds it is stated that the Fast. Cap. give Silius' name as "C. Silius P. f. P. n. / [Caecina Largus]." In our opinion the list offers no evidence that there was more here than "C. Silius P. f. P. n."

We now come to Dio Cassius. Although only Γάιος Σίλιος or ὁ Σίλιος appears in the text of Books LVI and LXI (the latter in epitomized form), the "index" ¹⁴ to the former has Γ. Σίλιος Γ. υἱ. Καΐνα Λάριος, i. e. "C. Silius C. f. Caecina Larius." The errors in filiation and in the spelling of the cognomen find parallels in other examples from Dio's indices, though they have comparatively few major errors. One or two cognomina found only in Dio have not been universally accepted or thoroughly explained: for example, Φούρτιος for L. Calpurnius Piso, cos. 15 B. C., and Ἀρβατος for M. Valerius Messalla Appianus, cos. 12 B. C. (cf. Degrassi, *I. I.*, XIII, 1, pp. 276, 139, for 15 and 12 B. C.). For A. D. 4 the Dio index reads Σέξτος Αἰμίλιος K. υἱ.

¹⁴ The listing of the years' consuls at the beginning of each book, preserved in at least one of the MSS.

Κάτος for Sex. Aelius Catus; for 7, Κ. Καίλιος Μέτελλος Κρητικός for Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus Silanus; and for 17, Γ. Καίλιος Γ. υί. Νέπος ἢ Ροῦφος for C. Caelius Rufus. This last has been variously explained: perhaps a Caecilius was adopted by a Caelius, or an original error ("Caecilius" for "Caelius") may have led to the addition of a cognomen ("Nepos") prominent among the Caecilii Metelli (see *P. I. R.*², C 141).

The Dio index then is the only positive evidence that Silius bore also the names "Caecina Largus," and we cannot regard our case for two men, a consul and a suffect, as proved or provable since it must postulate an error in Dio's index. Errors, however, do exist there, and it is fair to say that to Dio in the early third century a name like "C. Silius (A.) Caecina Largus" would have seemed perfectly normal; if he used a list like the "Lesser Fasti from Antium" which neglected the SVF, he could easily have made the supposed mistake through too hasty an examination. For us it is easier to accept an error on Dio's part than to accept "C. Silius A. Caecina Largus" as a correct name in A. D. 13. All the evidence except Dio's seems to weigh against it.

Degrassi¹⁵ has suggested Favonius (Dessau, 9483; *P. I. R.*², F 121) and M. Lollius (*R.-E.*, Lollius, no. 12) as suffects for A. D. 13. Both these men were consulars and belong to the Augusto-Tiberian period, but we have no evidence for the date of their suffectures. Degrassi believes that 13 is the most likely year (the Arval Brethren Fasti show that one or more suffects held office that year; see above, p. 289, and *I. I.*, XIII, 1, p. 297, no. 24). So to his two possible suffects for the year we add A. Caecina Largus. Although there is no known A. Caecina Largus with whom our man can be identified, "Aulus" is found commonly as a praenomen for the Caecinae (cf. the consul of 1 B. C.), and other Caecinae Lari are known from the Empire (*R.-E.*, Caecina, nos. 16-20; *P. I. R.*², C 100-102).

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¹⁵ *Epigraphica*, VIII (1946, publ. 1948), pp. 34-36.

THE PARADOX OF THE *OEDIPUS*.

Swellfoot the Tyrant, as Shelley entitled his version of this great play, is deservedly the most famous, though it is not the most overpraised, of Greek tragedies. Written during the maturity of Sophocles' powers, it remains, after twenty-five centuries of attrition and admiration, the most self-contained, the most complete, and the most adept of ancient plays. For many reasons none of these superlatives is misapplied; but there is a further reason for praise which appears to have escaped the attention of most critics.¹

The internal, or psychological, structure of the *Oedipus*, it is to be maintained here, is built upon a paradox, which one may suppose represents, at least partially, Sophocles' view of life during the disillusioning and harassing first years of the Peloponnesian War. For the poet, if he is indeed to see life steadily and see it whole, cannot hope to do so without an adjustment of vision. In this play the blind see; and when a man really sees with his eyes, he must summon the will to blind himself in his physical part, for the vision he would otherwise behold is too terrible for sight. Not only this: physical sight is equated with knowledge and light and truth, darkness with their opposites. The paradox is abruptly emphasized when light gives place to night: the protagonist puts out his eyes when he has finally been forced to see.²

¹ Though not that of E. H. Olmsted (*A. J. P.*, LXIX, p. 57), to whose criticism this study owes a great deal. She must not, however, be held responsible for its conclusions.

Most of the modern literature on Sophocles is highly controversial (an exception is the admirably straightforward work of F. Allègre, *Sophocle [Annales de l'université de Lyon, 1905]*), and some of it unrewarding as well (the nadir appears to have been reached in T. von Wilamowitz' *Die dramatische Technik d. Soph.* [1917]; and things have greatly improved since then).

² If it be objected that this makes the play too subtle to follow upon the stage, one may reply that this seems to have been its actual fate at the first presentation; for Philocles *ὁ αἰσχρὸς* (see *Ar., Vesp.*, 462, *Thesm.*, 168) won the first prize. Perhaps also the vigor of the first scene (if the plague was contemporaneously raging) and the horror of the last (when even the sympathetic chorus cannot bear to look at the

This paradox of disillusionment is constantly brought to our attention throughout the play, as will be seen from even a brief analysis of it.³

Aristotle (*Poet.*, 1453 b) justly remarks: δὲ γὰρ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὁρᾶν οὕτω συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον ὥστε τὸν ἀκούοντα τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων· ἅπερ ἂν πάθοι τις ἀκούων τὸν τοῦ Οἰδίπου μῦθον. τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὁψέως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν. The reference to the *Oedipus* is inevitable; and we may note that Aristotle offers no apology for the dramatist's introduction of the blinded hero upon the stage, even though the Chorus in the play cannot bear to look at their former king (1303). For it is the fearful fact, and not the mere ocular testimony, which produces the tragic effect. It is not unlikely that this seemed so obvious to Aristotle that, as often, he allowed his readers to make their own inferences and did not trouble to explain.

But did Sophocles hold such an opinion? He was a playwright and thus occupied with visual matters: he is credited, indeed, with the introduction of scene-painting.⁴ He knew that tragic ideas are intensified by tragic sights, as when he exhibited the dead body of Eurydice in the *Antigone*. In the *Oedipus*, it will

protagonist) may have contributed to a lack of acceptance. Jebb (ed. *O. T.*, p. xxxi) supposes that Philocles' play was very good: even this may not be so, though to accept Aristophanes as a literary critic of infallible discretion is not bargained for here. (G. H. Macurdy, *C. P.*, XXXVII [1942], pp. 307-310, finds the reason for Sophocles' defeat in a political interpretation of 873 ff.)

³ There is omitted, for the moment, a consideration of Sophocles' attitude toward conventional religion. In the opinion of the present writer he was, during the period in which he composed this play, passing through an antireligious phase. Observe that in the *O. T.* there is a complete suppression of the *reason* why Laius, and consequently his son, was doomed. The facts, to be sure, were familiar to an Athenian audience from such plays as Aeschylus' *Laios*, which contained the curse of Pelops (cf. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy*, p. 162). Kierkegaard's famous remark (*Either/Or*, I, p. 112 of the English trans.) is to the point: "... in Greece the wrath of the gods had no ethical character, but only esthetic ambiguity."

⁴ T. B. L. Webster (*Introduction to Sophocles*, p. 9) might perhaps have strengthened his argument about the friendship of Sophocles and Polygnotus by indicating that our poet may well have made this great innovation in stage technique under the influence of such an artistic relationship.

be found, he uses every device in his power, the cumulative effect of which is nothing less than overwhelming.

In the Prologue Oedipus (80-81) prays to Apollo that Creon's news may be bright (*λαμπρός*) as his countenance. The Chorus, upon entering, implores Athena, Artemis, and Apollo to shine forth (*προφάνητε* 163; cf. 474). *Παιὰν λάμπει* (186) and *ἀλκά* (189) has a bright face. (198-200 are not considered, for their meaning is doubtful.) 203-215 are full of light, culminating in lines which may be restored with Arndt: *φλέγοντ' ἀγλαῶπι <δαίρ> πεύκη*.

When the first episode is well under way, we are introduced to Teiresias, who is blind (302, 348, 371, 374 f., 389), but can see the truth (324; cf. 299 ff., 284 ff. where Teiresias is said to "see" just as Apollo does, 369, 436, 461, 563: this theme is later to be masterfully developed at 747). But through the ignorance of his interlocutor he is taunted with falsehood and dissembling⁵ (390 ff., 403). Even the Chorus is deceived on this point (499 ff.) and so is Creon (526). Oedipus, on the other hand, has, to all appearance, eyes; but they are metaphorically blind (337-8, 413)⁶ and will become physically so (419, 454). He speaks ironically of himself as ignorant (397); and that is what he really is (415 f.; cf. 545, 550). Blindness is night (374, 419). Apollo's truth has flashed forth (473-5). The Chorus is ignorant and blind (486-8). Only the gods know, man is ignorant (498 ff.); one man, to be sure, may be wiser than another, yet there is no guarantee for the wisdom of a professional seer. Yet, strangely enough, Oedipus, in the chorus' opinion, is the exception to this limitation: he has been found wise by the pragmatic test (509-10) and Teiresias is compared unfavorably with him. Such are the scrupulous devices of the fierce Sophoclean irony ("il met une conscience rare à préparer les dessous de son sujet," as Allègre remarks).

In the second episode eyes and mind are equated (528). Creon is false and ignorant (548, 552); but yet maintains a certain wisdom in his ignorance (569). Oedipus' lack of knowledge is

⁵ And Oedipus (388-9) declares that Teiresias can only see when it is to his financial advantage to do so.

⁶ Ancient criticism (see Jebb's note) already recognized the ambiguity of 337-8, but not that of the first part of 928.

again emphasized (677; cf. 745) at Creon's exit. Jocasta's speech to promote intellectual enlightenment ends with the words

ὦν γὰρ ἄν θεός
χρείαν ἐρευνᾷ ῥαδίως αὐτὸς φανεί.

The light thrown on the situation quickly brings about the first crisis, awakening in Oedipus

ψυχῆς πλάνημα κάνακίνησις φρενῶν (727).

Light has indeed been thrown on darkness (754); and it is clear that the blind can see (747). The slave who alone saw the truth no longer wishes to see it (759, 762; cf. 118 f.). It was Apollo who revealed the truth (790); but Oedipus is no longer in his right mind (915 f.), the confusion of which is well illustrated by his conjecture (969-70) as to the way in which he may have been responsible for Polybus' death.

And now we come to the great εἰκῇ κράτιστον ζῆν speech, in which it is not impossible that Sophocles may have embodied some measure of his own feeling about contemporary life, making the words fall with perfect naturalness from the lips of this pitiful woman, destined for a speedy and a fearful doom.⁷ For our purposes, after noting that πρόνοια is never σαφής (978, which by now has become a favorite word), we must briefly reflect upon 981-3:

πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη κὰν ὀνείρασιν βροτῶν
μητρὶ ξυνενάσθησαν· ἀλλὰ ταῦθ' ὅτῳ
παρ' οὐδέν ἐστι ῥᾶστα τὸν βίον φέρει.

In plain, prefreudian terms, incest is a dream in darkness (cf. Plato, *Rep.*, 571 C-D): in the light of day, he who would be happy must ignore such dreadful manifestations. Ignorance and blindness, it may be inferred, are better, at least to Jocasta's way of feeling.

We must note that it is from this frank, but misguided, discussion of intimate topics before a total stranger that the second

⁷It is impossible to overpraise Sophocles' care and skill in the treatment of Jocasta. She is the second of his great portraits of unfortunate women, of which Tecmessa was the first and Deianeira the last and greatest. Oedipus is, to be sure, the very opposite of Jocasta: he could not endure to live "at random"; in the words of Plato, *Gorg.*, 503 C: οὐκ εἰκῇ . . . ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι.

revelation (989 ff.) springs. We discover, through the Corinthian's agency, that Oedipus is ignorant of the true purport of his actions (1008). It is his sincere desire to throw light on unknown matters (1059, 1065; cf. 1085); but Jocasta by this time knows only too well that continued ignorance is the only way to preserve her son and husband's well-being (1068) and rushes off to her death.

The wretched herdsman, who next reluctantly appears, also implies that knowledge is a dangerous instrument (1151); and Light, when it comes, shines but once on the protagonist, only to be extinguished (1183), for Oedipus has indeed been revealed (1184) as he is. He looks at the Light for the first and last time, knowing that it will blind him.⁸

In the astonishing stasimon that follows, man is defined in Pindaric terms which suggest a shadow:⁹ that is, something between light and darkness. The Chorus wishes it had never seen Oedipus (1217; cf. 1303) since Time, the all-seeing, has found him out (1213). The lyric terminates with a highly poetical, but somewhat cryptic phrase (cf. 870 and Jocasta's use of *ὀφθαλμός* in 987):

*ἀνέπνευσά τ' ἐκ σέθεν
καὶ κατεκόιμῃσα τοῦμὸν ὄμμα.*

The Messenger remarks that what is being brought to light, as well as that which is yet concealed, is evil (1227). Sight of evil is the most painful thing (1238; cf. 1265, 1271 ff., 1295, 1297). Those who have had wrong knowledge (in this case partly sexual: cf. the ambiguity of 337-8) must live in darkness.

At Oedipus' appearance the Chorus, though it is unable to look, yet wishes to learn and inspect (1303-5). Darkness is horror (1313 ff.). Oedipus finally calls himself blind (1323). Though in darkness he now has knowledge (1325-6). Why should a man see when there is nothing pleasant to see (1334-5)? Oedipus' intellect is pitied (1347), for it is as much the cause of

⁸ Cf. the interesting remarks in L. W. Lyde's *Contexts in Pindar*, p. 14.

⁹ The metaphor may be thought to be more Jebb's than Sophocles'; and perhaps one is wrong to allow *μηδὲν ζώσας* to suggest the 8th Pythian and *Ajax*, 125 f.; but if one compares *Ajax* 1275 and 1257 with this passage, one may comprehend the reason for Jebb's translation and the present interpretation.

his wretchedness as is his evil fate (that is, he wanted to know too much¹⁰). The chorus wishes it had never known him (cf. 1217, 1303 above). Death, it thinks (1368), is preferable to blindness.

But sight is worse, Oedipus declares (1371 ff.): how can a man bear to look upon the unendurable: father, mother, wretched children, innocent fellow-citizens, all cruelly wronged? How can a man, with knowledge of his pollution upon him, endure to see (1385)? Yes, ignorance is indeed bliss (1389-90). The best thing is to conceal the polluted man where he will never again be seen (1411-12). The Sun, Creon remarks, must not look upon such a sight, nor should the light of day (1425 ff.). We must acquire knowledge rightly and not act with unseemly precipitation (1443, 1445; cf. 1518).

At the exodus the insistence of the Chorus on visual terms is perhaps not important, for many, like van Herwerden, Bruhn, Ritter, and Pearson, believe 1524-30 to be an interpolation.

This, then, one may believe, is the paradox of the *Oedipus*: the blind see, yet those gifted with physical sight are, as it were, metaphysically blind. Its chief theme seems to be: the conditions of life being what they are, who knows whether to see is not in reality to be blind?

If such is the case, it is not surprising that the play was beyond the comprehension of the Athens of the poet's day, or of any audience of any day. Sophocles, the craftsman of intricate and subtle language, has written very carefully indeed, as an examination of the vocabulary shows.¹¹ The stages of revelation are

¹⁰ The scholiast does not agree: δέλαιε τῆς συνέσεως ἔνεκα . . . χαλεπὸν γὰρ συνετῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα συνεχεῖς θῆναι. But this does not seem to fit the context here, nor does it agree with 1367. Plutarch, *Mor.*, 522 B-C, somewhat naively ascribes all of Oedipus' troubles to his curiosity, showing, at least, that this was an ancient interpretation.

¹¹ A study of the vocabulary of revelation yields some interesting results; φαίνειν and its compounds are used some 36 times; that is, in one out of every 40 lines. Other words of the same or related meaning, such as δεικνύναι, δηλοῦν, μηνύειν, σημαίνειν, and the like, swell the total to 58: one out of every 25 lines in the play. Similar collections, perhaps even larger, might be made for words of knowledge and ignorance; seeing, light, and darkness; truth and falsehood. The vocabulary of the play is compact and relatively small: every line tells, and every other line contains an important word. The obvious fact that similar collections could be made from the *Philoctetes* is not unimportant and

dexterously balanced, as has often been noted. The protagonist is at first revealed as an admirable man, happy, rich, powerful, a good king, devoted to his subjects and his family. His tragic flaw, if such a phrase be applicable, is symbolized, if the word is not too weak, by the precipitous haste with which he jumps to conclusions about the motivation of other people (656-7): Teiresias, Creon, Jocasta, all the named characters in the play, are one after another rejected without adequate cause. The rash speed with which he curses himself at the beginning of the play is paralleled by his hasty self-blinding at the end.¹² His quickness to suspect and to condemn others is contrasted with a painful slowness to grasp the appalling facts about his own situation.

"Oedipe," says Allègre, "est un être impulsif qui fait tout avec passion, mais qui ne sait jamais ce qu'il fait."¹³ In an ominous moment, he dubs himself the child of Fortune: it is a belated recognition of his talents, though not of his limitations, as a scion of Chance, of which neither bad nor good may be rationally predicated. His emotional nature is by no means commensurate with the vigor of his intellect or the headstrong ruthlessness of his self-assurance. Finally, having discarded all external cooperation, he stands alone, but in total darkness. In a literally blinding flash the truth is revealed. As Sophocles seems to have believed, it was the beginning of his career as a hero,¹⁴

indicates, one may believe, that the problem there was somewhat similar to the one confronting the dramatist here.

¹² This (*pace* Allègre, p. 329) is one of the reasons why Sophocles did not adopt Euripides' expedient of having Laius' old servants put out Oedipus' eyes.

¹³ P. 362; cf. pp. 379 f.: "Si maintenant l'on recherche par quel moyens de détail Sophocle a réussi à suspendre si longtemps la révélation fatale, on verra qu'il n'en a pas employé d'autre que celui dont la fatalité elle-même se sert pour aveugler ses victimes et les perdre."

¹⁴ See *O.C.*, 74. A hero is technically a man above merely human actions: his motivation and aspirations are directed by a supranormal impulse, as illustrated by the *O.C.* throughout. But here, as Allègre admirably puts it (p. 367): "Tout y arrive de ce que les dieux ont résolu et rien n'y arrive de ce que les hommes veulent; tous sont au même degré frappés d'aveuglement, comme si l'air fatal au milieu duquel ils se meuvent les pénétrait de son poison." (We shall have to except Creon: see the next note.)

but the end of his happiness on earth. He joins Teiresias in endless night; and like the seer, he has begun to see.¹⁵

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Περιεόκκασα—ARISTOPHANES, *KNIGHTS*, 697.

About the middle of the *Knights* of Aristophanes, in a quick exchange of abuse between Cleon and the Sausage-Seller, the latter jeers (696-7):

ἦσθην ἀπειλαῖς, ἐγέλασα ψολοκομπῖαις
ἀπεπυδάρισα μύθωνα, περιεόκκασα.

The last word here represents Dindorf's emendation—substantiated by Photius (*s. v.*) and universally adopted by editors—for the *περιεόκκασα* or *περιεόκκνυσα* of the manuscripts.

The verb *περιεόκκασα* is a *hapax legomenon*. It is not glossed in Hesychius, Suidas, or the *Etymologicum Magnum*—nor, indeed, is its hypothetical original, **κοκκάω*. The compilers of modern lexicons, in common with practically all editors, while keeping the reading *περιεόκκασα*, translate as if the root word were *κοκκύω*, “utter the sound ‘cuckoo,’” or “crow,” as a cock. The new Liddell-Scott-Jones dictionary, for instance, renders *περικοκκάω* as “cry cuckoo all around.” Samples of the translations of the passage by various editors are as follows:

¹⁵ Many new facets of Sophocles' subtle mind are revealed by each fresh perusal of the play from the point of view outlined here, such as the significance in the parodos of the apostrophe, ἄμβροτε Φάμα (158). Cf. Bultmann, *Philol.*, XCVII, p. 12: “Der Gegensatz von Licht und Finsternis ist . . . im Griechentum kein ethischer Dualismus . . . Der Gegensatz von Licht und Dunkel ist . . . vielmehr der von Heil und Unheil.”

One of the most interesting of the phenomena brought to light (as against Wilamowitz, *Hermes*, XXXIV [1899], pp. 61 ff.) is the relevance of the character of Creon, the neutral figure standing apart from the plot, neither seeing nor blind, neither active nor passive, not good nor yet evil. Creon alone is given no development within the play, and Creon alone has not been blinded by knowledge when the play is over. But the Sophocles who had already written the *Antigone* had a worse fate in store for him.

"I like your threats; I'm wonderfully tickled To hear you fume; I skip and cuckoo around you" (Rogers, Loeb); "Oh! How he diverts me with his threats! His bluster makes me laugh! And I dance the *mothon* for joy, and sing at the top of my voice, cuckoo" (Black and Gold; also Oates and O'Neill); "Your threats and bounce I laugh at, dance on you The double-shuffle—cock-a-doodle-doo!" (Way); "Je danse un *mothon*! Je crie tout à l'entour 'cocorico'!" (Van Daele); "It makes me laugh, it amuses one to see him Bluster and storm! I whistle and snap my fingers" (Frere); "I dance a horn-pipe, and cry cock-a-doodle-do over him" (Merry); "Suave mihi est audire tuas minas; rideo fumos tuae jactantiae, saltito *mothonem*, alta voce canto" (Dindorf); "Mich vergnügt dein Drohn, dein Holtergepolter macht mir Spass, Wie ein Böcklein muss ich springen, kräh'n wie ein Hahn dazu!" (Droysen); "I like your threats, laugh at your empty bluster, dance a fling, and cry cuckoo all round" (Hickie); "Dolce m'è il suon di tue minaccie, e rido De tuoi gran vanti al fumo, or salta, ch'io Quasi cuculo canto" (di Bagnolo); "The threats I like; the smoky brags I laugh at; The scamp I kick away, and cuckoo at him!" (Walsh); "Recht hübsch geflucht, dein Drohen macht mir Spass, Ich tanz' und spring' und schnalze vor Vergnügen!" (Seeger); "J'aime tes menaces, je ris de ta jactance, je te fais la nique, et je me moque de toi" (Artaud), with note: "Littéralement, 'Je danse le *mothon* (danse obscène), et j'imité le chant du coq'"; "I admire These threats, and ridicule thy vamping; I leap, and sing aloud with cuckoo's note" (Wheelwright); "Mir behagt die Drohung, lachend hör' ich den Prahlerwind, Ab trampel' ich den Plumptanz, and umher kukuk ich eins!" (Voss).¹

¹ The editions cited in this paragraph are: *Aristophanes, with the English Translation of Benjamin Bickley Rogers*, Loeb ed. (London, Heinemann; New York, Putnam, 1927), I, p. 191; Anon., *Aristophanes, The Eleven Comedies*, Black and Gold ed. (New York, Liveright, 1930), I, p. 42; Whitney J. Oates and Eugene O'Neill, Jr., *The Complete Greek Drama* (New York, Random House, 1938), II, p. 505; Arthur S. Way, *Aristophanes in English Verse* (London, Macmillan, 1927), I, p. 84; *Aristophane—Les Acharniens, Les Cavaliers, Les Nuées*, traduit par Hilaire Van Daele (Paris, Belles Lettres, 1923), p. 110; *The Acharnians and Three Other Plays of Aristophanes*, translated by J. Hookham Frere (London, Dent; New York, Dutton, 1911), p. 104; W. W. Merry, *Aris-*

In the interpretation of the word in question, it seems to me that too little attention has been given to the testimony of the early commentators on the passage—Photius and the scholiast. The former's gloss on *περιεκόκκασα* is: "*περιεγέλασα. καὶ κατορχησάμην* <*sic*>· *Ἀριστοφάνης*." The latter's comment is: "*περιεκόκκυσα* <*sic*>· *περιεκορδάκισα. ἔστι δὲ εἶδος ὀρχήσεως*." The rest of his statement is to the effect that the word here implies derision.

If these comments, deriving in all probability from ancient sources, are to be trusted (and I see no reason for doubting their credibility, especially in view of the fact that Dindorf based his emendation on the authority of Photius), then *περιεκόκκασα* would seem to mean here, as Rogers and Voss perceived, "I have cuckooed around you"—i. e., "I have derided you by dancing the cuckoo around you." "Dancing the cuckoo," although metaphorical in this passage, would refer to an imitation of both the movements and the cry of the bird. Whether a distinction in meaning between **κοκκάζω* and *κοκκύζω* is to be inferred, the latter referring to the cry alone, we do not know; but the text of the scholion would argue against this supposition.

The remainder of the line contains mention of another dance—the *mothon*. This was a lewd dance, performed often by sailors or by intoxicated persons.² It was characterized by writhing or wriggling, and apparently also by a striking of the buttocks with the soles of the feet or with the flat hand (Schol. Aristoph. *Knights*, 697 and 796). It seems thus to have been similar to

tophanes, *The Knights*² (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1902), Part II, p. 45; Wm. Dindorf, *Aristophanis Comoediae* (Paris, Didot, 1899), p. 53; J. G. Droysen, *Des Aristophanes Werke*² (Leipzig, Von Veit, 1869), I, p. 129; Wm. J. Hickie, *The Comedies of Aristophanes* (London, Bohn, 1853), I, p. 83; Coriolano di Bagnolo, *Comedie di Aristofane* (Torino, Marzorati, 1850), I, p. 146 and notes, p. 199; Benjamin D. Walsh, *Aristophanes—The Acharnians, Knights, and Clouds* (London, Bohn, 1848), p. 198; Ludwig Seeger, *Aristophanes* (Frankfurt a. M., Rütten, 1845), I, p. 305; M. Artaud, *Comédies d'Aristophane*² (Paris, Lefèvre, 1841), p. 77; C. A. Wheelwright, *The Comedies of Aristophanes* (Oxford and London, Talboys, 1837), I, pp. 323-4; J. H. Voss, *Aristofanes* (Braunschweig, Vieweg, 1821), I, p. 142.

² Photius, *s. v. mothon*; Suidas, *s. v. mothon*; Hesychius, *s. v. mothon*; Pollux, IV, 101; Schol. Aristoph. *Plut.*, 279; Townley Schol. on *Iliad*, XXII, 391; *Et. Mag.*, 589, 57; cf. Lillian B. Lawler, "The Dance of the Ancient Mariners," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXV (1944), pp. 31-33.

the figure called *ῥαθαπνυγίζειν*.³ Such striking of the buttocks was a motif common in the *kordax*, the distinctive dance of Old Comedy.⁴ The verb *ἀποπνυδαρίζειν*, used with *mothon* in our line, is interpreted by the lexicographers (*Et. Mag.*, 696, 3; Schol. Aristoph. *Knights*, 697) as denoting "leap, spring"; and its later form, *πνυγαρίζειν*, is taken as indicating an association with *πυγή* (*Et. Mag.*, 696, 3). Antyllus (*ap. Oribas.*, VI, 31, 1) says that the kicking of the buttocks was done sometimes with both feet together, sometimes with the feet alternating. Photius (*s. v. mothon*) definitely says the *mothon* is *κορδακώδης*—characteristic of the *kordax*.

In the line in question, both the *mothon* and the suggested cuckoo dance are referred to metaphorically. Nevertheless, since the *mothon* is authenticated as a real dance of classical antiquity, associated with the *kordax*, and since the scholiast on the line glosses *περικόκκισα* as *περικορδάκισα*, it would certainly be logical to infer that a cuckoo dance or figure existed, and that it was to be found in connection with the *kordax*. It is well established that bird figures and motifs were common in the Greek dance, and were of high antiquity;⁵ and the very existence of such comedies as the *Birds* of Magnes and of Aristophanes is *a priori* evidence that such figures and motifs were actually used in the choral evolutions of Old Comedy.⁶ In Aristophanes' play, the cuckoo is mentioned only casually (504-7), as "king of Egypt and of all Phoenicia." However, it is entirely possible that one member of the chorus in the play was actually costumed as a cuckoo.

The nature of a mimetic cuckoo dance would not be hard to determine. The European cuckoo, *Cuculus canorus*, is a fairly large bird, with distinctive habits, and the Greeks had observed it with interest since their primitive days. To them, as to the inhabitants of mediaeval England, it was the herald of spring.

³ Hesychius, *s. v.*; Schol. Aristoph. *Knights*, 796; cf. also Hesychius, *s. v. ἀλέσθαι πρὸς πυγὴν*.

⁴ Heinz Schnabel, *Kordax* (Munich, Beck, 1910), pp. 16-19; Kurt Latte, "De Saltationibus Graecorum Capita Quinque," *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, XIII, 3 (1913), p. 21.

⁵ Lillian B. Lawler, "The Dance of the Holy Birds," *C. J.*, XXXVII (1942), pp. 351-61.

⁶ Lillian B. Lawler, "Four Dancers in the *Birds* of Aristophanes," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIII (1942), pp. 58-63.

In early times it was evidently held in high regard. Zeus, we recall, was believed to have wooed Hera in the guise of a cuckoo, on or near Mount Kokkygion, in Argolis (Pausanias, II, 17, 4; II, 36, 1-2; Schol. Theocr., XV, 64); and a cuckoo was perched upon Hera's scepter in the famous chryselephantine statue of the goddess made by Polyclitus for the Argive Heraeum. Cook discusses the implications of the legend.⁷ He sees in it evidence for a prehistoric concept of Zeus as a cuckoo; and he expresses the opinion (III, pp. 63-4) that there is in the story a "relic of the old Minoan belief that gods appeared in the shape of birds." He regards the name of the birds' city in Aristophanes' play, "Cloud-cuckooborough," as ritualistically significant. He also points out (III, pp. 64-5) that the bird has always held the attention of the peoples of Europe. He notes that all over Europe to this day there is a very old tradition that the cuckoo is a bird of good or evil omen, and that it is a sort of daemon which can give or withhold a "long and prosperous life." Pollard,⁸ on the other hand, has, successfully, I believe, upheld the thesis that the idea of a Zeus-cuckoo is a late one, and that the myth is aetiological; but that the connection of the cuckoo with Hera is unquestionably authenticated, and may be a legacy from Minoan-Mycenaean times, when the great mother goddess was habitually associated with birds of many different kinds.

The use of animal mummery and dances in religious rituals was widespread around the Mediterranean, in both prehistoric and historic times.⁹ In it, sacred animals were imitated by costumed worshippers. Such mummery naturally included bird dances of many kinds.¹⁰ Where protected by the secrecy of mystery cults, these dances remained solemn and serious; otherwise, they often degenerated into buffoonery and "horseplay." In Athens, of course, the animal *komos* played a large part in the

⁷ A. B. Cook, *Zeus* (Cambridge, University Press, 1914-40), I, pp. 134-5; 518; 532; II, p. 893 and note 2; p. 1144, note 2; III, pp. 63-8.

⁸ J. R. T. Pollard, "The *Birds* of Aristophanes—A Source Book for Old Beliefs," *A. J. P.*, LXIX (1948), pp. 353-76.

⁹ Lillian B. Lawler, "Pindar and Some Animal Dances," *C. P.*, XLI (1946), pp. 155-9; "Two Notes on the Greek Dance—I, The Fox," *A. J. P.*, LXIX (1948), pp. 87-90; "A Lion among Ladies," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVIII (1947), pp. 88-98.

¹⁰ Lawler, "Holy Birds" (see note 5).

development of Old Comedy.¹¹ Typical of the kind of deterioration in dignity which must inevitably have accompanied portrayal in the rough-and-tumble animal *komos* is the fact that soon "cuckoo" became a synonym for a cowardly, stupid, coarse, or half-crazy person (Aristophanes, *Acharn.*, 598 and schol. *ad loc.*; *Et. Mag.*, 524, 50)—as, indeed, it is to this day, in many languages.

In a dance or figure imitative of the cuckoo we should expect to find movements characteristic of the bird. *Cuculus canorus*, with its slim body, long wings, and long, rounded tail, has a swift, graceful, swooping flight.¹² It is very active, and is in motion from early morning until far into the night.¹³ It seems, however, to make every effort to avoid observation; for it is subject to pursuit and attack even by birds much smaller than itself, because of its resemblance to the hawk (cf. Aristotle, *Hist. An.*, VI, 563 b; XI, 618 a), and because of its parasitism in laying its eggs in other birds' nests.¹⁴ Light and graceful as it is in the air, it is singularly clumsy on the ground. There its one form of locomotion is an awkward, flopping hop,¹⁵ because of the fact that the arrangement of its four toes (two pointing forward and two pointing backward) precludes easy walking or running. The shrill mating-call of the male bird is familiar in all parts of Europe. As it perches on a bough, screeching "Cuckoo!" at the top of its voice, it sometimes turns in a circle about its own axis.¹⁶ Rival males fight bitterly, striking one another with beak and wings.¹⁷ All of these characteristic actions would lend themselves well to imitation in a mimetic dance.¹⁸

¹¹ Roy C. Flickinger, *The Greek Theatre and Its Drama*⁴ (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936), p. 38.

¹² Alfred E. Brehm, *Die Vögel*³ (Leipzig and Vienna, Bibliographisches Institut, 1900), II, p. 79; Walther Kahle, *Der Kleine Brehm* (Berlin, Voegel, 1924), p. 362. I am indebted to Dr. Emory E. Cochran, of New York City, who first called my attention to Brehm's work.

¹³ Brehm, *op. cit.*, II, p. 82.

¹⁴ Alfred Newton and Hans Gadow, *A Dictionary of Birds* (London, Black, 1893-6), p. 119.

¹⁵ Brehm, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 82-3; Kahle, *op. cit.*, pp. 364-5.

¹⁶ Brehm, *op. cit.*, II, p. 83.

¹⁷ Brehm, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-5.

¹⁸ For further information on the European cuckoo, and references to the bird in Greek literature, see D'Arcy W. Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Birds*² (London, Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 151-3; Otto Keller, *Die Antike Tierwelt* (Leipzig, Engelmann, 1913), II, pp. 63-7.

In many countries of Europe today there are old folk dances named for the cuckoo. Typical of these are the cuckoo dances of Germany, Bohemia, Moravia, and Russia.

The "Kuckuckstanz" of Pomerania, in Northern Germany,¹⁹ is characterized by turnings in place as the dancers cry "Cuckoo!" The "Kukacka" of Bohemia²⁰ features quick running steps (perhaps suggestive of flight), turns about the dancer's own axis, and stamping steps as the dancers cry "Ku, ku, ku!" The "Kukachka" of Moravia²¹ makes use of hops, smooth running steps, and turns in place. The Russian "Kukushka"²² is much more active, mimetic, and brilliant. In it, the dancers jump on both feet, in the manner of "a bird hopping from place to place," and at the same time flap their arms as if they were wings; they also turn in place, with little jumps, and cry "Cuckoo!"

In a moving picture "short subject" issued recently, featuring winter sports in Aspen, Colorado, a cuckoo dance on skis was introduced as a *tour de force*. The performer, dressed in Tyrolean garb, hopped, flapped his arms, and turned about his own axis, clockwise. The dance was evidently inspired by the cuckoo folk dance of Germany and Austria.

These dances may, of course, bear little or no relation to one another, and may have arisen spontaneously. However, when old folk dances of both Eastern and Western Europe, especially those of great popular appeal, agree so closely in pattern and detail, there is always the possibility that they may have a common origin in a Greek or Graeco-Roman prototype.

In this connection, the words chosen by two translators of Aristophanes are interesting. We have referred above to Voss' rendition of the line we have been discussing: "Ab trampf' ich den Plumptanz, und umher kukuk ich eins." Although "Plumptanz" is evidently meant to refer here to the *mothón*, yet it could actually be an accurate descriptive term for some of the cuckoo

¹⁹ Oswald Fladeres, *Deutsche Volkstänze* (Kassel, Bärenreiterverlag, 1927), I, pp. 10-11.

²⁰ Anna Spacek and Neva L. Boyd, *Folk Dances of Bohemia and Moravia* (Chicago, Saul Bros., 1917), p. 16.

²¹ Marjorie C. Geary, *Folk Dances of Czechoslovakia* (New York, Barnes, 1922), pp. 22-3.

²² Louis H. Chalif, *Folk Dances of Different Nations* (published by the author, 163-5 W. 57th St., New York, N. Y., 1926), III, pp. 59-62.

dances of modern Europe. Perhaps Voss had seen such dances, and was unconsciously influenced by them in translating the line. In an entirely different play, the *Lysistrata*, Droysen²³ translated the vexed διποδιάξω of line 1243, in dialect, "Mer wollen den Kukuk hopsa." I have argued elsewhere²⁴ that the διποδία here referred to was a dignified, graceful Spartan "dance to the dimeter" of Laconian choral songs; but that several writers, both ancient and modern (obviously including Droysen), have confused it with the ποδισμός or the διαποδισμός, which was a hop, with both feet held closely together as if tied, and with the body bent far forward. A figure of this sort, with lewd movements of the hips and thighs, was a characteristic feature of the *kordax*.²⁵ It would combine well with the *mothōn*. Scaliger²⁶ says that the figure is one in which "iunctis pedibus, labore plurimo et conatu, picos imitabantur." I have no idea from what source Scaliger drew this bit of information; but it offers a hint, at least, that the ultimate origin of this particular feature of the *kordax* was a dance or figure imitative of an awkwardly hopping bird.

In summary, then, I should like to offer the suggestion that line 697 of the *Knights* of Aristophanes is a passing reference, in the form of a metaphor, to a real dance or figure imitative of a cuckoo; that this dance or figure was a part of the old animal *komos* which, with its roots perhaps in Minoan-Mycenaean religious practices, was later a factor in the development of Greek comedy; that it became a *schema* of the *kordax*; and that characteristic features of it were awkward hops on both feet, a flapping of the arms, turns about the dancer's own axis, quick running steps to suggest flight, some hostile or derisive lunges with "beak" and "wings," and an obligato of cries of "Cuckoo!" or the Greek equivalent thereof.

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²³ *Op. cit.* (note 1), II, p. 183.

²⁴ "Diple, Dipodia, Dipodismos in the Greek Dance," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXVI, pp. 59-73.

²⁵ Schol. Aristoph. *Clouds*, 540; Schnabel, *op. cit.* (note 4), pp. 5-6; Louis Sèchan, *La danse grecque antique* (Paris, de Boccard, 1930), p. 196.

²⁶ Julius Caesar Scaliger, "De Comoedia et Tragoedia," in Vol. VIII of Jacobus Gronovius' *Thesaurus Graecarum Antiquitatum* (Venice, 1732-7), cols. 1533 F-1534 A.

REVIEWS.

CAMPBELL BONNER. *Studies in Magical Amulets, chiefly Graeco-Egyptian.* Ann Arbor, The Univ. of Michigan Press; London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. xxiv + 334; 25 pl. (*Univ. of Michigan Studies, Humanistic Series, XLIX.*)

One rarely has the "honor of introducing" a piece of really basic scholarship to one's colleagues. Those who reviewed Preisendanz's edition of the Greek Magical Papyri, or Furtwängler on Greek Vases must have felt as I do in trying to write adequately of this study by Bonner on the amulets of late antiquity. These amulets had been studied with not always well-directed enthusiasm during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Such interest quickly expired, however, after the first quarter of the nineteenth century, when scholars unfortunately began to idealize and segregate the high moments of antiquity, and by forcing all eyes upon Greece from Homer to Demosthenes, upon Rome during the late republican and early imperial centuries, actually took the classical world out of the stream of history (and incidentally out of most modern interest). Furtwängler refused to consider the late syncretistic amulets with his classical gems, and induced the Berlin Museum to move them bodily into the section of Egyptology, where their welcome was stony disregard. Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries specimens found there were occasionally discussed by such unreliaables as King, Osborn, and the editors of the Southesk collection, but the stones were in general ignored. Still widely called Gnostic, though Beller-mann had dispelled that illusion in 1817, the stones were for the most part unknown and, as printed in rare folios, inaccessible.

The discovery of the magical papyri, and their publication, made scholars who worked with them freshly aware of the amulets, which obviously were cognates of the charms. Charms and amulets had a great deal of light to throw upon each other, but the matter could not be studied because there was no critical study of the amulets to balance the collection of charms by Preisendanz. This need has at last been filled by Bonner in the work we are considering. Here are splendid photographic reproductions of nearly four hundred of the amulets, largely of specimens which Bonner collected himself, or induced the University of Michigan to purchase, though there are a great number of others from public and private collections in Europe and the United States. The result is, as Bonner regretfully says, by no means "a complete survey of all existing amulets" (p. 135): that, or even an approximation to that, would indeed be a major work; but it is a magnificently representative offering, one which gives an excellent impression of the amulets as a whole and what is upon them.

Those less acquainted with the difficulties may regard Bonner's meticulous textual work as his greatest contribution. Gibberish appears everywhere on ancient charms and amulets, gibberish which

may reflect any one of a large number of languages in total degeneration, like the famous medieval case of *hocus pocus* from *hoc est corpus meum*. In reconstructing the meanings of these Bonner not only goes far, but knows when to stop, a very rare combination, and on pp. 186-207 gives the best discussion I know of the phenomenon.

Bonner may well feel his deepest satisfaction in his solution of the problem of arrangement. For one of the most difficult problems in presenting the amulets is that of organization. The device on one side of an amulet can hardly be considered without reference to what is on the other: but on the stones almost every combination appears, so that no important symbol escapes involvement with most of the others. Bonner has solved this problem by first treating amulets marked to serve a given purpose, as for general health, love, or some specific type of physical disorder, and then by taking symbols of major importance which were used for various purposes. The result is a surprisingly small residuum of miscellanea.

The problem of reproduction is almost as difficult. When one sees the photographs of such objects so often published, one is apt to think regretfully of the old line drawings. Bonner's plates are really excellent. Weak eyes will often need a glass to study them, but the reproductions are so clear that a glass usually does make clear what is there.

The book begins with a masterful summary of method, quotations about amulets from ancient authors, warnings against misconceptions and prejudices. I shall in a moment disagree in some details with the methodology here outlined, but still recommend it as incomparably the best treatment I know of the subject. There follows a discussion of the influences discernible on the amulets from Egyptians, Jews, Persians, and Greeks. The author is then ready to discuss the amulets themselves.

First Bonner discusses the amulets of a generally protective character, and here the interest is in petitions inscribed on the amulets, since petitions for general protection appear with a variety of figures (though Harpocrates is more common than any other one). More specific seem to be the specimens next considered, the medical amulets. There are representations in which a large bird, an ibis, stork, or ostrich, is attached to objects behind him, and usually with a variant of *πέπτε* or *πέσσε* "digest," somewhere on the stone. These amulets seem to have functioned for what must have been the endemic threat of dysentery, cholera, food poisoning, diseases of avitaminosis, and the like (to a very minor extent to correct the results of "man's proneness to overeating," as Bonner says, with the excesses of the upper classes in mind). The bird is usually attacking a snake, and Bonner thinks that the power of such birds to digest snakes made them a symbol of digestive triumphs for man: I should be more inclined to think that the agonies of intestinal difficulty were most aptly visualized as the writhing of a snake-demon within one, so that one called upon a snake-devourer for deliverance. That the ibis was also Thoth, a saving god from time universal, must also have entered into the symbolism, with no particular realistic association at all. In discussing such matters, in fact, one of Bonner's few defects is that he is apt to look for an explanation of a symbol, which then tends to become *the* explanation. This is the most com-

mon fallacy in dealing with symbols, since it ignores the fact that symbols have an extraordinary way of getting the widest variety of associations and values, and of presenting them simultaneously with not the least sense of responsibility for consistency. Symbolism is a field which has been repellent to the scholarly mind, because in it understanding requires the acceptance of confusion, rather than the creation of clarity.

Bonner goes on to an excellent discussion of Chnoubis, another digestive symbol. Here the protective figure is itself a snake, usually made solar by its radiant lion's head, but still basically a snake. It too is so often marked with inscriptions pleading for good digestion that its usual reference is unmistakable. The presence of the snake on both these amulets, the one deified with its solar head, the other being devoured by a divine being, suggests some very deep connection of the snake with digestive problems (of course with many other problems as well) which investigators should keep in mind. Here is at once an instance of the logical inconsistency of symbols.

After a section on the crane (or phoenix), which again is with a snake, Bonner discusses a series of amulets for colic on which Heracles may be represented strangling a lion, or Ares appears, or Aeolus with his bag of winds. It is obvious that in Heracles and Ares we have the divine power which attacks, fights, strangles, so that the basic element of the bird attacking a snake, the struggle between divine or demonic forces, is again presented. Bonner lists amulets with a large number of other symbolic types as having inscriptions which indicate that they were worn for digestion. And probably most wearers of the specifically digestive amulets expected general protection from them as well. Amulets to protect the eye usually had a lizard, for sciatica a reaper, for the gout Perseus, and Bonner lists others dedicated to various physical ailments.

A long and especially interesting section describes amulets whose inscriptions clearly indicate that they were worn for successful childbirth, and to prevent prolapsis and kindred difficulties. The typical symbol operative in such matters was a very complicated representation centering in what looks like a big-bellied pot, usually inverted, with what at first appears to be the crank of a winch attached to it, and a sort of grating below the lowered mouth. At the top are a pair of streamers or snakes upon which stand various gods, usually three or four of them. Bonner follows Delatte's interpretation of this symbol, and gives excellent evidence for his statement (he rarely becomes so positive) that it is "definitely proved" that this figure represents the uterus.

In the chapter "Unseen Perils" Bonner lists several types, the most interesting of which is the figure usually called "the evil eye," but which is more accurately called by its ancient term "the much-suffering eye," that is the figure of an open eye attacked from all sides by a spear, nails, trident, dog, lion, scorpion, snake, ibis, almost anything destructive. On the other side of amulets with the eye is often presented a cavalier, but to this figure Bonner returns later.

A valuable discussion follows of the types used in "aggressive magic," that is of amulets to avert wrath, of various sorts of love charms, and of black magic. In this section (pp. 108 f.) Bonner

discusses as evidence of black magic an amulet of which I should say a word, since it is one of the very few for which I have an alternative suggestion. The amulet bears on each side a mummy, with three projections from the head which are probably descendants of the three lotus flowers often used on crowns in Egypt. Under the feet of the mummy on both sides is a peculiar symbol which I take to be a magical "character," and on the margin of the obverse is written "Memnon child of Day sleeps (i. e. lies dead)" as Bonner translates it, accompanied by a long string of magical syllables. On the margin of the reverse are the words "Antipater child of Philippa sleeps," with the same magical syllables, and ἐγὼ ὁ ὢν beside the mummy. In discussing this Bonner recognizes that the mummy is probably Osiris, but does not recall that Osiris as a mummy, whether just drawn as such or as being transported to the other world on the Sun-ship, or lion, or whatever, is the chief single Egyptian symbol of immortality. He recalls that Memnon was killed, and supposes that the parallel statements on the charm expressed the hope that Antipater would also come to a bad end. Bonner has forgotten, however, that Memnon was one of those human beings who were given immortality after death (see "Memnon" in Roscher's *Lex. Myth.*). The amulet was probably made by Philippa to bury with the corpse of her son Antipater to help him into immortality, because to be "dead like Osiris" was the great hope of immortality, as, in Christian terms, is identification with the crucified Christ. "I am the One who is" Bonner recognizes properly as the announcement of God to Moses from the bush, the Septuagint of the Authorized "I am that I am." Here the phrase is properly associated with the mummy Osiris, in the sense that he represents the living one who gives life to others. I should guess, then, that Philippa was a devout Jewess, hellenized of course, who in the hope that rises out of utter grief put this amulet upon her son in his tomb. Whether she was a Jewess or not, the amulet seems definitely to look to immortality for her son Antipater, look for it in terms both of Osiris and of "I am that I am."

The discussions in the chapters that follow, "The Snake-Legged God," "The Young Sun," "Helios and Solar Types," and "Pantheistic and Monstrous Forms" follow a second type of organization, for while heretofore Bonner has classified the amulets according to their purpose, now he follows the type of symbol, which may be upon amulets designed for a wide variety of purposes. The second method opens more important questions, on the whole, but is far more difficult, for what an amulet means is much more obvious when it has πεπτε on it than when it has simply divine figures and names, with or without magical syllables. In these chapters Bonner seems to me to fall short of his goal, in spite of the tremendously useful body of material he gathers under each heading. In discussing the snake-legged god he has finally, I hope, laid the ghost of Gnosticism in these matters, and it appears at last that the anguipede is not properly named "Abraxas"; that the term "Abraxas" is not exclusively Gnostic; and that "there is no reason to believe that the conception [of the anguipede] originated in Gnostic circles." I think Bonner's suggestion that the cock's head on the anguipede shows Persian influence is not especially convincing, in view of the very common association of Hermes and the cock; I doubt that the

figure is armed "simply" (we must always be careful with "simply") as "another instance of the tendency . . . to clothe divine beings . . . in the costume of a Roman emperor" (p. 124) since, as he goes on to say, the shield is that of an ordinary Roman soldier, and I can see nothing exclusively imperial about the rest; and the snake legs upon a being otherwise solar suggest not the "chthonic," though the snake is often chthonic, but solar rays, as the common solar snake usually does, for example the uraeus and Chnoubis. This peculiar monster, Bonner reasonably suggests (p. 126), was the deliberate creation of "some teacher, the leader of a sect, rather than a natural blending of religious symbolism," and he later adds that it might have been produced by a "compact school of theosophists," but of such a person or school, he says, nothing is known (p. 135). The person, if there was one, is certainly unknown, but I am not sure that the group was made up of "Hellenized magi or pagan 'gnostics'." Since the term *Iao* is so common on the figure even where the figure is used in the most pagan environment it seems to me a natural guess that the term *Iao* was an original part of the symbol; which in turn would suggest that the figure was invented by some hellenized Jews, and that it so satisfied their needs that it spread widely and rapidly in general use: but of such a Jewish possibility in a moment.

Harpocrates as "the Young Sun" is again most admirably presented for its variety of appearances and identifications, and the same can be said of the chapters on Helios and the Pantheistic and Monstrous Forms which follow. The treatment of the inscriptions is a model, and the discussion of types from Palestine, Syria, and Christianity, and of "Unusual and Obscure Types" at the end of the book round it out solidly.

It is clear that Bonner has at last given us a sure foundation on which to stand in using this material. If accurate publication, description, and classification were the end of all study in the field, Bonner would have come as near reaching the "end" of the study of ancient amulets as a single work could hope to do. Better than having produced a "definitive work," however, Bonner has at last magnificently cleared the way for asking the next questions. These questions were not an integral part of Bonner's work, and, frankly, he himself often begs them. He would himself, however, feel that to use his work as a means of going on was the best compliment which could be paid it, and so I should like briefly to suggest what seem to be the next steps.

The first is a general consideration of the function of such objects. Bonner, for all his devoted care in presenting them, obviously has little sympathy with such symbols or with those who used them. He refers throughout to "magic" as something of a totally different kind from religion, without stopping to define in what this difference consists. "Religion," as on p. 123, often refers to a formal religion, that is to a system and recognized group of whose theological structure we have some knowledge from literary sources. So when he denies that an amulet or figure belongs to religion in those contexts he means that it was not the expression of a formal and recognizable cult group. He says: "It is necessary to inquire whether any of the prayers and invocations that are inscribed on some amulets

express a genuine religious feeling, and if so, to determine its relation to known religious groups such as the Jews, the orthodox Christians, and the Gnostics" (p. 21), a list in which paganism, Greek or Egyptian, is conspicuously absent. Later he includes the pagans, however, when he says: "Christians and pagans alike often wore upon their bodies objects made in similar forms and of the same materials, though adorned with different images and symbols. Among the spiritual-minded of both camps there was no thought of magic" (p. 208, n.). When Bonner gets on this ground he becomes an apologist who says things which are highly disputable. Helios, for example, was used by pagans, Christians, and Jews, as were many other images, and they were used by the "spiritual-minded of both camps." The difference between magic and religion, he goes on here to suggest, is that the spiritual-minded in wearing such objects "would keep their minds clear of the feeling that power proceeded from the thing itself, regardless of the wearer's religious attitude." This "notion that supernatural power may be inherent in some person, animal, or material object, or that it may at least reside there temporarily" is a "primitive concept" which is at the base of "belief in the efficacy of amulets" (p. 2). But to call "primitive" all belief that supernatural power can reside even temporarily in a material object is to condemn as "primitive" all use of consecrated ground, consecrated churches, holy water, medals and rosaries blessed by ecclesiastics, the cross as an effective medium to help in diseases, not to say the consecrated elements of the Christian eucharist, or the holy scrolls of Torah in a synagogue. That is, in ruling amulets, because they are "magical," peremptorily out of the history of religion, as Bonner repeatedly does (see especially p. 123) he means that amulets, as objects of potency because of divine power inherent in them, were used by the less spiritually minded followers of many religions, but were no part of the proper offerings of any religion, and were never used for their inherent potency by the spiritually minded. It seems to me clear that the importance of amulets in human history cannot be established without correcting almost every one of those basic assumptions, though it is beyond the scope of this review to bring in the flood of evidence that Jews, Christians, and pagans of the most sensitive type have clung in life and death to the material tokens of their faith, not merely as tokens, but as bringing what Jews call the "Shekinah" to their lives.

Less fundamental for general history, but of great importance for the origin of many of these amulets, and for Jewish history, is the question of their relation to Judaism. The problem can be briefly stated. On the amulets (and on the charms from papyri) Jewish names are among the commonest found. "Iao" is the most frequent single one of these, but "Adonai," "Sabaoth," appear very often, while it is not surprising on amulets of almost any type to find "Gabriel," "Michael," "Raphael," or even, though less commonly, "Abraham," "Isaac," "Jacob," or "Solomon." The problem is: when an amulet has "Solomon," so labeled, on one side, and Hecate on the other, or when "Iao" is written with a figure of Helios, does this testify to direct Jewish production, or only to "Jewish influence" upon pagans who borrowed such names and figures to strengthen their still pagan magic? And if Jews did make and wear

such amulets, has this any bearing upon the history of Judaism? Bonner clearly makes room for the possibility that Jews who were not "strict followers of the Law" could have made and worn amulets on which "Iao," the forbidden name, was written, and he says that Jews may have taken "anything that is of the heathen, whether an image, or name, or a formula," but they would have "Judaized" these only "for magical purposes." Still "the strange mental attitude of those who are attracted by magic" makes it clear that these amulets have only "magical, not religious significance" (p. 30). But when Bonner talks about Jews he obviously does not want ordinarily to be taken to refer to Jews of so questionable a type, though he admits that "there were probably a good many Jews who wore images of heathen gods as amulets" (p. 28). Bonner's general position is stated more clearly when he says: "On our amulets Jewish influence is mainly confined to the inscriptions, because monotheism and the prohibition of images restrained the Jews from developing figure designs comparable to the divine and demonic types carved on Graeco-Egyptian gems" (*ibid.*).

When he treats Palestinian amulets (Chapter XV) he admits that he is dealing with "some designs that were developed under Jewish inspiration, but represents a Judaism touched by Hellenistic influences and ready to use a magic which was not free from pagan elements" (p. 208). Under this category Bonner considers the amulets with Solomon as a cavalier, on the reverse of which a number of pagan figures are presented. He is aware that the paintings in the Dura synagogue and the mosaics in Beth Alpha seem to show that the commandment against the making of images "was not strictly observed by all Jewish communities" (p. 28), but he does not seem to know of the two "much suffering eyes" in the Dura Synagogue, one of them labeled "Iao," of the figures so much like magical ones in the cemetery of Sheikh Ibreiq in Palestine, or in fact of the great mass of Jewish images of which we know from Rome, through North Africa, amazingly common in Palestine, and on out to Dura itself. For example Ares, Tyche, Psyche, the three Graces, and, many times, Nike, are painted on the walls of the synagogue in Dura. These figures were presented by Jews in their places of public worship, so that we have no right to think that they could have been Judaized for magical purposes only. Just how Jews could have regarded such figures is indeed a difficult question, but we cannot begin by ignoring that material, or by summary judgments. Once we recognize that Jews of the day could and did, in their public places of religion, do a great many things which the rabbis did not approve (though a paragraph in the Talmud describes some astonishing figures which various rabbis used on their seals; cf. Albert Wolf, *Jewish Encyclopedia*, XI, p. 136) then we can no longer approach the charms and amulets with a double standard. For a double standard it is to say freely, when the name Ares appears on an amulet "the divine name marks [the amulet] as Greek" (p. 42), but over and again to refuse to see a similar implication for Jewish origin in the Jewish names. For example Bonner discusses (pp. 100 f.) an amulet which has the names "Damnamanaios and Adonaios and Iao and Sabaoth," where, even though Bonner makes one of his rare slips and omits "Iao," he admits that

the composer of the formula on the amulet "had a good knowledge of Jewish legend and Hebrew turns of expression," such as an allusion to Solomon and "Meehles (Michael?)" and echoes of one passage, possibly two, from the Psalms. After this he can conclude only "On the whole, Jewish influence is beyond doubt, but, as usual, Jewish authorship is not proved." To not a word of this can one take exception, any more than to his statement, "Not every person who wore a ring engraved with the words *Iao Sabaoth* was a Jew, not every pendant with a figure of Aphrodite arranging her hair was worn by a Greek woman" (p. 18). But in practice Bonner assumes throughout that an amulet with a Greek figure, or with Greek names, can be *assumed* to be Greek (or, *mutatis mutandis*, Egyptian), but that one needs *proof* for Jewish origin even in the face of overwhelming predominance of Jewish reference. This was entirely justified in view of the dominant conception that the history of Judaism is essentially a history of rabbinism, which Bonner had no reason to challenge in view of the very small percentage of Jewish art which had apparently come to his attention.

If, however, the total impact of the art from this period suggests that Jews may not have been at the time thus rabbinically controlled (a large problem I am opening up in a work whose first volume is now in press), then we shall have to face the amulets on the basis of a single standard. That is we must discuss whether an amulet with mixed Jewish and Greek motifs is to be called originally a "Jewish" or "Greek" amulet (whoever wore it) in exactly the same way that we would allocate another amulet similarly divided between Greek and Egyptian motifs and names. Techniques for such discrimination can seem plausible only after considerable testing, but I should suggest that the names on an amulet are the best guide to its source. A charm in which Greek and Jewish names were about evenly mixed I should call quite indeterminate; one with a few Greek names, or a single one, but with the predominant appeal to Jewish names I should call probably Jewish, done by a Jew who looked primarily to "*Iao*" or "*Michael*," but who could throw in *Helios* or another for good measure. Similarly when a Sun God is represented and the only name or names with it are Jewish, I should call the amulet Jewish as freely as Bonner, quoted above, said that the name *Ares* marked as Greek an amulet on which it appeared. A "Greek" amulet may, of course, have been made by a Jewish craftsman, and a "Jewish" amulet made by a Greek. The immediate wearer or engraver can never be identified, except that in cases where the individual is named on the stone one can discuss who he was and why he wanted the specific design. Still I think we can distinguish in many instances between Greek or Egyptian amulets as such, and Jewish ones. Actually there are a large number of amulets which it seems to me can be called "Jewish" in inspiration, whoever actually made or wore them. If that is true the evidence of these stones seems to me extremely important for the history of the Jewish religion, since I define a religion by the practices of its avowed devotees, not by the ideals of its leaders. But obviously the merits of such a methodology cannot be tested in a review.

The value of Bonner's study for investigating such a question, however, is only one of the ways in which the work will be useful.

To the history of religion, popular religion if you will, in late antiquity, and to the whole problem of the nature of fetishes and charms, this study is one which will be of indefinite value. Our heartiest congratulations to the author in completing so great a task, great in extent, and great in the power of its execution.

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- H. G. PFLAUM. *Les procurateurs équestres sous le Haut-Empire Romain*. Paris, A. Maisonneuve, 1950. Pp. 365; a folder with 13 large, separate sheets containing outlines of individual careers. Fr. 1500.

The great work of Otto Hirschfeld on Roman administrative history, *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diokletian*, appeared for the first time in 1878 and the authoritative revised edition in 1905. Three years later Alfred von Domaszewski published his broad study of the grades and lines of promotion, *Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres*. These two books treated both the senatorial and equestrian officers. Moreover, the history, recruitment, social position and influence of the equestrian order as a whole were treated in a masterly study by Arthur Stein, *Der römische Ritterstand* (Munich, 1927). All three and the authors of numerous studies on various groups and individual offices have found sources in a few precious literary references, but the bulk of their material has come from inscriptions in an unremitting flow of new evidence. Similarly Pflaum in *Les procurateurs équestres* turns his attention to a few precious literary passages as in an excellent discussion of letters from Cornelius Fronto to the Caesar Marcus Aurelius and to Antoninus Pius on pp. 198-206, but the body of this new and very important study of the procurators of the Early Empire is an organization and evaluation of epigraphical material, which with rare exceptions the author has succeeded in dominating.

It is well known that whereas the Roman administrators of the Republic were drawn entirely from the senatorial order and whereas the administrators of the Late Empire came up for the most part through careers which were not differentiated on principle, the administrators of the Early Empire were appointed, even in the lowest grades and preparatory posts, by a system of differentiation as to whether they were senators or *equites*. Pflaum reinvestigates the equestrian administrators. He does not intend to replace the work of his predecessors but to correct and supplement it; and he is quite justified in handling summarily certain subjects for which Hirschfeld's discussion is still valid. On the other hand, the absence of an index of inscriptions or indeed an index of any kind is a major defect which will cut down the usefulness as a book of reference and the possibility of control. Moreover, it would have been easy and commendable to use brackets in the tables and career outlines rather than represent the restorations and the more uncertain inferences as factual data, especially where the texts are not given.

Also some explanation why the reader finds no references to European publications later than 1947 and to American publications later than 1943 might have been prudent. Among the preparatory studies which he has not mentioned the most surprising omission is R. H. Lacey, *The Equestrian Officials of Trajan and Hadrian* (Princeton, 1917).

The reviewer would give the reader some idea of the rich contents of the book, which is fundamentally historical throughout but is divided into two parts, one which describes the evolution of posts open to *equites* and one which emphasizes the person of the incumbent in various ways. In the first part Chapter I deals with the origins of the procuratorial posts. The victor of Actium set about integrating the equestrian order into his following, and he placed financial affairs in the hands of equestrian procurators. While Augustus and Tiberius tried to distinguish between the *princeps* as private citizen and as magistrate, this was hardly possible and the procurators appeared more and more clearly as public officials, until Claudius regularized their position. Titles in inscriptions of the first century emphasize the personal bond between the financial procurator and the emperor by the latter's full name, but the form *proc. Aug.* becomes gradually more common and at last normal. The provinces which the emperor accepted, in 27 B. C. and later, were regarded as in need of a garrison, but a shortage of legionaries and the difficulties of recruitment imposed restrictions, wherefore some provinces, inadequately provided, were organized under equestrian procurators as governors. The latter and the great equestrian prefects were at first appointed for the task alone and not promoted according to grade or seniority.

In the second chapter Pflaum traces the progressive increase in the number of posts, which he reckons at 25 under Augustus, 39 under Claudius, 49 under Nero, 55 under Vespasian, 62 under Domitian, 80 under Trajan, 107 under Hadrian, 127 under Marcus Aurelius, 136 under Commodus, and 174 under Septimius Severus. Through the reign of Vespasian new posts were created as the result of 1) annexations, 2) divisions of districts or bureaux, 3) extension of equestrian administration to new fields, but there was no co-ordinated plan. Domitian made a start by subordinating the freedmen who had been the real chiefs of two great bureaux (*ab epistulis* and *a patrimoniis*) to an equestrian chief in each, and in other ways, but there was still no properly graded service (*hiérarchie*), because the posts were divided topheavily between 29 *ducenarii*, 21 *centenarii*, and 12 *sexagenarii*. Trajan continued along the road opened for him by Domitian, but it was of course Hadrian who completed the development, to end up with a well balanced service of 36 *ducenarii*, 37 *centenarii*, and 35 *sexagenarii*, appointed according to grade, seniority, and ability, with a true *cursus*. "It is absolutely astonishing," says the author, "that 107 equestrian functionaries could have sufficed for a task which, beside the management of imperial finances, included the cabinet of the *princeps*, all the fleets, the administration of Egypt and of a considerable group of provinces organized under an equestrian government." Americans familiar with bureaucratic Washington will have no quarrel with the author's description of Hadrian's achievement as "this magnificent

economy of forces." An interesting point, well emphasized by the author, is the new type of collegiality first introduced under Trajan, who appointed an equestrian *a rationibus* and an equestrian *procurator summarum rationum*, so that the department practically had two chiefs, although one was in a lower grade than the other. The most important of Hadrian's reforms was the appointment of *equites* as heads of all the main bureaux, but one of the changes by which he built up the number of posts open to *sexagenarii* was the notable substitution of procurators from the emperor for assistants freely chosen by senatorial officials. Septimius Severus does not appear as a great innovator but as a continuator and exaggerator along lines developed under Domitian, Trajan, and Hadrian. He had 10 *trecenarii*, 37 *ducenarii*, 46 *centenarii*, and 71 *sexagenarii*. The enrollment of many centurions in the equestrian order, the accession of a new social group to power, marks the period of the Severi, and Pflaum gives Septimius Severus credit for the integration in the equestrian order without much violence.

In Ch. III entitled "Le pouvoir des procurateurs-gouverneurs et des procurateurs financiers des provinces" Pflaum takes up questions connected with differences between a praesidial procurator and a *legatus Augusti pro praetore*. Listing the honorary inscriptions with the word "praeses," he argues that the term began as a sympathetic description of senatorial governors, then became even more common for equestrian governors, and that by 250 A. D. the word "praeses" had imposed itself as the ordinary term for governor of either type.

In Part II, after a preliminary chapter on the motives which induced a man to seek a procuratorial career (political and social power and chances of enrichment), a section in which the author properly emphasizes the importance of patronage, Pflaum studies the local origins of procurators and their preparation via the praetorian guard, or the *tres (quattuor) militiae*, or the *duae militiae*, or *una militia*, or as *primipili*, or even as civilians without preparation but with some special knowledge or with aristocratic standing in some Italian city. A third chapter deals with the support of candidates by influential personages at court. In the very illuminating fourth chapter Pflaum works out the lines along which presumably good men were advanced and the factors which influenced their careers, especially after 117 A. D. He isolates as the most important factors predetermining the kind of career a good man with the right contacts would have as 1) his local or national origin, 2) his road of access (ex-praetorian, etc.). Three types of careers emerge from a study of the *ducenarii* between 117 and 192 A. D.: 1) that of the ex-praetorians and *primipili bis* and a small number of graduates from the *militiae equestres*, who often get praesidial procuratorships and military prefectures but seldom get posts in the capital; 2) that of most graduates of the *militiae equestres*, who get no praesidial procuratorships and few posts in the capital; 3) that of civilians and a very few others, who stay for the most part in Rome. The author furthermore points out a compensatory lag in the promotion of civilians, a phenomenon noticeable particularly in the ranks of the *sexagenarii*. The ex-praetorians enjoyed a very rapid promotion as a rule. Then careers divide naturally into Occidental and Oriental careers with a few cases classed as Mixed. Pflaum of course attri-

butes this to the division of the empire into a Latin-speaking half and a Greek-speaking half. He collects also figures for procurators of African origin, likewise evidence for African careers. (The figures are based on data and inferences from inscriptions giving a man's *cursus honorum*, so that an Athenian whose procuratorship of Cyprus is attested incidentally in an epigram would not be counted among the procurators of Eastern origin.)

An epilogue on the end of the procuratorial career of the Early Empire refers to the breakdown of the old requirements for eligibility and places a different emphasis on the role of Gallienus in the development toward the administrative system of the Late Empire.

This picture, which in the main inspires confidence, will be found untrue in details, so that readers will have to adjust the statistics here and there.

To go back to the theory of the new collegiality whereby many an important office had two chiefs, it is a great help in understanding the character of some posts of which we have only the titles. On the other hand, Pflaum has not worked it out well in the case of the *ratio privata*. On pp. 85 and 104 Pflaum asserts that there were two chiefs of this bureau, one a *trecentarius* and the other a *centenarius*, corresponding to the two chief *rationales* of the *fiscus*. When one consults the references one finds that Sex. Varius Marcellus, the father of Elagabalus, had indeed been *proc. rationis privat. CCC* (Dessau, *I. L. S.*, 478) and that M. Aquilius Felix had been *proc. rat. privat. Aug. n.* early in his procuratorial career, when he was probably a *centenarius* (the *cursus* from Cannae, *A. E.*, 1945, No. 80, plus 1946, p. 188). The reviewer, who does not dispute the possibility or probability or even certainty of a double directorship of the *ratio privata*, denies that the *cursus* from Cannae can be interpreted as containing a reference to any such assistant directorship of the *ratio privata*. For Aquilius Felix has exactly the same title as Varius Marcellus. The huge *res privata* dates from the enormous confiscations of the year 197 according to the well-founded opinion of Tenney Frank (*An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, V, pp. 78-79). The *res privata* previous to 197 A. D., i. e. the *patrimonium privatum*, was a far less important department, which could not have rated a *trecentarius* as director. The difference in salary of the two directors merely reflects the difference between the relatively small *res privata* in 193 A. D. under Aquilius Felix and the *res privata* after 197 A. D. under Varius Marcellus.

The career of M. Aquilius Felix receives abuse in another section. On p. 284 Pflaum counts as the man's third promotion the procuratorship *a censibus equitum Romanorum*, thereby overlooking the prefecture of the Ravennate fleet and depriving his slender table on p. 288 of a fifth case of five promotions.

As to the history of the office *a censibus*, on pp. 60 and 66 Pflaum attributes the creation of the unified office *a libellis et censibus* to Hadrian. The unification is well attested under Antoninus Pius, but the one piece of evidence which Pflaum cites for the reign of Hadrian is *I. L. S.*, 1338, the *cursus honorum* of a man presumed to be T. Haterius Nepos, prefect of Egypt from 120 to 124 A. D. The inscription shows that the man was *proc. Aug. Armeniae mai[oris]* (114-117 A. D.), then (*proc.*) *ludi magni*, then (*proc.*) *hereditatium*,

then (*proc.*) *a censibus*, then *a libellis*. The inscription does not attest unification of the posts *a libellis* and *a censibus* under Hadrian as in the time of Antoninus Pius, nor, as Pflaum mistakenly suggests on p. 255, does it attest the immediate rise of a *procurator hereditatium* to the Palatine office of the *a libellis*. Moreover, what exactly was the bureau *a censibus*? Perhaps the reader could supplement the treatment of the *a censibus* with that in *A. J. P.*, 1946, pp. 314-18, which Pflaum has overlooked, and which reviews also the passage of the *Fragmenta iuris romani Vaticana*, § 204, where Pflaum on p. 90 erroneously claims evidence for another cumulative title *a censibus et a libellis*.

A different interpretation is possible also of one period in the career of P. Cominius Clemens, who, Pflaum thinks, was first prefect of the Ravennate fleet and then of the Misenensis. The pertinent inscription, *I. L. S.* 1412, reads *praef. classium praet. Misenens. et Ravenn.* but enumerates separately the previous procuratorships, which were less important. According to Pflaum (pp. 241 f.) the only exception to the rule that the *cursus* of a graduate of the *militiae equestres* counts no more than four successive posts as *ducenarius* is that of P. Cominius Clemens. If, however, Cominius Clemens commanded both fleets simultaneously, there is no exception. Long before he ever heard of the aforesaid rule, the reviewer concluded that Cominius Clemens must have been the commander of a task force of both fleets during one of the large-scale naval operations of the reign of Marcus Aurelius.

C. Furius Sabinus Aquila Timesitheus, when *magister (vicesimae hereditatium)* at Rome, had merely the first of several procuratorships as *ducenarius* according to Pflaum's career No. 347. Timesitheus may have been the only chief, but the post was inferior in dignity to the posts of the great *trecentarii*. On page 103, note 2, Pflaum is obviously in contradiction with himself and mistaken in citing the same post as that of a *trecentarius*. On page 103 he cites also other *magistri* as *trecentarii*, and so it is well to examine these more closely, all the more so because Pflaum gives no reference to A. E. R. Boak, "The Roman *Magistri* in the Civil and Military Service of the Empire," *Harvard Studies Class. Phil.*, XXVI (1915), pp. 73-164.

1) —Priscus, after being *magister a censibus*, then *magister a libellis*, became prefect of the *vigiles* according to Pflaum's career No. 338 (see also p. 294), but merely subprefect according to the text in the *Corpus* and in *I. L. S.*, 1456. In the absence of any indication that Dessau was wrong, the reader must attribute the error to Pflaum and conclude that as *magister a libellis* Priscus was still *ducenarius*.

2) Q. Axilius Urbicus according to Pflaum's career No. 340 became first *a studiis et a consiliis Augg.*, then *magister sacrarum cognitionum* (*I. L. S.*, 1459). One could argue either that by itself this inscription would not prove the priority of either office or that the *a studiis* was merely *centenarius* (cf. G. M. Bersanetti, *Epigraphica*, IX [1947], pp. 56-61). There is some reason to infer that Urbicus, as *magister sacrarum cognitionum* was *ducenarius*, no reason to infer that he was *trecentarius*.

3) L. Vibius Fortunatus according to Pflaum's career No. 339 became first *proc. ducenarius stationis hereditatium Romae*, then *magister a*

studiis, but though this is probably true, it is no reason to doubt that his next promotion was, as usual, still within the grade of a *ducenarius* (*I. L. S.*, 1458).

4) Pontius Eglectus Julianus (*C. I. L.*, VI, 37096) rose from [*pro*]c. prov. *Asiae* to be [*magi*]ster a *studiis Augg.* The latter, his last recorded post, could easily, even more easily, be that of a *ducenarius*.

5) C. Attius Alcimus Felicianus according to Pflaum's career No. 327 (see also p. 204) became *magister summarum rationum*, then *magister summae privatae*, then *praefectus vigilum*, then *praefectus annonae vice praef. praet.* The main question is: To what post did Attius Felicianus rise after being *magister summae privatae*? The man's *cursus honorum* is given in descending order in two inscriptions where an error of engraving and the uncertainty of punctuation give a certain amount of leeway for the interpretation. *C. I. L.*, VIII suppl., 23963 records the highest offices as follows: *vice praef. praet.*, *praef. annonae*, *vice praef. vigilum*, *mag[istro] summae privatae*, *magistro su[mma]rum rationum*; and *C. I. L.*, VIII suppl., 23948 records them *praef. annonae praef. praet.*, *vice praef. vig.*, *magistro summae privatae*, *magistro summarum rationum*. In the reviewer's opinion Boak (*loc. cit.*, p. 80) was quite right in talking about "the advancement of Attius Felicianus from Master of the *res privata* to Viceprefect of the Watch." It is no accident that on neither of the two inscriptions, which were erected in different localities, is it stated that Attius Felicianus became prefect of the *vigiles*: he did not yet have sufficient prestige to be appointed directly to a prefecture. The reviewer submits that as *magister summae privatae* Attius Felicianus was still *ducenarius*; then he became acting prefect of the *vigiles*, then prefect of the *annona*, and while still prefect of the *annona* he served as acting prefect of the Pretorian Guard (emend *C. I. L.*, VIII suppl., 23948 to read *praef. annonae <vice> praef. praet.*). But is not the *magister summarum rationum* merely the *procurator summarum rationum* under a slightly different title? We know that the *procurator summarum rationum* was 1) a junior colleague of the *a rationibus* and 2) a *ducenarius*.

As a result of this survey of the careers yielding the title, the reviewer suggests that the bureaucratic title *magister* in the third century implied a director, either the only director (*ducenarius*) or the junior member (*ducenarius*) of a college of two co-directors. The *magister summarum rationum* would usually be the junior member of a college consisting of the *a rationibus* and himself, and the *magister a censibus* might usually be the junior member of a college consisting of the *procurator a censibus equitum Romanorum* and himself, but in some cases either temporarily or permanently there may have been no expensive *trecenarius* serving as senior co-director, so that the title *magister* cloaked a lowering of the required grade. The choice of the word *magister* in this sense was suggested by the fact that when the Roman government introduced direct collection of taxes they had often retained the old staff of the previous *societas* with its *promagistri* in the provinces and its *magister* (director) at Rome, except that an imperial procurator (an equestrian career bureaucrat but not a specialist) was appointed over the *magister*.

One case will suffice to indicate especially the submerged problems beneath Pflaum's simplifying assertions as to the local origin of his procurators. It occurs in the Athenian inscription, *A. E.*, 1947, No. 89.

The monument was erected because a(n ex-)procurator of Asia with a career neither Occidental nor Oriental, Lucilius Pansa Priscillianus, one of the leading men among the older equestrian supporters of Caracalla and indeed the father of an intimate friend of the emperor, had used his influence in behalf of Athens ([τῇ]ς εἰς τὴν πα[τρίδ]α τὰς Ἀθῆν[ας εὐν]ο[ί]ας). In lines 4-5, [---¹⁵--- τοῦ] | κυρίου Αὐτοκ[ράτορος, where the reviewer urged in 1946 and still urges that no restoration be made, Pflaum believes that we have the culminating post, which by analogy with the career of one procurator of Asia he would actually identify (p. 283), and even cites evidentially (p. 291), as that of the *a cognitionibus*, as if no procurator of Asia ever became *magister a studiis Augusti*; but a reference to an early post or to something outside the *cursus* proper in line 4 would be less incompatible with the ascending order of the extant titles and with the climactic arrangement of line 10.

Now Pflaum describes Lucilius Pansa Priscillianus on pp. 192 and 266 unreservedly as an Athenian. The reviewer has looked for some trace of this family at Athens in the multitude of prytany and ephobic catalogues published in *Hesperia* and the Corpus, and since he can find none, the reviewer suggests that the word πα[τρίδ]α in line 12 means the polis of the dedicators but not of the patron. The reviewer suggests further, on the basis of *C. I. L.*, IX, 662 and 663, that Lucilius Pansa Priscillianus came from Apulia, where he erected a statue to a lady from the consular family of the Scipiones Orfiti. It is not inappropriate for an equestrian official with a mixed career to hail from a bilingual area like the Adriatic (so also C. Publicius Proculianus of Ravenna), but an Athenian in charge of the aqueducts at Rome and of fiscal affairs in Lower Pannonia would be a *rara avis* indeed.

The *ius gladii*. Theorizing about its evolution in the Early Empire, Pflaum (pp. 117-125) emphasizes the importance of Dio Cassius, LIII, 13, 6-7 as showing that the *ius gladii* meant the right of military commanders to put Roman soldiers to death without appeal, but he rejects as an anachronism the evidence of Dio Cassius, LIII, 14, 5 that in the time of Augustus the *ius gladii* could mean also the right of governors to put to death those under their rule, which he thinks was an extension due to Septimius Severus. Proof, however, that it antedates Septimius Severus lies in Philostratus, *Vit. soph.*, I, 532: (Polemon) "persuaded the Smyrnians not to let actions which they had against one another go anywhere outside the city, but to settle them at home. I mean real actions, because those against adulterers, temple-robbers and murderers, from the neglect of which pollutions arise, he bade them not only take out but throw out of Smyrna, for these cases required a judge with the *ius gladii*."

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A. M. DALE. *The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama*. Cambridge, The University Press, 1948. Pp. v + 220.

In this study, Miss Dale has set out to indicate "the prevailing movement of each type of rhythm" in the lyrics of fifth-century drama. After two preliminary chapters, devoted to the general characteristics of Greek dramatic lyric and to definitions, the author proceeds type by type through dactylic, anapaestic, iambic with trochaic and the combinations of the two, cretic-paeonic, dochmiae, ionic, aeolic (choriambic), aeolic (prosodiac-enoplian), and dactylo-epitrite, and ends with brief consideration of strophic construction and of performance (that is, the relation of music and motion or dance to metre). There is a useful synopsis of forms, an index locorum and general index, no bibliography. While the latter is not necessary, its absence gives some clue to the nature of the work. This is not a complete or comprehensive survey of Greek dramatic lyric, but an advanced essay on the nature of the principal metres.

It is perhaps also because of the independent, personal character of the work that definitions are given in abrupt, sometimes cryptic, form. There are times, in fact, when this reviewer simply does not understand what is intended. Here is an instance: "But a final syllable is only *anceps* in the sense that a long syllable has license to shorten, not vice versa, since no period or *στίχος* may end on a naturally short syllable" (p. 19, n. 1; the thought of a misprint is dispelled by the repetition of the principle on p. 26). That just above Miss Dale has quoted as "clausula of a period" the line *ἐν μάχῃ δ' ἀλώπικες* and marked the last syllable of the last word long, underlines the confusion and suggests that *ες* is not "a naturally short syllable" but "a long syllable with license to shorten," but as to why this should be so divination has so far failed to come up with an answer. Or again (p. 71): "hence . . . in the trochaic tetrameter, the rule against starting - - - -." What does this mean? From context and fact, it probably means either that the second half line must not start - - - - (generally true, but numerous exceptions) or, better, the second half line must not start with a *word length* amounting to - - - - as in a line quoted above. After numerous readings, I now think this is meant,¹ but the whole passage is bitterly obscure. And such obscurities are unfortunately of some consequence. They are not due to incapacity, for Miss Dale writes with style and finesse; more probably, it is a matter of undue condensation or cutting, inadequate illustration, or unwillingness to bore the advanced reader with the obvious. Thus, on p. 22, we meet the terms "pendant" and "blunt." They are not defined, here or elsewhere. Perhaps they are standard usage; if so, I do not know it. After some study, the reader emerges with a fair idea (dogged by an apparent contradiction or two) of what blunt and pendant mean, but also with the feeling that he has been forced to interpret an interpretation as if it were text to be interpreted.

Such problems arise, perhaps, out of the nature and form of the study, its limitation in length and scope. More significant is the

¹ But what is *apparently* meant, context or no, is that trochaic tetrameter must not begin with a metrical or word-length unit of - - - -, plainly untrue.

sort of matrix from which you could hack out iambic or trochaic segments." The chapter on dactylo-epitrite is disappointing, and the interpretation of the epitrite pair - - - - - as two cretics with linking *anceps* (p. 169) so anomalous as to be unbelievable after the forthright practice of Pindar (see p. 177 for what the poet is supposed to have "conceived" as his "colon-ingredients"). The determination to exclude ictus in favor of pure quantity seems exaggerated. It leads to occasional contradictions (e.g. p. 66) and to unsolved problems.

On the whole, this is an advanced, original, and exciting book. It is too difficult to serve as an introduction; rather, it will force the student to re-examine, often to recast or reject, his hardened notions concerning dramatic lyric.

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ROLAND G. KENT. *Old Persian Grammar, Texts, Lexicon*. New Haven, American Oriental Society, 1950. Pp. xiii + 216. (*American Oriental Series*, XXXIII.)

Unless, as is not impossible, additional texts be discovered, the distinguished Professor Emeritus of Comparative Linguistics at the University of Pennsylvania here gives the learned world, with that extreme meticulousness which scholars have come to expect from him, what may be regarded as the definitive edition of the Old Persian inscriptions. Based on a long series of preliminary studies and on careful reading of practically everything of moment hitherto written on his subject, he has enriched his work with almost unassailable restoration of *lacunae* and emendation of corrupt passages; his textual notes are admirable in their fullness; and if, here and there, I myself should translate otherwise, the differences are minimal (e.g., DB 1. 86,¹ *nāviyā* would be a little clearer if rendered 'navigable [only, not fordable]'; cf. his *Lexicon*, s. v.; DB 5. 24, 'by raft' seems more idiomatic both in OP and in English than 'by raft(s)'; DSe 43-45, appears to mean, rather, 'much handiwork that previously had not been put [or, made] in place, that I put [or, made] in place'; and DSf 56-57, 'much excellent [had been] ordered; much excellent there was').

In § 1. III, one might note that the metre of Middle Persian hymns written with Semitic logograms (Huzvarišn, "Book-Pahlavī") is quite non-existent, but becomes perfectly regular Iranian verse when the Iranian equivalents are substituted ("Pāzand"). A striking Aramaism (§§ 12, 315) not mentioned by Kent is the word-order verb + subject instead of subject + verb in the constantly recurring phrase *θātiy Dārayavauš xšāyaθiya* 'saith D. the King' (cf. כֹּה אָמַר הַמֶּלֶךְ הַגָּדוֹל מֶלֶךְ אַשּׁוּר 'thus saith the great King, the King of Assyria' [2 Kings 18. 19]). Kent (§§ 6, 12) says little more than that "Aramaic also seems to have had a certain influence on the phrasing and the syntax. . . . it is to be expected that the style of

¹ So far as practicable, Kent's system of abbreviations is here followed.

the inscriptions should reflect the style of Aramaic; and it does"; with some very general remarks. The subject should be thoroughly investigated, preferably by a professed Semitist.² My own interpretation of apophony ("ablaut") is very different from Kent's (§ 121 against Gray in this JOURNAL, LXII [1941], pp. 476-84; *Foundations of Language* [New York, 1939, 1950], pp. 65-6).

Since a very exhaustive and competent review of Kent's volume has been written by Professor G. S. Lane (*Lang.*, XXVI [1950], pp. 412-17) for all but the vocabulary and the translation (on the latter of which I have already briefly touched), I may here restrict myself to some observations on the etymological material of the Lexicon, merely noting that I regard the Lat. "genitives" *eius*, *cuius*, etc., like Skt. *asmākam*, *yusmākam*, Lat. *nostrum*, *uostrom*, Germ. *unser*, as originally stereotyped neuter singular nominative-accusatives (*Foundations*, pp. 196-7, against Kent, p. 57^b).

I turn, then, to comments on thirteen words in the OP vocabulary.

1-2) *abīcarīš* (DB 1. 64-65). This is almost certainly the acc. sg. neut. of an -s-stem (§ 185. III), but I strongly doubt if it should be compared directly with NPers. *carīdan* 'to pasture' (p. 169^a). I connect it, rather, as a collective, with lexicographical Skt. *abhīcara-* 'servant,' i. e., 'servants, retainers' (cf. Gk. τὸ δούλον, Lat. *servitium*, Fr. *le service* in the same collective sense). In this passage also occurs another ἀπ. λεγ., *māniya-*, usually connected with GAv. *dəmāna-*, LAv. *nmāna-*, Skt. *dāma-*, Gk. δῶμος, Lat. *domus* 'house,' etc. (p. 202^b). Here, however, Kent seems not to have given sufficient consideration to the Aramaic rendering of *māniya-* by מַנְיָא 'riches, treasure.' I again suggest (cf. *J. A. O. S.*, XXVIII [1913], pp. 281-3) that the OP word is to be compared with Skt. *mānya-* 'honourable' (lit., 'to be thought of' > 'valuable'), not with Skt. *māna-* 'building, house, dwelling.' I would, accordingly, translate this very troublesome sequence: 'the service (= servants, retainers) and the live-stock and the treasure and the houses.'

3) *avadaš* 'from there, from then,' *avaθāš-tā* 'from thenceforward them' *dūradaš* 'from afar,' all ending in -š, not in -ša (cf. Benveniste, *Gramm.*, §§ 367, 389). With š cf. Hom. κακῶν ἔξ, θεῶν ἔξ, Lat. *ex*, etc., < *ēk-s < *ēgh-s (cf. Walde-Hofmann, *Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*³, I (Heidelberg, 1938, p. 424), probably with adverbial -s (cf. Brugmann, *Gdr.*, II, 2, pp. 823-4, 737-8).

4-5) *Āθiyābaušna-*. I do not see why this nom. pr. is necessarily to be considered a determinative compound ('Freed from Misfortune'; so Kent, §§ 160. Id, 243, p. 166^a; cf. Bartholomae, *Altiranisches Wb.*, col. 323); it may equally well be a possessive compound ('Having Misfortune-Freedom'), as proposed by Justi, *Iranisches Namenbuch*, col. 50^a, though with an impossible interpretation of the first component; similarly Av. *pouru-baoxšna-* 'possessing abundant freedom,' rather than 'bringing much freedom' (against

²I essayed this in a long out-moded paper, "Stylistic Parallels between the Assyro-Babylonian and the Old Persian Inscriptions" (*A. J. S. L.*, XVII [1901], pp. 151-9), where I also noted the similar constantly recurring Av. phrase *āat mraot Ahurō Mazdā* 'then spake A. M.' (contrast the order in the Skt. type *Arjuna uvāca* 'A. spake').

Bartholomae, col. 901). The same type may recur in another nom. pr., *Bagābigna-*, where it seems needless to assume, with Kent (§§ 160. Ic, 243, p. 199^a), a ptc. in *-na-*, and so 'Begotten by God' (cf. also the conjectures of Bartholomae, col. 922). The view of Justi (*Iran. Namenb.*, 56^b, 489) that the name means 'Having the Glory of God' (or 'of the Gods') at least deserves consideration—i. e., *baga-ā-bigna-*, to the base **bheiġ(ʷ)e-* 'shine,' Gk. *φοῖβος* 'pure, bright, radiant' (Walde-Pokorny, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der indogermanischen Sprachen* [Berlin and Leipzig, 1930-1933], II, p. 138). This interpretation is sustained by the OP nom. pr. *Ἀπα-βίγνης* 'Having Aryan Glory' (Justi, 22^a), where 'Aryan-Begotten,' or even 'Having Aryan Seed,' seems less likely. The Babylonian borrowed nom. pr. *Bagabigi(?)in* may perhaps be added here (T. Clay, *Business Documents of Murashû Sons of Nippur Dated in the Reign of Darius II* [Philadelphia, 1912], p. 12).

6) *kaufa-* 'mountain.' If one may assume an alternation *pH : p*, OP *kaufa-*, Av. *kaofa-*, NP *kōh* are not isolated in Iranian (so Kent, § 75. II), but find cognates in Lith. *kaūpas*, OCS. *kupŭ*, OHG. *hūfo* 'heap,' etc. (W.-P., I, pp. 372-3; W.-H., I, p. 311).³

7) *takabara-* 'petasos-wearing.' If the first component is correctly interpreted (cf. Kent, p. 185^b), it is apparently connected (against him, § 76. V) with the I-E base **teqe-* 'weave,' seen in Osset. *taxun*, Arm. *t'ek'em*, Lat. *texo* (< *teq-s-*) 'weave' (W.-P., I, p. 716).

8) *tanū-* 'self.' This use of a word for 'body' as a quasi-reflexive pronoun, so also in Vedic and Av., might well be noted in a special paragraph 202A (cf. Brugmann, *Gdr.*², II, 2, pp. 401-2).

9) *nāmā* 'name.' I fail to see why Kent (§§ 187, 251C, p. 193^a) takes *nāma* as a suffixless loc. sg. neut., but *nāmā* perhaps as an acc. of specification (§§ 187, 249L, p. 193^{ab}), though he recognizes (§ 312) that *nāmā* is normally used in conjunction with a fem., otherwise *nāma* (Benveniste, §§ 152, 278, 312), and the OP word is found only in the nom.-acc. (Benveniste, § 278). I have long regarded *nāmā* in name-phrases as a nom. in apposition with the person or thing named, the pair forming an elliptical nominal phrase (nom. absolute) inserted bodily in the main sentence without grammatical connexion. Examples abound in OP (cf. Schwyzler-Debrunner, *Griech. Gram.*, II [Munich, 1950], p. 86), of which I quote the two excellent examples given by Kent (§ 312), though with my own translation, materially different from his: *Dādaršiš nāma Arminiya manā ba^adaka avam frāišayam Arminam* 'an Armenian, D. his name, my subject—him I sent forth to Armenia'; *Sikayauvatiš nāmā didā Nisāya nāmā dahyāuš Mādaiy avadašim avājanam* 'a fortress—S. (its) name; a district in M., N. (its) name—there I smote him.' It seems unnecessary to suggest, as does Kent, that "these phrases are perhaps based on similar phrasing in Aramaic," since the same con-

³ As Lane remarks, Kent pays slight heed to the laryngeal hypothesis (why laryngeal, despite the universal usage?); cf. Kent's discussion of Skt. *ahām*: Gk. *ἐγώ* (§ 193), disregarding I-E **egHom*. He entirely neglects W.-P.

struction appears in Gk., e.g., *πόταμος Κύδνος ὄνομα, εὖρος δύο πλέθρων* 'a river, K. (its) name, (its) breadth of two plethra.'⁴

10) *naiba*- 'beautiful, (religiously) good.' Kent, stating that the word occurs only in Iranian (§ 75. V), fails to notice the cognate group of OIr. *nóib* 'holy' (W.-P., II, p. 321; H. Pedersen, *Vgl. kelt. Gram.*, I [Göttingen, 1909], pp. 156, 387).

11) *fraθara*- 'superior.' Av. *fraθara*- (p. 198^a, where read § 148. II instead of § 149. I) seems not to occur.

12) *raucah*- 'day.' The OP type *Anāmakahya māhyā XV raucabiš θakatā āha* (DB 2. 56), rendered by Kent (§ 252. D) 'of the month A., 15 by days were past,' goes, rather, as a general pl. case-form, in § 252. I ('of the month A., 15 days were past'). As he himself says (§ 252. I), Av. knows the same construction (add to his references, p. 82, n. 2, Reichelt, *Aw. Elmb.*, § 427), and the OIran. gen. pl. has become the general pl. case in NPers. nouns. This use of *raucabiš* as a np. is confirmed by the ns. in DB 3. 8: *Garmapadahya māhyā I rauca^h θakatam āha* 'of the month G., 1 day was past.'

13) *vain*- 'see.' The etymology proposed by Kent (<**ueid-n*-, §§ 83. I, 130, 210. III, p. 206^a) seems excellent, but is, like Av. *vaēn*-, NPers. *bīnad* 'see,' and perhaps also Skt. *ven*- 'desire,' a denominative in -n- (cf. Brugmann, *Gdr.*², II, 1, p. 263; 3, p. 313, on *ven*-: *venā*- 'longing, desire'), i. e. **ueid-n*- from the base **ueide*- 'know, see' (cf. Skt. *vēda*- 'knowledge': Lat. *uideo*, SBal. *gīndag* 'see'), the semantic development being 'sight' > 'desire' > 'knowledge' (for the base in general, W.-P., I, pp. 236-239).

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FRANCESCO ARNALDI. *Da Plauto a Terenzio, II: Terenzio.* Napoli, Loffredo, 1947. Pp. 227.

The present volume is a sequel to Professor Arnaldi's earlier study of Roman drama, which, after a brief treatment of Livius Andronicus and Naevius, was devoted to an analysis of Plautus' comedies.¹ The first third of this book deals with three other dramatists, Ennius (pp. 5-54), Pacuvius and Caecilius Statius (pp.

⁴ *Nāma* and *ṇama* are mere appositives in such passages as OP (DB 1. 36) *I martiya maguš āha Gaumāta nāma hauv udapatatā* 'there was a man, a Magian—G. (his) name—he rose up'; Av. *va'riš yō Haosravā ṇama* 'a bay—H. (its) name'; *Vayuš bā ṇama ahmi* 'I am V., (my) name'; *mereyō yō parō-darš ṇama . . . yim mašyāka avi dužvačarhō kahrkatāš ṇama aōja'te* 'the bird—P. (his) name— . . . whom evil-speaking folk call K. (as his) name' (ns. as a direct quotation); Ved. *Havir asmī nāma* 'I am H. (my) name'; cf. also Arm. *ar komsī umemn Likianēs anum kočeceloy* 'with a count—L. the name was called' (where A. Meillet, *Altarm. Elmb.* [Heidelberg, 1913], p. 78, sees an acc. of specification).

¹ Cf. my review in *A. J. P.*, LXX (1949), pp. 221-4.

55-80); then follow two chapters of an historical and critical nature, on the life of Terence (pp. 81-102) and on the chronology of the comedies (pp. 103-138); the author's discussion of the six Terentian plays ("L'arte," pp. 139-218) provides the most significant chapter of the book, and this is followed by a short conclusion ("L'artista," pp. 219-226).

In the first two chapters Arnaldi discusses the multiplicity of Ennius' interests (p. 11), his importance as a predecessor of Vergil (p. 12), the manner in which he reflects the Roman culture of his period (p. 13); the analysis of Ennius as an epic poet is followed by a consideration of "Ennio tragico" (pp. 31 ff.) and especially of the lyrical nature of his plays (pp. 43 ff.); Arnaldi thinks that Ennius in tragedy and Plautus in comedy perhaps followed Livius Andronicus and Naevius in their use of meters, as Fraenkel maintained in his *Plautinisches im Plautus*, but admits that the paucity of the fragments of the first two poets makes proof impossible. Arnaldi looks upon Pacuvius as the spiritual heir of Ennius and considers his *Antiope* superior to the *Medea*, Ennius' masterpiece (p. 55), an assumption hardly supported by the Ciceronian passages which he cites as evidence. The author quotes numerous fragments, not only of Ennius and Pacuvius, but also of Caecilius Statius, and points out the Plautine nature of many of the latter (pp. 69 f.); he finds in Caecilius the *πάθος* noted by Varro, but says that the playwright "è ancora lontano da Terenzio" (p. 72).

Arnaldi devotes sixty pages to Terence's life and the chronology of the plays, as against eighty on the comedies themselves—a somewhat surprising ratio. The statements given in the ancient *Vita* lead him into a lengthy discussion of the Scipionic circle and of Polybius, whose pages, along with the comedies of Terence, he considers an important document for the nature of the circle (p. 94), and he calls the famous words of Chremes in *Heaut.* 77 "la prima e più caratteristica espressione dell' *humanitas* del circolo degli Scipioni" (p. 96); is it really this, or merely an excuse on Chremes' part to concern himself in the affairs of Menedemus? Elsewhere (p. 168) Arnaldi says that *Hec.* 549-56 is chronologically the first formulation of the *humanitas* of the Scipionic circle. He agrees with Schanz and Jachmann that the chronology of the plays is as follows: *Andria*, *Hecyra I*, *Heauton Timorumenos*, *Eunuchus*, *Phormio*, *Adelphoe*, *Hecyra II* and *III*, but the conflicting statements in the ancient sources and the recent attempts of Gestri, Blum, and others to change the accepted order of the plays receive full consideration. Arnaldi makes a detailed analysis of the Terentian prologues, thus retracing the work of Fabia and Flickinger, and concludes (p. 133) that the accepted chronology is the only possible one. One feels, however, that this section, like that on the Scipionic circle, is unnecessarily prolix and would have profited from condensation.

Arnaldi's treatment of Terence's comedies resembles his procedure in Volume I—considerable attention to metrical matters, analyses of the structure of the plays and a consideration of their relation to the Greek originals, and many penetrating estimates of the plays themselves. He rightly stresses the novelty and the originality of the *Hecyra* (pp. 163 ff.) and, by viewing it as Terence's second play,

avoids the error of Norwood who based his theory of Terence's dramatic development in part upon his view of the *Hecyra* as Terence's fifth comedy. That there was a development seems undeniable: the first three comedies (*Andria*, *Hecyra*, and *Heauton*) are both less amusing and less conventional than the *Eunuchus*, *Phormio*, and *Adelphoe*, but the last three, on the contrary, reveal a far more successful handling of the "duality method" and contain some of the traditionally comic personages (*miles*, *parasitus*, *leno*); Terence was learning to compose comedies that combined greater artistry with broader comic appeal.² Both the *Hecyra* and the *Phormio* were adapted from Apollodorus, but the differences between the two are very striking; Arnaldi calls the *Hecyra* "la più sentimentale" of Terence's comedies, the *Phormio* "la più vivace, accanto all' *Eunuchus*" (p. 170), but he sees in both comedies a sense of justice and of truth which he ascribes to the Greek playwright.³

The author makes many other interesting points. The *Heauton* shows no evidence of *contaminatio* and in line 6 (*duplex quae ex argumento facta est simplici*) *facta* refers to the Greek original, not to Terence's play (p. 187; cf. pp. 122 f.); this is definitely preferable to Flickinger's view that *duplex* means two plays, one Greek, one Latin, but the verse can also be interpreted as meaning that the plot is double but nevertheless comes from a single Greek play—not from two originals as was the case with the *Andria*. Arnaldi points out many changes which Terence is known to have introduced into his comedies and states that "Terenzio, contaminatore di Menandro, è nettamente superiore a Menandro puro" (p. 195). The *Eunuchus* receives high praise for its vivacity, humor, and irony (pp. 201 f.), but the *Adelphoe* is Terence's masterpiece and surpasses the *Eunuchus* "per la profondità dei caratteri, la serietà dell' impostazione, la stessa sostanziosità dello spirito comico" (p. 204). Micio is the outstanding character of the comedy, and his dialogue with Aeschines (635-712) Arnaldi considers perhaps the finest scene in all Terence, a "stupenda scena—nel suo equilibrio di toni comici e sentimentali" (p. 210).

The short final chapter is less a description of Terence's artistry than a defense of Leo's views concerning Terence against those of Jachmann, whose polemic Arnaldi likens to Caesar's polemic against Cicero.⁴ He believes that in *vis* and *comica virtus* the Menandrian

² I discuss this development in a new book, *The Nature of Roman Comedy*, now being published by the Princeton University Press. This work is concerned chiefly with the comedies, like Arnaldi's two volumes, and unlike Beare's *The Roman Stage* (1950) which treats mainly of the history and staging of Roman drama; I am less interested in *contaminatio* and the reconstruction of the Greek originals than in the features of the Roman comedies (stage conventions, plot-structure, characters, moral tone, suspense and irony, humor in situation, character, and language, etc.).

³ P. 178; cf. n. 6, where Arnaldi suggests that the Greek original of Plautus' *Epidicus* was the work of Apollodorus.

⁴ Cf. p. 225; Arnaldi does not accept, incidentally, the belief of Herrmann, Ferrarino, and others that the famous *dimidiata Menander* epigram is also to be attributed to Cicero, and he explains the phrase as meaning that the Menander of the Terentian comedies gives an incomplete picture of the Greek dramatist.

originals did not differ much from the Terentian comedies (p. 226), but he is convinced that Terence was a creative artist, not a mechanical translator (pp. 221 f.), a dramatist who presented in a literary form the *urbanitas* of his circle (p. 223); one of Arnaldi's best summaries of Terence's qualities appears in his discussion of the *Andria*: "la sua capacità di creazione, il suo senso sobrio del comico e la profondità e delicatezza di sentimento" (p. 143).

Arnaldi's second volume has the weaknesses of the first volume, but to a less striking degree; Norwood's *The Art of Terence* and Flickinger's article on the prologues are cited,⁵ but Post, Rand, Frank, Harsh, and other scholars who have written much on Menander and Terence are ignored. Perhaps American books and journals were not available to the author, but it is surprising that there is no mention of Beare, Enk, Kuiper, and other European authorities. Arnaldi's treatment of Terence's life and originality might have profited therefrom and at least would have presented a more up-to-date picture of Terentian scholarship. But the two volumes combine to give to the reader a competent and useful discussion of early Roman drama and a stimulating and often valuable analysis of the twenty-six extant Roman comedies.

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Hérodote, Histoires, Livre VI. Texte établi et traduit par PH.-E.

LEGRAND. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1948.

Pp. 140.

In this volume of the Budé Herodotus Legrand maintains the high standard which he set when he published the first volume in 1932. No papyrus fragments have been found from Book VI and consequently there is no new textual information to be taken into account since the third edition of Hude; nevertheless Legrand offers some interesting variations from Hude's text and new solutions of several difficulties. Some of his changes in the text are the result of his attempt to regularize the dialect and there is not space to list these novelties here. But there are several new readings which may be discussed briefly.

In VI, 102 we read that the Persians after conquering Eretria and waiting a few days, sailed on to Attica *κατέργοντες τε πολλόν* (so Hude, following ABCP; DRSV have *κατεργάζοντες*). But "making haste" hardly describes what the Persians are doing, since they have just taken several days rest. Accordingly Dietsch suggested *κατοργέοντες* "superbientes," and Legrand improves this to *κατοργώντες* "tout bouillants." For the Herodotean use of this word he might perhaps have referred to the famous anecdote according to which Herodotus told the father of Thucydides ὦ Ὀλορε, ὄργῃ ἢ φύσει τοῦ νιού σου πρὸς μαθήματα (Marcellinus, *Vita Thuc.*, 54). Also new and interesting is the suggestion of a lacuna in 134, 2, in the description of the behaviour of Miltiades at Paros: τὸν δὲ διερχόμενον . . . ἐπὶ

⁵ Cf. pp. 157 f., where Thornton Wilder's *The Woman of Andros* is mentioned.

τὸν κολωνόν ("διερχόμενος doit être le débris d'un membre de phrase où il était dit que Miltiade avait atteint la colline en traversant une partie du προάστειον"). Less important and less convincing is his alteration of φέρει to φορέει in 61, 4 on the ground that φορέειν is used throughout the chapter to describe how the nurse carries the child to the temple of Helen. In 92, 1 Hude reads: ἐπεκαλέοντο τοὺς αὐτοὺς [οὓς] καὶ πρότερον (ABCP have οὓς, omitted by DRSV). Legrand reads τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς καὶ πρότερον, claiming this as his conjecture; but this reading was in fact adopted by Blakesley and by Stein, who credits it to Dobree. Other older emendations which he adopts and Hude rejected are Valekenaer's ἀγνοίη for ἀνοίη in 69, 5; van Herwerden's βουλομένων δὲ αὐτοῦ for βουλόμενον δὲ αὐτόν in 81; the commonsense διότι of Richards for the meaningless διὰ τό or διὰ τὰ of the MSS in 64, where Hude obelizes; and Hude's own tentative conjecture, which he did not admit into his text, of διέβαλλε for διέβαλε in 61, 1.

Legrand also adopts some of the readings of D which were cited for the first time in the apparatus of Hude's third edition, e. g. the aorist participle ἀράμενοι in 14, 2 where other MSS have the present participle. The aorist participle is certainly an improvement here—"having hoisted sail they sailed away." On the other hand in 44, 1 he reads Θεσίους οὐδὲ χεῖρας ἀνταειρομένων κατεστρέψαντο where all the MSS have ἀνταειραμένους, which is certainly defensible as a reading. In 73, 1 he adopts the reading of S, ὠρθώθη, in preference to the *difficilior lectio* of the other MSS ὠδώθη.

There is no introduction at the beginning of this book as the Ionian revolt was discussed in the previous volume, but after chapter 42 there is a discussion of some thirty pages devoted to the Greek expeditions of Darius, which includes an examination of the sources used by Herodotus for this part of his work. The translation is, as always, admirably lucid and its usefulness will not be confined to French students. Two of his notes may be singled out for mention: his suggestion that the "sleeve full of silver" on which Leotychides was found sitting during his expedition to Thessaly (72, 2) was really "une sorte de sac semblable à une manche étranglée aux deux bouts"; and his brief remark on the famous hoplite charge at Marathon (112, 3): "δρόμῳ. Il ne doit s'agir que d'un 'pas accéléré'."

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M. P. CHARLESWORTH. *The Lost Province or The Worth of Britain.* Cardiff, Univ. of Wales Press, 1949. Pp. vii + 89. (*Gregynog Lectures*, 1948.)

In his brief preface Professor Charlesworth says: "I have tried to set out why the Romans first conquered and afterwards remained in this island; then in what ways its occupation proved useful and profitable to them; finally what they have bequeathed to us. On this last topic I have ventured to stress some less familiar methods of approach, and if sometimes I may appear dogmatic I hope later to have fuller opportunity of justifying them." It is to be feared that

Professor Charlesworth's recent lamented death may have prevented this further treatment.

The lectures were delivered at Aberystwyth in March, 1948, and as was fitting there is a good deal about the Welsh language as well as about Welsh geography; for the latter there is a fine map of Roman Wales supplied by Dr. V. E. Nash-Williams. Charlesworth thinks that the Latin language of the Roman occupation made a strong impression on Welsh; he gives many words in modern Welsh which seem to derive directly from Latin.¹

There are four lectures, the first is called "The Years of Conquest." Before giving a historical outline the author asks a series of questions,—“Why did the Romans choose to incorporate this distant island in their Empire? Why, that once done, did they retain it for nigh on four hundred years? What did they gain from the occupation? And what have we gained or what did this island retain when the legions departed?”

The first question he endeavours to answer in the first lecture, beginning with the historical outline, and first Caesar's invasion. He thinks Caesar's chief object was the reputed wealth of Britain, but a geographical error also contributed. Caesar described the island as triangular, and the second side (the west) he said faced towards Spain; so Britain would be a link with the other provinces.

Britain served as a refuge for exiles from Gaul; also the disunity of the island made it seem an easier conquest. So Claudius decided on the invasion of 43 A. D., and at first the conquest proceeded very quickly. Camulodunum (Colchester) was made the capital. Charlesworth passes very lightly over the revolt of Boadicea and the destruction of Camulodunum (both unnamed!) in A. D. 61. Though the revolt was very formidable it was stamped out; and when Vespasian became Emperor he adopted a new "forward" policy, and the legions advanced to York and to Wales. Then in 77 came Agricola, to whose conquests full justice is done. He was, however, recalled by Domitian in 84, perhaps through jealousy.

The next great name is Hadrian, who came to Britain in 122. Just as he had given up some of Trajan's Eastern conquests so now he abandoned Scotland and built the Roman Wall from Newcastle to Bowness, "which even today in its ruins remains one of the most majestic abiding monuments of the past empire."

The second lecture is on "Romans and Britons," and begins with Septimius Severus, 192-211, and his great work in Britain. "This hard-headed ruler had decided that Britain was well worth keeping; he would never have expended this vast amount of energy, labour and money upon a non-paying proposition." Later Aurelian, 270-275, gave up Dacia and made the Danube the frontier. "But he did *not* abandon Britain. If we ask why, there can only be one answer: because Aurelian thought it of value."

Then came the time of the sea-raiders on the south and southeast coasts, and a line of forts was built along the Saxon shore, of which a sketch map is given. Constantine became Emperor at York in 306, and six years after that he started out to win Rome for himself.

Disasters came later, and Britain was deprived of the Roman

¹ See K. K. Jackson's article "On Some Romano-British Place-Names," *J. R. S.*, XXXVIII (1948), pp. 54-58.

legions. "Yet these Romanized Britons, though the west could do nothing for them, and the east had forgotten them, put up a splendid resistance. Think of the generations it took before Angles, Saxons and Jutes had thoroughly occupied England alone; Wales they never conquered."

The third lecture is headed "What Rome gained from Britain." "The comparatively mild climate of our country allowed Roman arms to penetrate further north than on the Continent.—The Roman Wall zone in England lies far to the north of any region on the Continent occupied by the legions."

Rome early began using Britain for recruiting auxiliaries. Charlesworth estimates that a total of 12,000 men was enrolled. It was also used as a "strategic reserve"; in times of danger some of the legionaries could be used for Germany or elsewhere. The British fleet was also of importance: under Agricola it circumnavigated Britain; inscriptions show that detachments from the fleet helped in building Hadrian's Wall.

The mineral wealth of the island was important, particularly lead and iron. Tin was worked early: then the mines were closed, but they were opened again in the third century. Cattle and sheep breeding was carried on in the large estates. "The Roman invasion had developed Britain into a rich and flourishing island." "Raiders made it their target because here was something worth raiding, cattle and sheep, cloth and hides, silver and lead and iron, a wealthy material civilization." "That was one of the reasons why the Romans clung to it. Some of the most experienced and wisest heads among the emperors—Vespasian, Hadrian, Severus, Aurelian, Diocletian, men not prone to act from motives of sentiment or of mere prestige—had decided to retain it; they had hard heads, they were good judges."

The fourth and final lecture is headed "What we have gained from the Roman occupation." To begin with there is the unification of the country, for the first time in history. Charlesworth stresses the effect on the language; modern Welsh still retains many words. "These new words for new things came over into Celtic, and have survived to this day as a lasting heritage." Roads are mentioned particularly, "many of our main roads are still built upon Roman foundations." "In time . . . a network of roads covered the whole island." A great variety of trees, fruits, vegetables, and flowers was brought in by the Romans.

"Even in the sixth and seventh centuries there remained both in Wales and in England the memory of the great and powerful civilization that could perform feats far beyond the resources of smaller kingdoms: there lingered the memory of a great tradition." Then and even later there could be seen the remains of walls and gates, bridges and buildings.

As will be seen from this summary Charlesworth sets the abiding results of the Roman occupation of Britain higher than the estimates of some other historians, but he ends on a sadder note. "Remember what was lost—the central organization and administration of the whole country broke down . . . as for the roads, they crumbled into tracks."

This volume, though so brief, is a valuable contribution to the study of Roman Britain. It is extremely well printed.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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